2016 | 1 (9) | 65-79
Article title

Konsensus waszyngtoński a doświadczenia Indonezji i Malezji w trakcie azjatyckiego kryzysu finansowego z 1997 roku

Title variants
The Washighton Concensus and the experience of Malaysia and Indonesia during the Asian Financial Crisis
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The purpose of this article is to present the impact of Washington Consensus principles for selected Southeast Asian countries – Malaysia and Indonesia and their struggle during Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Government’s universal issue, particularly in developing countries, is the ability to find a range of government market regulations to ensure fast economic development and social wealth. The author presents that an idea of the government participation is contained between two opposite concepts. The first idea claims that the government should be completely eliminated. The second, one that the government intervention is necessary to revise the market failures. Initially, the Washington Consensus principles were based on laissez-faire and neoliberal solutions. According to postulates prepared by J. Williamson, the Washington Consensus principles originally anticipated e.g. financial discipline, economy and trade liberalization, privatization, open for FDIs or deregulation. Proposed laissez-faire reforms were supposed to to constrict the role of government and build the functioning of economy upon a market mechanism.. Representatives of Bretton Woods organisations e.g. International Monetary Fund or The World Bank, followed this way to achieve the goals of the Washington Consensus. Due to the consensus political effectiveness, the postulates were implemented in many countries in Latin America or East Asia, for instance in Indonesia. To this analysis the author selected two countries from the region, both before the 1997 crisis, recording the impressive economic growth. During the crisis the governments of both countries decided to choose a completely different weapon to fight against the economic chaos. Jakarta, surprised by the economic collapse scale, which during its first phase had “hurt” the country, adopted the IMF recommendations almost indiscriminately. By contrast, Malaysian government adopted alternative strategy and implement own crisis management tools. They were based on e.g. capital control or an intensive role of the government in the reduction of socio-economic loses, which were aftermath of the crisis. The author based on works of many independent economists. It supposed to form the objective opinion about decisions made by particular governments. Additionally, to compare outlined thesis, author’s conclusions were based on economic data and indicators. The data illustrate the long term effects which were being caused by the crisis and reforms implemented by the particular countries governments. Conclusions that can be extrapolated from the presented paper, argue that Malaysia decision of taking own alternative way to fight against the economic breakdown was right. This can be clearly seen by comparing the 1997 crisis effects in Malaysia and Indonesia. Government in Jakarta, despite the financial and advisory support from IMF, was dealing worse during the economic collapse and after it. The results of the research indicate defeat of neoliberal ideas in the developing countries economy and the significant role of the government and effective institution in market mechanism optimization.
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