PL EN


2014 | 62 | 2 | 115-132
Article title

Is “The Presumption of Atheism” in Fact a Neutral Procedure? A Critical Examination of Antony Flew’s Position

Authors
Content
Title variants
PL
Czy „domniemanie ateizmu” jest faktycznie neutralną procedurą? Krytyczna analiza stanowiska Anthony’ego Flew
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
This article examines the concept of “The Presumption of Atheism” by Antony Flew. Flew claims that at the beginning of a debate on the existence of God we should adopt a standpoint of atheism and the opus of proof lies on the theists. I question different requirements that Flew puts on the representatives of theism and atheism. In responding, I raise an epistemological issue concerning how strong evidence for a particular belief should be in order for one to hold that belief. I claim that this depends on a subject’s circumstances and on his or her individual conditions. By means of these deliberations I try to reveal how various persons could reasonably demand from a theistic belief a different degree of probability than they do from an atheistic one. This shows, I think, that Flew’s procedure does not have to be rational for others, although it could be in his own case.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest koncepcja “domniemania ateizmu” Antony’ego Flew. Flew twierdzi, iż w punkcie wyjścia debaty na temat istnienia Boga powinniśmy przyjąć stanowisko ateizmu a ciężar dowodu spoczywa na teście. W artykule kwestionuję różne wymagania stawiane przez Flew reprezentantom teizmu i ateizmu. Odpowiadając na propozycję Flew, analizuję problem epistemologiczny, jak silne świadectwa na rzecz danego przekonania są potrzebne, by podmiot przyjął to przekonanie. Twierdzę, iż zależne jest to od okoliczności, w jakich znajduje się dana osoba i jej indywidualnych uwarunkowań. Za pomocą tych analiz staram się wskazać, w jaki sposób różne osoby mogą racjonalnie wymagać od przekonania teistycznego innego stopnia prawdopodobieństwa niż od przekonania ateistycznego. Pokazuje to, jak sądzę, iż propozycja Flew nie musi być racjonalna dla innych osób, choć może być taką dla samego Flew.
Year
Volume
62
Issue
2
Pages
115-132
Physical description
Contributors
author
References
  • Clifford, William Kingdon. “The Ethics of Belief.” In Lectures and Essays, edited by Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock, 177–211. London: Macmillan and Co., 1879.
  • Evans, Donald. “A Reply to Flew’s The Presumption of Atheism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1) (1972): 47–50.
  • Feldman, Richard, and Earl Conee. “Evidentialism.” Philosophical Studies 48 (1985): 15–34.
  • Flew, Anthony (with Roy Abraham Varghese). There is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind. New York: HarperOne 2007 [Polish translation: Anthony Flew. Bóg istnieje. Wyznanie ateisty, trans. Robert Pucek. Warszawa: Wyd. Fronda, 2010].
  • Flew, Anthony. “The Presumption of Atheism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1) (1972): 29–46.
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  • Moser, Paul K. The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2009.
  • Pace, Michael. “The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe’.” Noûs 45 (2011): 239–268.
  • Plantinga, Alvin. “Reason and belief in God.” In Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 16–93. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.
  • Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
  • Schellenberg, John L. The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007.
  • Swinburne, Richard. Epistemic justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
  • Swinburne, Richard. Faith and Reason. 2 nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • Van Inwagen, Peter. “Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis?” In God and the Ethics of Belief. New Essays in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell, 131–149. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
ISSN
0035-7685
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-2bbe4e32-aa34-4522-af12-14d17c6b7d87
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