Opóźnienia w modelach społecznych dynamiki replikatorowej

• Authors: Robert Jankowski

Title variants

EN

Delays in Social Models of Replicator Dynamics

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

This paper discusses the impact of delayed information on the social models of replicator dynamic. Internal fixed point is here the optimal decision in the population. Examples and simulations confirm presented results. Here is described both the standard replicator dynamic and the modified model, which assumes that players imitate opponents taking strategies with a higher average payoff in the past. Moreover the model, in which each strategy has its own delay is presented

Keywords

PL

Badania operacyjne; Teoria gier

EN

Game theory; Operations research

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
• Journal: Studia Ekonomiczne
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 178
• Pages: 93-107

Contributors

author

Robert Jankowski

References

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Identifiers

ISSN

2083-8611