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2017 | 2(8) | 5–26
Article title

Sovereign Debt Restructurings in Belize: Debt Sustainability and Financial Stability Aspects

Content
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Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
This paper examines the causes, processes, and outcomes of the two Belize sovereign debt restructurings in 2006–07 and in 2012–13, which occurred outside an IMF-supported program. It finds that the motivation for the two debt restructurings differed, as the former was driven by external liquidity concerns while the latter was motivated by a substantial increase in the coupon rates and future fi scal solvency concerns. Despite differential treatment between residents and non-residents, both 2006–07 and 2012–13 debt exchanges were executed through collaborative engagement, due in part to the existence of a broad-based creditor committee and the authorities’ effective communication strategy. However, while providing temporary liquidity relief, neither of the debt restructurings properly addressed long-term debt sustainability concerns. Going forward, the success of the 2012–13 debt restructuring will still depend on the country’s ability to strengthen fi scal efforts and the public debt management framework.
Year
Issue
Pages
5–26
Physical description
Dates
online
2017-10-10
Contributors
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
ISSN
/2353-6845
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-2bfe1ed2-e7bb-4be5-a244-ef2a60ded389
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