Zdecydowanie niższy udział krajów UE w eksporcie Litwy i Łotwy w porównaniu z innymi gospodarkami EŚW, to przede wszystkim wynik niewielkiego zaangażowania korporacji międzynarodowych w obu tych krajach. W efekcie Litwa i Łotwa pozostają na peryferiach globalnych łańcuchów wartości, które silnie wpłynęły na strukturę eksportu pozostałych krajów regionu (także Estonii[6]). Odzwierciedla to niski udział w eksporcie Litwy i Łotwy towarów klasyfikowanych jako maszyny i sprzęt transportowy (SITC 7). W 2012 r. ich udział w eksporcie obu tych krajów nie przekraczał 20%, podczas gdy w pozostałych krajach EŚW stanowiły one średnio ponad 45% wartości eksportu.

Z drugiej strony, w większości krajów EŚW spowolnienie eksportu, spowodowane kryzysem w strefie euro, silniej dotknęło kategorie związane z handlem wewnątrzkorporacyjnym (*intra-firm trade*). Wpłynęło to dodatkowo na zróżnicowanie dynamiki eksportu między krajami bałtyckimi a pozostałymi EŚW.

Wysoką dynamiką charakteryzował się w 2012 r. także eksport pogrążonej w głębokim kryzysie Grecji. Silny wzrost eksportu do krajów spoza Unii Europejskiej, w tym głównie do Turcji, związany był ze wzrostem sprzedaży produktów naftowych. Natomiast spadek greckiego eksportu do pozostałych krajów strefy euro należał w 2012 r. do najgłębszych w Unii. Na wysoką dynamikę eksportu Słowacji złożył się zarówno wyraźny wzrost sprzedaży do strefy euro (najwyższy spośród wszystkich krajów Unii) oraz do pozostałych krajów UE, jak i krajów trzecich. Słowacja, obok Wielkiej Brytanii, jako jedyny z czołowych producentów samochodów w UE zwiększyła ich eksport (wpływ na to miało wprowadzenie do produkcji nowych modeli samochodów).

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[1] Dane WTO wskazują, że w 2012 r. eksport Unii Europejskiej (łącznie *extra+intra*) wzrósł o 0,3% (po wzroście o 5,7% w 2011 r.). Natomiast import obniżył się o 2,0% (w 2011 r. wzrósł o 2,4%).

[2] W 2002 r. handel Unii Europejskiej (27 państw członkowskich) stanowił 40,6% światowego eksportu oraz 39,6% światowego importu.

[3] Kraje rozwinięte to Szwajcaria, Norwegia, Islandia, Australia, Nowa Zelandia, Japonia, Kanada i Stany Zjednoczone.

[4] Według szacunków Komisji Europejskiej.

[5] W 2012 r. import krajów b. ZSRR wzrósł realnie o 9,4%, a krajów bałtyckich (łącznie Estonia, Litwa i Łotwa) o 6,5%.

[6] Nieco inna jest struktura geograficzna eksportu Estonii. W 2012 r. 15% estońskiego eksportu trafiło na rynki krajów b. ZSRR i 14% na rynki dwóch pozostałych krajów bałtyckich, natomiast 52% do pozostałych krajów UE. Różnice występują także w strukturze towarowej eksportu. Produkty klasyfikowane jako maszyny i sprzęt transportowy (SITC 7) stanowiły w 2012 r. w Estonii 1/3 wartości eksportu ogółem.

■

GOSPODARKA I FINANSE

IS FRANCE'S ECONOMY A REAL DANGER FOR THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?

*Miklós Somai**

There is a growing concern among politicians, decision-makers and experts about France's poor economic performance and its possible effects on the Franco-German relationship, so far the main driving and accelerating force of the EU. Since the end of 2012, the French economy has been sliding into recession again. The number of unemployed has risen without interruption for the last more than two years and – against all electoral promises – deindustrialisation has even gained momentum since the beginning of Hollande's presidency. The country has to face major structural problems: low competitiveness, unsustainable welfare system, rigid labour market – long-standing weaknesses that the crisis has only revealed and amplified, and which result in shrinking export markets and huge and still increasing public debt. Being off track for too long, France runs the risk of losing more and more ground against Germany, which may cause important shifts in balance of forces within the European integration. The main aim of my paper is to display and analyse the state of the French economy and set out a detailed account of the first year of the Left in power in order to assess whether the above fears are justified.

Macroeconomic situation

At the turning of 2012/2013, the French economy experienced the second quarter of contraction, by definition, a technical recession. After having stalled in 2012, GDP growth is expected to contract slightly in 2013 (-0.1%)[1]. Measured in GDP per capita, the situation is even worse as the French population is growing by 0.5 per cent a year; so this indicator automatically decreases with a yearly GDP growth lower than 0.5 per cent. But what matters most to the people of France is their prospects on the labour market. In this context, things get

even worse as in the French economy productivity gains are approximately one per cent a year; so businesses are able to produce the same volume of goods with one per cent less employees. It implies that, taking into account the effects of both demographic pressure and productivity gains, the French GDP would have to increase by at least 1.5 per cent a year in order to boost employment. And it will be some time before it does…

Figure 1

Yearly GDP growth rate for the last 40 years



Source: Destatis, Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP), https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/VGR/Inlandsprodukt/Inlandsprodukt.html and Insee, Évolution du PIB en France, http://www.insee.fr.

When it comes to compare France with their peers, the first country that pops into one's head is Germany. As the latter undertook significant structural reforms, e.g. in its health care system and labour market, in relatively favourable economic situation of the early 2000s, the comparison covering the last few years only presents France being at a huge and growing disadvantage. But if one steps back and considers a longer series of data, it becomes evident that the two countries' economic performances are not so much different; for the last couple of decades, sometimes the one and sometimes the other could develop faster by turns of 12-13 years (See Figure 1). And much depends on the year chosen as the point of reference for comparison: as for the cumulative GDP growth, if it is 1995, France still has a tiny advantage over Germany; but if it happens to be the year 2005, a totally different picture is developing before our eyes: a growing handicap is taking shape on the side of France (See Figure 2).

Putting this GDP-growth matter into a larger context and comparing the performance of the five biggest economies of the EU, it can be clearly established that France is far from being in a worse position, and it ranks second after Germany at the moment (See Figure 3). More generally, for all important macroeconomic data, France ranks in the middle of the group of the five big European countries (See Figures 4-11). Naturally, with all these comparisons we do not intend to downplay the importance of the risks associated with French economy's weaknesses. Only, there is so much fuss about France's economic decline all over in the media that it seemed to be useful to put the whole thing into a larger context, both in space and time[2]

The scope of this paper does not allow a detailed critical review of each aspect of France's macroeconomic situation. For obtaining such reviews the reader has to resort to other studies (of which there is fortunately an increasing number) issued e.g. by institutions like the IMF or the European Commission[3]. Here, we will confine ourselves to the presentation of the evolution of the current account (see Figure 6), in order to explain the fundamental problem of France's declining economic competitiveness[4].

Since the year 2000, the current account balance has been on a downward trend; it turned into negative in 2006 and has on the whole deteriorated without interruption

Figure 2

Cumulative GDP growth since 1995 (left axis) and 2005 (right axis)



Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database.
Data for 2013 and 2014 are based on estimations.

Figure 3

Cumulative GDP growth since 2007



Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database.
Data for 2013 and 2014 are based on estimations.

Figures 4-11.

4. GDP, volumes – % change Q/Q-4



5. GDP per capita in PPS



6. Current acc. bal., % of GDP 3-year average



7. Shares of world exports, 5-year % change



8. Unemployment rate, 3-year average ILO



9. Non-consolidated private debt, % of GDP



10. General debt (Maastricht), % of GDP



11. Government deficit/surplus, % of GDP



Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database.
Data for 2013 and 2014 are based on estimations.

over the last 13 years to reach a record deficit of 1.9 per cent of GDP in 2012. The deficit was financed mainly by debt (i.e. by inflows of portfolio and other investments), whereby the country's net external debt increased to more than 36 per cent of GDP in 2011. What's more, France appears to have played an intermediary role before the euro crisis by receiving net inflows from non-EU and non-euro area creditors (e.g. of Japan, the US or the UK) and channelling them to euro area deficit countries. And even if French banks succeeded recently in considerably reducing their exposure to euro area periphery countries (with the notable exception of Italy, where it remains substantial), significant financial vulnerabilities stem from the banking sector's extensive cross-border linkages and exposure to wholesale funding.

The external deficit is widening by the borrowing needs of non-financial corporations and the government, while households and financial corporations continue to be net lenders to the economy.

As for the breakdown of the current balance, three of its four main components have shown a good level of stability for the last more than 15 years; trade in services and the income balance have always been positive, while current transfers have showed an increasingly negative balance (reflecting France's becoming one of the biggest net contributor to the EU budget as of 2002). But the main reason behind this long downward trend in the current account can unmistakably be found in the fourth component, i.e. the increasingly negative contribution of goods to the trade balance. Although the ever more expensive energy bill accounted for more than two-thirds of the merchandise trade deficit in 2011, the blame for the deterioration of net trade lays almost equally on each of the main category of goods: so, not only on fuel but also on intermediate, consumer and capital goods[5].

Competitiveness

Despite the fact that France remains one of Europe's top FDI destination (third for the stock of FDI at the end of 2012[6], also third for the number of FDI projects in general and first for the number of FDI projects in the industry in 2012[7]), all indicators converge on the conclusion that French industrial competitiveness has been declining for the last more than ten years at an accelerating rate[8]. Industrial sector's contribution to GDP (12.5% in 2011) is shrinking more rapidly than in several European concurrent countries like Italy (18.6%), Sweden (21.2%) or Germany (26.2%). The same is true for employment where the sector has lost over two million jobs in the last 30 years[9]. It is all the more worrisome each industrial job supports three or four jobs elsewhere[10]. The industrial decline can also be traced in long lasting and significant contraction of France's world market export shares (see Figure 7), even if the perspicacity is somewhat marred by divergent trends to be observed between goods and services, since France has recently gained some market shares in the latter[11].

When one tries to identify the causes behind France's poor industrial performance, first there is a temptation to fall into superficial information, fuelled by old prejudices and other unjustified opinions. And indeed, on the surface the geographic orientation may play a role: French exports appear to be more oriented toward the EU 27 and in particular the euro area and less toward the more dynamic markets of emerging countries (like the BRIC[12]) than the German or Italian ones. As a comparison, the share of the BRIC in 2011 was 6.1 per cent for French exports and 10.5 per cent for German exports. But, as total German exports being more than 2.6 times bigger than French ones, the ratio between their exports toward the BRIC is 1:4.5! Is it really what was surveyed by the Swiss Business School and published by The Daily Telegraph that out of 59 countries France has the most negative attitude both to globalisation and economic and social reform?[13]

One might get closer to understanding the causes of France industrial decline by examining the enterprise structure of the French industry or more generally that of the French economy. On one side, there are very large companies with strong positions in international markets, realising an increasing share of their turnover abroad. As a rule, France has as many big multinationals in the Fortune's Global 500 list as Germany has, and clearly more than Britain or the three countries of Italy, Spain and the Netherlands taken together (See Figure 12).

As for the average annual turnover, French multinationals are very close to their European peers (See Figure 13). On the other side, there are multitudes of micro and small enterprises which have serious difficulties growing into medium-sized companies. These famous medium-sized industrial businesses, able to play the innovation game, develop their products and thus remain competitive in the market at home as well as abroad, which make up the core of the industrial fabric both in Germany and Italy, are in France very insufficient in number. In order to reach the standards set by such European countries like Germany, Italy or even the United Kingdom, their number, standing at about 1,300 in the industry, should be doubled[14].

Among factors preventing small enterprises from becoming medium-sized ones, the so-called Gallois Report[15] mentions the shortage of equity capital and the abundance of legal and fiscal obstacles which, combined with the lure of gains of selling their start-ups to big corporations for large sums of money, can easily dissuade young entrepreneurs from taking the risks of growing. The relative absence of the medium-sized companies, this somewhat "dual" structure of the economy, weakens the incentives for cooperation among actors and results in damaging the solidarity within the industrial fabric. There is always a sense of mistrust when the difference in size between trading partners is too significant: small

Figure 12

Number of companies ranked on Fortune's Global 500 list by countries of Europe



Source: CNNMoneyFortune, Global 500, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/full_list/.

Figure 13

Number and average annual turnover of firms on Global 500 list of 2012 by countries



Source: CNNMoneyFortune, Global 500, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/full_list/.

enterprises are afraid of being exploited and dominated by big corporations, regardless of whether they are private or state-owned, domestic or foreign. But there is no confidence in cooperation on the other side, either: large multinationals are not inclined to award big contracts to small businesses which they consider to be unable to deliver in big quantity, good quality (close to zero PPM[16]) and just in time. As a consequence, delocalisation often concerns whole segments of industry in France, which not only creates a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other countries who can preserve the critical elements of the value chain (high-technology, assembly) within their territory, but also has a tremendous impact on employment.

Difficulty for SMEs in accessing export markets, inability of manufacturers to move up the value-added chain, weak integration between fundamental research and industrial R&D, inadequate relationship between business and education, not forgetting labour market rigidities and segmentation (between CDI and CDD workers), legal and judicial uncertainty of layoffs, low activity rates for both young and elderly people, as well as relative high price of labour (especially in non-tradable services[17]), all these are key factors which represent and/or contribute to structural weaknesses in the French industrial sector[18].

But one must not forget that for all the above symptoms France (or the French industry) is far from being a unique case. Almost all its peers have to face very similar problems. If some country stands out as an exception, it is undoubtedly Germany, which, thanks to the significant reforms undertaken in the early 2000s, managed not only to stabilise its public finances but also to achieve a considerable success in fighting unemployment. It is very typical that no other EU member state was able to reduce youth unemployment during the crisis but Germany: between 2008 and 2012, its youth unemployment rate went down from 10.8 to 8.2 per cent, so by almost a quarter[19].

Although there is a common understanding that the structural weaknesses of the French economy was only revealed and amplified by the crisis, there is another element, too, whose impact was at least as great in this process of revelation and amplification as that of the crisis. This other element is called globalisation which has not ceased to accelerate in the past ten-fifteen years and which entails the gradual dismantling of barriers to free movements of people and capital, the ever-increasing level of liberalisation of trade and services, and among other things the admission of China to the WTO in 2001, since when France's trade balance in goods began to go into chronic deficit. Except for the high-technology product category (e.g. pharmaceuticals and aerospace), where France benefited from its RCA[20] to keep its world market share stable (at 5-6%), for all other categories, notably low- and medium/low-technology products, the growing competition of the emerging countries combined with the above-mentioned structural weaknesses resulted in declining market shares, narrowing profit margins, bankruptcies and massive layoffs. If German companies are doing so much better in maintaining or even increasing their market share, it is not only because they squeezed labour costs before the crisis[21], but also or mainly because they were able to move up in the value chain, shift towards more sophisticated products, which in turn allowed them to improve their profit margin, enabling them to invest into technology and human resources, thus innovation. Germany concentrates more and more on high- and medium/high-technology products, a way to overcome the crisis also for France.

Concrete measures of the left-wing power to restore France's competitiveness

France has been under the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) of the European Commission since February 2009. With 56.5 per cent of GDP spent by the public as an average in the period of 2009-2012, the country ranks second in the EU after Denmark (58.3%), but far ahead of Germany (46.6%), Spain (46.2%) or even the UK (49.7%) or Italy (50.7%)[22]. The public debt is expected to keep growing from 90.2 per cent of GDP to 96.2 per cent in 2014. Although France has made significant efforts to contain its fiscal deficit, considering the impact that further consolidation would have on its economic growth, the Commission has recently proposed an additional delay of two years for France to put an end to the EDP by 2015 at the latest[23].

So, the new socialist government, in power since May 2012, had from the beginning to face the double challenge of putting public finances in order and enhance economic competitiveness. In order to accommodate the left-wing electorate, the government first delivered a series of symbolic measures like the reduction of minimum retirement age from 62 to 60 for those who started to work very early and can validate their 40 years of contribution period (15% of those who retire each year); the pushing up of the minimum wage by a symbolic 2 per cent; the boosting of support for low-income families on schooling; a rent freeze for 36 months on new contracts introduced in some urban areas; a 30 per cent pay cut for president and ministers; and new income tax rates of 45 and 75 per cent to be applied above €150,000 and €1million respectively[24].

However symbolic, the measures adopted and promised to be adopted during first couple of months of the Left in the power alarmed both business circles and scientists/counsellors of international institutions. They developed insecurities at home and a very bad image of France abroad, as if something like a climate of "anti-enterprises", "anti-managers" or even "anti-capitalism" prevailed in the country[25]. An extraordinary pressure had been building from chief executives of big corporations to push the government to reduce public spending and

taxes, in order to restore companies' margins and investment capacities[26].

Amid the waves of discontent, the government launched two important initiatives aimed at improving the functioning of the economy: first, they mandated social partners (employers and employees) to negotiate a comprehensive reform of the labour market; second, they commissioned the already mentioned Gallois Report. Based on a series of recommendations of the latter, the government decided in November 2012 upon a package of 35 concrete measures (the so-called National Pact for Growth, Competitiveness and Employment[27]). The package was supposed to create a "competitiveness shock", focusing on lowering taxes and business costs, improving the access to effective and tailoring funding for the SMEs, giving greater incentives and support for innovation, and guaranteeing a simpler and more stable regulatory, administrative and tax environment. The most far-reaching measure, as intended to be by the government, is a tax credit to be calculated in proportion to companies' gross payroll costs (4 per cent in 2013, and 6 per cent in 2014 and onward), excluding salaries in excess of 2.5 times the minimum wage.

This measure, which is supposed to lower the labour cost for the business sector by a yearly €20 billion (instead of €30 billion recommended by the Gallois Report), asks for at least two comments. First, as it will partly be financed through additional tax revenues, of which €7 billion from "adjustments" applied to VAT rates, it resembles very much to the so-called social VAT, proposed under and even enacted by the outgoing right-wing power (and later cancelled by the actual one), and consisting of increasing the normal VAT-rate to finance a decrease in social security contribution paid by companies. This resemblance is a proof in itself of how narrow is the path of the economic policy the French government, let they be leftist or rightist in their political orientation, have to follow. As for the second comment, it is connected with that the tax credit is limited to wages up to 2.5 times the SMIC[28]. As in the innovative part of the economy (including much of the manufacturing) wages are rarely below this limit, the measure openly aims to intervene in those low-technology segments of the industry where (as presented above) French companies are facing the fiercest competition from low-wage emerging countries. For some analysts, accusing the government of short-termism, the money earmarked to this measure of defence, could be better and much more efficiently spent on the side of modernisation, the moving up the value-added chain…

Concerning the other initiative of the government on the labour market reform, an agreement (*Accord national interprofessionel sur la compétitivité et la sécurisation de l'emploi*, ANI[29]) was signed in January 2013 between the social partners. The ANI lays the basis of growing flexibility for the employers, involving growing internal mobility, flexible working time, more easily enforceable redundancy plans, in exchange for growing security for employees, like the mandatory contributions of firms to their private health insurance, extended unemployment benefits, while short-term contracts will be taxed more heavily, thus making permanent contract more attractive to the employers. The agreement aims at clarifying and simplifying the process of how to deal with redundancy problems, but also at eliminating legal uncertainty regarding the breach of job contracts. Although the ANI was not signed by all trade unions (the more radical CGT and FO having refused to sign the deal), it could be considered a great victory for President Hollande and his government, as it was the outcome of compromise, reached within a period of little more than four months of social dialogue. It was a victory for this sort of Hollande's method of slow consensus-building. The agreement seems to be good for both employees, by boosting their career security, and employers, by enhancing their ability to adjust to the business cycle.

Apart from the above two big issues (i.e. competitiveness and labour market reform), important moves are under consideration in order preserve the French social model for the next generations. These concern, among others, child benefits, unemployment and pension systems. Without prejudging the outcome of all these ongoing reforms, it is clear that regressive transfers should be applied above a certain level of income, like in the UK where there is more means-tested welfare system[30]. As for the pension reform, a comprehensive report has recently been tabled before the government in order to foster the public debate in this field[31]. In it, three orientations had been identified: first, the pension system will have to be balanced by 2020, as there is a necessity for it to contribute to restoring the country's public finances and international credibility; second, this effort must be fairly distributed among actors and generations, which means that even those who are already retired will have to take their share of the burden; third, the pension should fully be linked to the work, so it is dependent on the time spent at work but also on working conditions.

Conclusions

The world's fifth economic power and trader, world sixth stock of FDI at home, world's third stock of FDI abroad[32], France is among the leading industrial economies in lots of sectors (aerospace, railways, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, luxury goods, power generation, agriculture, defence, insurance, hospitality, etc.) and has a lot of other assets like growing population, excellent public services, infrastructures, healthcare and education system (with world-class universities like Polytechnique and HEC business school), not speaking of its enviable lifestyle, countryside, climate, the promotion of culture, literature, intellectual debate…

The economic and financial crisis together with the ever-increasing globalisation revealed and amplified the country's structural weaknesses (including unsustainable

welfare system, rigid labour market), and led simultaneously to enormous unbalances in the public finances and to gradual loss of competitiveness relative to some of its main trading partners. With this paper, I tried to demonstrate that these problems are not problems of France alone and the country is already on the way of correcting the imbalances. When criticising or evaluating the pace of reforms, it also should be kept in mind that the main challenge for the whole adjustment strategy is how to pursue consolidation and regain efficiency while preserving both market confidence in French policies and the benefits of France's social model and … stability.

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[1] European Commission, *Assessment of the 2013 national reform programme and stability programme for France*, Commission staff working document – Brussels, 10.4.2013 SWD(2013) 117 final, p. 3.

[2] See e.g. Szu Ping Chan, *France risks being left behind by periphery if it does not reform* – The Telegraph, 4 June 2013 or 'The Economist', *France and the euro – The time-bomb at the heart of Europe – Why France could become the biggest danger to Europe's single currency*, November 17th, 2012.

[3] See: e.g. IMF, *France 2012 Article IV Consultation* – IMF Country Report No. 12/342, December 2012 or European Commission: *In-depth review for France*, Commission staff working document – Brussels, 29.5.2013 SWD(2013) 360 final.

[4] There is no common understanding among economists on whether current account balances are a good indicator for assessing competitiveness in general and in the Euro Zone in particular. However, as a three-year backward moving average of the current account balance (as percent of GDP) is mentioned at the first place among the headline indicators of the European Commission's Scoreboard, a list of eleven indicators covering the major sources of macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness losses and being part of the early warning system of the so-called Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, it seemed to be a forgivable simplification to use the current account as a tool for demonstration of France's competitiveness decline (See: European Commission, MIP Scoreboard, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/mip_scoreboard/index_en.htm) What's more, in the case of France, current accounts reflected net exports for more than 80 per cent on average for the last five years (2008-2012), which brings us even closer to France's export capacity and competitiveness (See: World Bank, *Current account balance and Net trade in goods and services* – http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.CD, http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=net%20exports&language=EN).

[5] See Graph 2 in European Commission, *In-depth review for France,* Commission staff working document – Brussels, 29.5.2013 SWD(2013) 360 final, p. 7.

[6] CIA, *Stock of direct foreign investment at home*.

[7] Ernst & Young, *2013 European attractiveness survey,* http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/Business-environment/2013-European-attractiveness-survey---Investment-varies-across-Europe.

[8] While FDI flows fell sharply around the entire world since the beginning of the global financial crisis, France, due to its high-quality infrastructure, a skilled and productive workforce and other factors, remained attractive as an investment location: its two most successful years of the last decade were 2010 and 2011, when 782 and 698 foreign entities chose to invest in job creating activities in the country (See: French Ministry for the Economy and Finance et al (2012), p. 6 and p. 69).

[9] L. Gallois , C. Lubin, P.E. Thiard, *Pacte pour la compétitivité de l'industrie française – gouvernement*.fr, 5 novembre 2012 – http://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/fichiers_joints/rapport_de_louis_gallois_sur_la_competitivite_0.pdf p. 9.

[10] Ibidem, p. 5 footnote number 2.

[11] See Graphs 6 and 7 in European Commission, *In-depth review for France*, op. cit., p. 11.

[12] Brazil, Russia, India and China.

[13] J. Warner, *France says 'non' to globalisation*, 'The Daily Telegraph', May 23rd, 2013.

[14] Gallois et al., *Pacte pour la compétitivité de l'industrie française,* op. cit., p. 13.

[15] Commissioned by the government from L. Gallois, a leading business executive (former CEO of EADS), the report, released in November 2012, identifies the sources of competitiveness loss and related corrective actions.

[16] PPM = Parts Per Million. An objective of having zero defective parts in a batch of one million parts.

[17] Although competition in services has become stronger, plenty of sheltered sectors remain (including the retail sector, network industries, but also regulated professions like taxis, health care or notaries) where hourly cost of labour appears to be particularly high in France (with 20-90% above its peers). (See: European Commission (2013b): *In-depth review for France*, p. 23.

[18] See IMF, *France 2012 Article IV Consultation,* p. 19-21; European Commission , *In-depth review for France*, op. cit. p. 14-16; Gallois et al, *Pacte pour la compétitivité de l'industrie française,* op.cit., p. 13-14.

[19] See ILO, *Global Employment Trends for Youth 2013: A generation at risk*: A generation at risk – International Labour Office – Geneva: ILO 2013, ISBN 978-92-2-127484-1 – http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_212423.pdf, figure 5 on p. 11 and p. 82.

[20] The indicator of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) was introduced by Béla Balassa in 1965 for identifying country's exports strengths and weaknesses. It measures the gap between the actual trade balance for a particular product and a theoretical situation when each product would contribute to the overall trade balance according to its weight in a country's total trade. (See: Fortes, *Export specialization of France and the four other leading countries of the European Union between 1990 and 2009*, 'Trésor-Economics', No. 98, February 2012).

[21] German competitiveness was restored partly by the wage-restraint policy implemented in the 2000s. Real wages stagnated or deflated between 2000 and 2007. See: European Commission, *In-depth review for France,* op. cit., p. 22 and Graph 23, p. 23.

[22] See: Eurostat, *Government revenue, expenditures and main aggregates* – http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=gov_a_main&lang=en.

[23] Europa.eu, *Commission takes steps under the Excessive Deficit Procedure*, Brussels, 29 May 2013 – http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-463_en.htm.

[24] The rate of 75% was rejected by the Constitutional Council in its decision No. 2012-662 DC on 29 December 2012 (See: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2012/2012-662-dc/decision-n-2012-662-dc-du-29-decembre-2012.135500.html).

[25] See: Van Renterghem (2013), *Au chevet de la marque France* (At the bedside of the brand France), "Le Monde" 19-20 May 2013, p. 20-21.

[26] See: C. Matlack, *French CEOs: 'Help!'* – "Bloomberg Businessweek", November 14, 2012, reporting on the open letter signed by the CEOs of virtually every major French company.

[27] See: France's Gouvernement, *Pacte national pour la croissance, la compétitivité et l'emploi* (National Pact for Growth, Competitiveness and Employment) – http://www.economie.gouv.fr/ma-competitivite/pacte-national-croissance-competitivite-emploi.

[28] Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance = Legal minimum wage in France.

[29] National Interprofessional Agreement on competitiveness and job security (See: France's Government, *Le point sur l'Accord sur la sécurisation de l'emploi* or CFDT, Accord National Interprofessionel du 11 janvier 2013 pour un nouveau modèle économique et social au service de la compétitivité des enterprises et de la sécurisation de l'emploi et des parcours professionels des salariés – http://www.cfdt.fr/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-01/ani_du_11_janvier.pdf.

[30] R. Thillaye, *François Hollande After One Year – The Silent Reformer or Lost in Reform?* – Policy Network, 1 May 2013, p. 11.

[31] See: Y. Moreau, *Nos retraites demain: équilibre financier et justice* – Rapport au Premier minister, gouvernement.fr, 2013, juin 2013.

[32] CIA, The World Factbook, /Stock of direct foreign investment – at home/, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2198rank.html ; /Stock of direct foreign investment – abroad/, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2199rank.html, *Stock of direct foreign investment at home and abroad and WTO,* International Trade Statistics 2012, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2012_eits2012_e.pdf.

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POLITYKA KONKURENCJI

KONCEPCJA KRAJOWEJ POMOCY REGIONALNEJ W LATACH 2014-2020

*Adam. A. Ambroziak**

Kończąca się perspektywa finansowa 2007-2013 i rozpoczynające się wieloletnie ramy finansowe 2014-2020, konieczność wsparcia realizacji strategii „Europa 2020" oraz negatywne konsekwencje kryzysu gospodarczego ostatnich lat sprawiły, że Komisja Europejska musiała zmodyfikować dotychczasowe podstawy prawne udzielania pomocy publicznej w państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej. Na efekty tego procesu wpływają zarówno interwencjonistyczne działania państw członkowskich w związku z kryzysem gospodarczym, coraz większe środki przekazywane przez agendy rządowe za pośrednictwem funduszy europejskich do przedsiębiorców, a jednocześnie narastające problemy z utrzymaniem dyscypliny finansów publicznych w państwach Unii. Przepisy regulujące pomoc regionalną stanowią podstawę określania wtórnych, wobec regulacji regionalnych, zasad udzielania wsparcia na inne cele – najczęściej horyzontalne, takie jak ochrona środowiska przyrodniczego, zatrudnienie, szkolenia, badania, rozwój oraz innowacyjność.

W artykule, pierwszym w serii poświęconej tej tematyce, przedstawiono zmiany kryteriów oceny pomocy regionalnej w latach 2014-2020 w państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej. W kolejnym artykule zostaną omówione szczegółowo zasady klasyfikacji regionów do objęcia tym rodzajem wsparcia oraz zróżnicowanie maksymalnych pułapów dozwolonej pomocy w regionach. Trzeci z artykułów zostanie poświęcony zmianie mapy krajowej pomocy regionalnej Polsce i konsekwencji dla polskich województw i podregionów.

Konieczność przyjęcia nowych wytycznych na lata 2014-2020

W wytycznych w sprawie krajowej pomocy regionalnej na lata 2007-2013[1] Komisja Europejska zapowiedziała, że w każdej chwili może podjąć decyzję o przeglądzie lub zmianie przepisów, jeśli okaże się to konieczne z przyczyn związanych z polityką konkurencji bądź ze względu na potrzebę uwzględnienia innych dziedzin polityki wspólnotowej i zobowiązań międzynarodowych[2]. W maju 2012 r., realizując te zamierzenia, Komisja przyjęła Komunikat w sprawie unowocześnienia unijnej polityki w dziedzinie pomocy państwa[3]. Tytuł wskazuje, choć w języku polskim niejednoznacznie[4], na konieczność dostosowania zasad udzielania pomocy publicznej do nowych warunków gospodarczych. Ponieważ większość środków z funduszy europejskich trafia do przedsiębiorców w formie pomocy publicznej, można domyślać się, że właśnie nowe wieloletnie ramy finansowe na lata 2014-2020 powinny być główną przesłanką zmian prawa UE w tym zakresie. Tak bowiem było siedem lata temu[5], gdy w czerwcu 2005 r. Komisja Europejska przyjęła *„Plan działań w zakresie pomocy państwa. Mniejsza i lepiej ukierunkowana pomoc państwa: mapa drogowa reformy pomocy państwa na lata 2005-2009"*[6]. Zawierał on zasady, kryteria i główne propozycje zmian warunków udzielania pomocy publicznej, mających za cel zwiększenie spójności regionalnej i społecznej, poprawę konkurencyjności przemysłu UE, tworzenie stałych miejsc pracy i podwyższenie jakości usług publicznych. Mimo że pomoc nie powinna być głównym narzędziem wychodzenia z trudności gospodarczych, z jakimi Unia Europejska musiała się zmierzyć w latach 2008-2010, zaczęła być tak traktowana przez większość państw członkowskich UE w trakcie obecnej debaty nad wytycznymi na lata 2014-2020.