All Properties are Divine or God Exists - The Sacred Thesis and its Ontological Argument

• Authors: Bjørdal Frode Alfson
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

A metaphysical system engendered by a third order quantified modal logic S5 plus impredicative comprehension principles is used to isolate a third order predicate D, and by being able to impredicatively take a second order predicate G to hold of an individual just if the individual necessarily has all second order properties which are D we in Section 2 derive the thesis (40) that all properties are D or some individual is G. In Section 3 theorems 1 to 3 suggest a sufficient kinship to Gödelian ontological arguments so as to think of thesis (40) in terms of divine property and Godly being; divine replaces positive with Gödel and others. Thesis (40), the sacred thesis, supports the ontological argument that God exists because some property is not divine. In Section 4 a fixed point analysis is used as diagnosis so that atheists may settle for the minimal fixed point. Theorem 3 shows it consistent to postulate theistic fixed points, and a monotheistic result follows if one assumes theism and that it is divine to be identical with a deity. Theorem 4 (the Monotheorem) states that if Gg and it is divine to be identical with g, then necessarily all objects which are G are identical with g. The impredicative origin of D suggests weakened Gaunilo-like objections that offer related theses for other second order properties and their associated diverse presumptive individual bearers. Nevertheless, in the last section we finesse these Gaunilo-like objections by adopting what we call an apathiatheistic opinion which suggest that the best concepts `God’ allow thorough indifference as to whether God exists or not.

Keywords

EN

modal logic; ontological argument; Gödel; higher order logic; philosophy of religion; theology

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 329-350

Dates

published

2018-09-15

Contributors

author

Bjørdal Frode Alfson

• University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
• Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte Filosofiseksjonen ved IFIKK; Programa de pós-graduaçao em filosofia, Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil

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