A Generalisation of a Refutation-related Method in Paraconsistent Logics

• Authors: Trybus Adam
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This article describes a refutation method of proving maximality of three-valued paraconsistent logics. After outlining the philosophical background related to paraconsistent logics and the refutation approach to modern logic, we briefly describe how these two areas meet in the case of maximal paraconsistent logics. We focus on a method of proving maximality introduced in [34] and [37] that has the benefit of being simple and effective. We show how the method works on a number of examples, thus emphasising the fact that it provides a unifying approach to the search for maximal paraconsistent logics. Finally, we show how the method can be generalised to cover a wide range of paraconsistent logics. We also conduct a small experimental setting that confirms the theoretical results.

Keywords

EN

paraconsistency; refutation; maximality

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 235-261

Dates

published

2018-06-15

Contributors

author

Trybus Adam

• Institute of Philosophy The University of Zielona Góra, Poland

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