2014 | XCI (91)/2 | 155-173
Article title

System wynagradzania menedżerów jako kluczowy czynnik determinujący politykę zarządzania ryzykiem banku. Studium przypadku Lehman Brothers Holding

Title variants
Executive compensation system as a key factor determining bank risk management policy: The Lehman Brothers case study
Languages of publication
The article presents an analysis of the importance of the executive compensation system’s structure for the bank risk management policy. The case of Lehman Brothers proves that the construction of remuneration schemes for the bank executives should require the specific problems arising from the Agency Theory. The level of payment must be associated with long-term objectives and the strategy of sustainable growth. To achieve that it is necessary to formulate new guidelines and rules dedicated to the banking sector. It turns out that current forms of managers’ participation in the ownership do not provide sufficient protection against the so-called moral hazard. Recent studies show that managers are in fact rewarded for winning highly levered bets on the value of banks’ assets. While in the case of losing they make only a kind of ‘paper losses’.
Physical description
  • Katedra Ekonomii Instytucjonalnej, Uniwersytet Łódzki
  • Akty prawne:
  • Dyrektywa Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2010/76/UE z 24 listopada 2010 r. w sprawie zmiany Dyrektyw 2006/48/WE oraz 2006/49/WE w zakresie wymogów kapitałowych dotyczących portfela handlowego i resekurytyzacji oraz przeglądu nadzorczego polityki wynagrodzeń, Dz.U. UE, Nr L 329/3 z dn. 14.12.2010 r.
  • Zalecenie Komisji z dnia 30 kwietnia 2009 r. w sprawie polityki wynagrodzeń w sektorze usług finansowych (2009/384/WE), Dz.U. UE, Nr L 120/22 z dn. 15.05.2009 r.
  • Opracowania:
  • Acharya V., Richardson M., Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey 2009.
  • Bannier C.E., Feess E., Packham N., Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-taking in the Banking Industry, Review of Finance Advance Access 2012/27.
  • Bebchuk L.A., Cohen A., Spamann H., The wages of failure: Executive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 657.
  • Bebchuk L.A., Spamann H., Regulating Bankers’ Pay, Discussion Paper No. 641, Harvard Law School, Cambridge 2010.
  • Fahlenbrach R., Stulz R., Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, Fisher College of Business Working Paper Series, August 2010.
  • Fried J.M., Shilon N., The Dodd-Frank Clawback And The Problem Of Excess Pay, The Corporate Board January/February 2012.
  • Grundfest J., What’s Needed is Uncommon Wisdom, N.Y. Times Dealbook Dialogue, October 6, 2009.
  • Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 1976/3/4.
  • Masiukiewicz P., Hazard moralny a systemy motywacji w bankowości, Prakseologia 2011/151.
  • Sharma K., Financial sector compensation and excess risk-taking – a consideration of the issues and policy lessons, DESA Working Paper 2012/115.
  • Urbanek P., Nadzór korporacyjny a wynagrodzenia menedżerów, Wyd. UŁ, Łódź 2005.
  • Wielopolska A., Sąd nad ustawą Dodda-Franka, Obserwator Finansowy 2.10.2012 r.
  • Dokumenty:
  • Lehman Brothers, Proxy Statement, March 5, 2008.
  • United States Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C. 20549 Schedule 14a Proxy Statement Pursuant To Section 14(A) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934, Lehman Brothers Holding Inc, March 2008.
  • Strony internetowe:
  •; stan na dzień 19.02.2014 r.
  •; stan na dzień 19.02.2014 r.
  •; stan na dzień 19.02.2014 r.
  • Kirkpatrick G., Corporate Governance Lessons from the financial crisis, OECD, 11.02.2009 r.,; stan na dzień 19.02.2014 r.
Document Type
Publication order reference
YADDA identifier
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