

Marek Świerczek

Intelligence infiltration of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Soviet intelligence

Introduction

In 2009 a set of documents by L.F. Sockow¹, entitled *Секреты польской политики. Сборник документов* was issued in Moscow. It contained selected materials from the SVR archive (Служба Внешней Разведки Российской Федерации, СВР²) that come from the INO GUGB NKVD (Иностранный отдел Главного управления государственной безопасности Народного комиссариата внутренних дел СССР, INO GUGB NKVD³) and that referred to the foreign politics of the Second Republic of Poland 1935–1945. Both the editor of the work, i.e. the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the set of documents with a clear-cut introduction by gen. Lev Filipovich Sockow leave no room for doubt about the propaganda nature of the work. And it was received exactly so by the Polish side. Polish historians and journalists tried to discredit the paper by proving that the thesis suggested there about the alleged politics of rapprochement between the Second Republic of Poland and Nazi Germans to establish that probable alliance against the USSR is in reality a manipulation. Probably it was only Władysław Bułhak who admitted that gen. Sockow's work proves the thesis that the Soviets had an agent in the Polish MoFA. He developed a hypothesis that the documents of the Polish MoFA published in the set could have been the result of a disinformation operation carried out by the II Department of the Polish General Staff (further: II Department) against INO GUGB NKVD.⁴ Apart from the short discussion storm the work did not seriously change the way the intelligence infiltration of the state institutions of the II Republic of Poland by the Soviet intelligence. When the excitement was over the case was closed. This way, in a non-understandable way, a Russian perspective was accepted, according to which an alliance with Germans in order to eliminate Russia⁵ was something wicked

¹ *Секреты польской политики. Сборник документов*, Л.Ф.Соцков (ed.), Москва 2009, p. 383.

² Служба Внешней Разведки Российской Федерации, СВР – The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, established on 18 December 1991 by the decree No. 293 as the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation.

³ The Foreign Department of the Chief Directorate of the State Security within the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR.

⁴ W. Bułhak, *Krótki kurs dezinformacji*, pp. 18–20, <https://ipn.gov.pl/download/1/18300/1-20672.pdf> [access: 28 VIII 2018]. **However, there is no proof for that hypothesis** (all the marked elements in the article come from the author).

⁵ Russia that first led to the I Republic of Poland's collapse, then suppressed bloodily the Polish independence uprisings twice, and, finally – already in a new Bolshevik form – it invaded the revived Poland.

and flagitious. It was as if the country of Poland did not have any rights to do its mere politics and to achieve its own goals. What is more, it was tacitly assumed that Poland as the only entity did not have moral right to parley with Germans. Nobody can deny that there were negotiations with Hitler – despite breaking international law and the basic human decency – by the French, the British, and, finally, the Soviets who wrote a treaty absolutely criminal as far as its contents. Such tactics is still carried out by calling a revisionist anyone who indicates that the war with Germans was not a historical necessity but an intersection of political myopia, foreign special services acts and, in the end, gimmicky stupidity in talking about the Polish history.⁶ However, putting aside the above problem (of journalistic not scientific nature), we should focus on something more important. **The SVR publication proves undoubtedly that the Soviet intelligence had agents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Second Republic of Poland.** Moreover, the nature of materials indicates the high-ranking source (or rather – sources)⁷ in the Polish MoFA. The first example is Заметка о беседе премьер-министра Геринга с маршалом Рыдз-Смиглы, происходившей 16/II-1937 г. (При этой беседе присутствовали: министр Шембек и посол фон Мольтке.) № 396/н/36⁸, from the contents of which we clearly see that there were only high-ranking officials of the Second Republic of Poland in the meeting. Naturally, we cannot exclude that the Soviet informants were for example the secretary of Minister Jan Szembek⁹ or aide-de-camp of Marshall Edward Śmigły-Rydz, or even a typist. Nevertheless, the whole Soviet materials suggest unequivocally that among different agents¹⁰ there were also high-ranking individuals. It means that the Soviets had full information about the Polish politics and were able to counteract Polish activities, to block Polish initiatives and to carry out pre-emptive information actions to compromise Polish diplomacy at international level. But most important was that they were able to impose interpretations of the eastern politics in favour of the USSR. **The thesis on agents in the Polish MoFA is, what was mentioned above, based on the published documents, so it should be treated as a fact. Indication of potential Soviet spies there is only a speculation.** Based on the premises one can tighten the circle of suspicions. Below there is a logical series that allows – in the opinion of the author of the article – to indicate the most probable candidates.

⁶ Cf. A. Bocheński, *Dzieje głupoty w Polsce*, Warsaw 1947.

⁷ Notes of the INO GUGB NKVD indicate that there were many sources – for example: “(...) from a serious Polish source the following news was sent telegraphically (p. 16); (...) from serious Polish sources (p. 17); information from a source placed close to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs circles (p. 76)”, etc. Cf. *Секреты польской политики. Сборник документов...*

⁸ *Секреты польской политики. Сборник документов...*, p. 133.

⁹ Jan Szembek, dob. 11 July 1881, date of death 9 July 1945, Polish diplomat. After graduating studies in Vienne he worked as a clerk of the national government in Bosnia; after Poland regained its independence he was a representative in Budapest and Brussels between 1921 and 1932; in 1932 he took a position of the undersecretary in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was the closest associate of Józef Beck.

¹⁰ Even descriptions of anonymous sources enclosed to the INO reports indicate unambiguously their multitude and differences in placement.

Theoretical assumptions of the analysis

The most important is to accept a logical principle (used for centuries), known as the Occam's razor.¹¹ It states that one should not introduce new terms and assumptions, if there are no grounds for that and the simplest theoretical solutions with the fewest assumptions are the best. Translating the rule into practice one should assume that if theoretically we can take a big number of possible Soviet sources in MoFA, like typists, cleaners, secretaries, guards, etc., such assumption is of no cognitive value, because the lack of access to Russian archives and any other data makes it impossible to carry out further studies. **Adopting the assumption that is simplest and proved many times in a counterintelligence practice that people who we know that had or in all likelihood could have contact with a foreign intelligence and, at the same time, they had or have access to information wanted by the intelligence, are obviously in a group of high counterintelligence risk. This fact allows to carry out further verification.**

Similar methodology can be, in the author's opinion, applied in a heuristics of historic studies. Particularly in case of special services, when there is no access to documents or the documents – from different reasons – are not fully reliable.¹²


Premises

First, the main rule of special services is the economy of action. In other words, to gain a goal, one begins with the simplest actions, which do not entail significant financial costs and are neither time consuming nor do they require complicated plans. Figuratively speaking: always the shortest way to the goal is chosen provided that each complication boosts the risk of failure. From this point of view the most important is to establish which MoFA's high-ranking employees in the 1930s the Soviet services had natural access to. And the answer is simple: **it is known that due to getting some renegades from in 1920 the Soviets had the natural contact with three high rank MoFA's employees, who had been linked to those renegades from the Polish Military Organization (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa) and from the Polish Army before 1920 because of their former front friendship.** Moreover,

¹¹ *Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitate* – Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.

¹² The key example are the GUGB NKVD materials from the time of "the great purge". Materials from operational cases, from investigations and court proceedings are a load of rubbish, (although full of checked facts), the origin of which – at least on the basis of the knowledge available – without the social psychiatry assistance cannot be explained. This is, of course, an extreme case but it shows a simple fact: the state apparatus, i.e. special services without any effective external supervision, can produce in different situations and because of different reasons virtual knowledge. To make things even more complicated, it is worth mentioning that the NKVD operational cases consisted of true pieces of information (for example testimonies forced by tortures) and, at the same time, of their absolutely absurd interpretations.

in the case of the two there are strong clues that confirm their recruitment by the Soviet counterintelligence already in the beginning of the 1920s in the course of their missions on their intelligence posts in the Soviet Russia.



Scheme. Links between the Polish renegades with the three officers of the II Department of the Polish General Staff who started their work in the 1930s.

Source: self-study.

The central figure in the above scheme is lieutenant of the Polish Army, Ignacy Dobrzyński¹³, who came to Moscow in November 1919 as a representative of the II Department of the Polish General Staff (further: NDWP). Due to the assistance from his foster parents, i.e. Jerzy and Tekla Hryniewscy, Dobrzyński established an intelligence post in the very centre of the Soviet Russia, which - apart from the capital city, covered also Smolensk and Orsha. However, there are no reliable information on the circumstances of Dobrzyński's cross to the Bolsheviks' side. The common version is that it was supposed to be a result of his ideological change under the influence of Julian Marchlewski and Artur Artuzov, who discussed philosophical and ideological issues with him instead of questioning him after the arrest by the VChK. It goes against the facts. In this context we can assume that it was an operational cover story by

¹³ Lieutenant Ignacy Dobrzyński (further Sosnowski) – 1897–1937. Since 1912, as the lower secondary school pupil, in Vilnius he had taken active part in numerous Polish patriotic and self-educating organizations. He studied at the Moscow University; entered the Polish Socialist Party acting in Moscow. In 1918 he volunteered to the gen. J. Dowbor-Muśnicki I Polish Corp. After leaving for Poland he took up intelligence work; on behalf of the II Department he established an intelligence net in Moscow based on his family contacts. After the net was disrupted by the WCzK He defected to the Bolsheviks and was active in the process of liquidation of the Polish intelligence networks.

the VChK¹⁴ to make the introduction of Dobrzyński in the Chekist environment easier because they were suspicious against the so called offerers.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the most plausible story seems to be the one given by Dobrzyński himself. He confided in his VChK friend, Mikhail Shreider that he volunteered to Lubyanka.¹⁶ Based on some excerpts from the “open letter” published by Dobrzyński in a Soviet press on July 18, 1920 and numerous clues in J. Hryniewski’s explanations, we should assume that the contact with the VChK started probably in April, May 1920, i.e. during serious failures in the war with Poland.¹⁷ For this article not the date of Dobrzyński’s defection is important but the fact that indefinite number of Polish intelligence officers and soldiers followed him. There were Wiktor Marczewski¹⁸ and Wiktor Steckiewicz¹⁹ shown on the scheme who betrayed Poland because of Dobrzyński. Because of their activity in a Polish independence movement (high school and student patriotic organizations, the POW, the Legions, the Army) the three individuals knew many people who then established the state institutions after Poland re-gained its independence, including the II Department of the Polish General Staff.

For the evaluation of the story it is important to understand that friendships from the front armies, from conspiracy or from intelligence posts – because of strong emotions and the necessity of full trust to each other because the survival depended on that – are much stronger than conventional relations or friendships from the time of peace. This is the reason why the renegades in the Soviet service

¹⁴ This topic will be described in a separate article.

¹⁵ The best proof of such distrust can be a letter of Filip Miedwied to Felix Dzerzhinsky of November 1920: “I get to know from comrades coming from Moscow that Dobrzyński is a direct assistant of the comrade Artuzow..., that Witkowski is a chief of the special department. I know that comrade Artuzow believes them endlessly, which is good for private and personal relations but if they are acquainted with all the work secrecies, if they work in the very centre of the WCzK Operational Unit, it can have the worst results for us (...).” Cf. А. Зданович, *Свои и чужие. Интриги разведки*, Moscow 2002, without paging, <https://www.e-reading.club/book.php?book=144085> [access: 29 V 2018].

¹⁶ С. Цыркун, *Кровавые ночи 1937 года. Кремль против Лубянки*, Москва 2010, without paging, <http://www.rulit.me/books/krovavyye-nochi-1937-goda-kreml-protiv-lubyanki-read-341761-1.html> [access: 1 VI 2018]. The author refers to the following document: М. Шрейдер, *Воспоминания чекиста-оперативника. Лит. запись И.А. Элланской*, p. 226.

¹⁷ Cf. “Gradually coming closer to the very roots of that Revolution, the core of the program and the tactics of those «nasty Bolsheviks», and seeing, at the same time, all weaknesses and defects and realizing the magnitude of that superhuman struggle they carry out with the whole world – I came to a conclusion that I do not have enough strength and will to go that way with them. Soon the moment came, when I said to myself that one should die or win under their flags. I went to those, against whom I had been sent for the most important for their enemies work, when it was hard to them, in the front lines and in the country.” – cited from: *POW po stronie rewolucji*, Warsaw 1921, p. 8.

¹⁸ Wiktor Witkowski-Marczewski (born in 1891), captain of the II Department. Since he defected to the Bolsheviks in 1920 he was working in the Soviet security apparatus; executed on 21 September 1937.

¹⁹ Wiktor Steckiewicz-Kijakowski (born in Warsaw in 1892), in 1920 he was a resident of the Polish Intelligence services in Piotrogrod. Recruited by the WCzK, Server next in the GPU-OGPU. Died in Mongolia in 1932.

could easily establish contacts with former friends from the military and the POW, particularly that it happened naturally abroad, where all those Polish officers showed on the scheme were in intelligence posts.²⁰

There is nothing more natural than the talk of old army friends by a drink, recalling fondly the old war times even if they are divided by politics at the moment. Such situation – as the clues indicate – was probably used by the Soviet intelligence services. A proof that all those named renegades were used in a recruitment process among their former colleagues from the POW and from the Army is the fact that they managed to get to cooperate some individuals taken by the Soviets hostages, inter alia Maria Piotuch, Stanisław Lewandowski, Włodzimierz Kwiatkowski, Juna Przepilińska-Singer, Elżbieta Łotakówna, Jadwiga Tejszerska, Władysław Puchalski, Leon Borecki and Maria Niedźwiałowska.²¹ **If Soviets used them as recruiters among captives from the POW and from the Army, it was also natural to use them in the same role against the officers from the II Department of the Polish General Staff whom they had known from the past.**

Further, the three case studies of the Polish MoFA employees are presented, who had contacts with the described renegades. The cases of Tadeusz Kobylański and Tadeusz Kowalski are described as one case because from the Soviet services perspective they created one operational case.

Wiktor Tomir Drymmer

Wiktor Tomir Drymmer was in close relations with Wiktor Marczewski and Wiktor Steckiewicz. The hypothesis on his contacts with Steckiewicz the author of this article presented in details in his work *Hipoteza tłumacząca sposób zainicjowania przez GPU gry operacyjnej z Oddziałem II SG WP w czasie afery „MOCR-Trust” – czyli zagadka Wiktora Tomira Drymmera*.²² It is worth to cite its conclusion that W. T. Drymmer knew Steckiewicz and most probably he met him in Rewal in 1921 without informing about it anyone from the headquarters in Warsaw. On the other hand the relationship with W. Marczewski is documented by W.T. Drymmer himself who described the nature of his friendship with that man in his memoires:

(After joining Drużyny Strzeleckie – the author’s note) I was allotted to the Marczewski’s platoon (...) Marczewski was an intelligent self-taught. His way of speaking indicated that he was from Powiśle district from a non-intelligent family. (...) We made warm friends. We ate from one canteen, we covered with the same

²⁰ Since 1921 W.T. Drymmer had been working in the attaché office in Rewl; since 1924 T. Kobylański was the deputy attaché in Moscow, and Tadeusz Kowalski was working in Moscow at that time, under the journalistic cover.

²¹ It is only a part of the Polish captives, I am giving only their names because their defection to Bolsheviks was overt and used in the Soviet propaganda.

²² „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego” 2015, No. 13, pp. 60–85.

blanket. (...) Our commandants instilled not only immense respect but also obedience and mutual fellowship in us, which we called in Legions *sitwa* (clique). *Sitwa* was a team of friends devoted to each other, ready to give their lives if needed, take the wounded from the fire, share a piece of bread or, what is more important – share the last cigarette. A *sitwa* fellow was a friend, a brother or even more than a brother of you shared war experiences, prison or an internment camp with him. You became a *sitwa* fellow for the rest of your life.²³

The above excerpt tells practically all about the nature of the two gentlemen's relation because W.T. Drymmer gives his laudation on *sitwa* **just after his description of** Marczewski, without mentioning any other colleague. This suggests that in the author's mind Marczewski was obviously associated with the *sitwa* fellow, whom (...) *you became for the rest of your life*. The relation clearly starts to deepen in the remainder of the memoirs. While describing taking documents from a reports depot of the I Brigade couriers, which was being searched, W.T. Drymmer tells how he murdered a Russian military policeman together with Marczewski:

Confounded we saw a close gate and a military policeman together with a gate keeper by it. Marczewski did not stop, grabbed a gun and shot the policeman, I shot my Browning as well, we pushed the terrified gate-keeper from the gate and we run out on the street, each of us in a different direction.²⁴

It is worth to remember a psychological situation of a 19-year-old boy from an intelligentsia Warsaw family²⁵, who takes part in a brutal action with an older and respected friend, during which they kill a man together. Such an event would certainly leave a strong mark in the psyche of a young man. Especially as the killing of a policeman was not a necessity, at least in that moment. Neither Drymmer nor Marczewski were suspected in any way, they were just walking out of the tenement building, in which there was a search in the couriers' flat. Marczewski's behaviour shows his ruthlessness, whereas young Drymmer – according to the psychological rule of the cognitive dissonance reduction²⁶ – had to be either faithful to the moral code of the Polish intelligent and acknowledge that his colleague did wrong (then also Drymmer took de facto part in that murder), or he could allow that his older colleague was an excellent leader, a man of iron will, deserving love and respect. Such tone we can observe in the memoirs.

²³ W.T. Drymmer, *W służbie Polsce. Wspomnienia żołnierza i państwowca z lat 1914–1947*, Warszawa–Kraków 2014, pp. 36–37.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 38–39.

²⁵ Wiktor's father was a teacher and a botanist by training.

²⁶ The basic mechanism of the psychological phenomenon called the cognitive dissonance reduction was rejecting the messages contrary to the existing beliefs and accepting only such messages that comply with the ideas threatened by the change. Cf. E. Aronson, *Człowiek – istota społeczna*, Warsaw 1987, pp. 130–192.

Possibly the most interestingly emotional relation between W.T. Drymmer and Marczewski is shown in an excerpt from the memoirs that refers to the reasons why Marczewski defected in favour of Bolsheviks:

(Marczewski - the author's note) After Bolsheviks were defeated in the battle of Warsaw he was commanding a company of infantry. There was a lack of food supplies during our counter-offensive. Marczewski ordered to confiscate a cow, which was a food for our company for a few days of struggle and marching. But he was under the supervision of the martial court and the famous August act, under which there was a martial court liability and the death sentence for the confiscation (...). Marczewski was sentenced to be shot. Poorly guarded, he grabbed a pistol from a guardian and he killed a policeman – as he thought – on his way out. In such desperate situation, Marczewski thought there was only one way then – escape to Russia.²⁷

We cannot help noticing that according to W.T. Drymmer – Marczewski's betrayal did not mean anything. It is an example of a terrible fate, that broke an honest and devoted man. From the ethical point of view an officer sentenced by the Polish court in 1920 after six years of struggle for the restitution of Poland, his taking care of the subordinates deserves only sympathy. Hurting the policeman and escaping to Russia seem morally acceptable, in self-defence. It was an emotional reaction of a patriot. The reality, as it may seem, was different though. Major Waclaw Przeździecki writes in a document on the proclamation of the former POW members that was spread by the Bolsheviks in 1920: (...) *former col. W.P. Wiktor Witkowski-Marczewski signed under the proclamation is a criminal runaway, sentenced for several malpractices by the Court of the 1st Division of the Legion to many years in prison.*²⁸

Waclaw Jędrzejewicz²⁹ wrote about Marczewski in a similar way:

Some day in Riga I met a former Polish officer, capt. Wiktor Marczewski ('Witkowski'). The POW member in Warsaw between 1914 and 1915, he marched with the Warsaw battalion as a chief of the company to the 1st Brigade, later on served in the Polish Army as a captain – and then a catastrophe. Some financial malpractices, escape to Russia and the service in the CheKa there. And now he found himself in Riga. He knew the Polish relations very well, that is for sure.³⁰

²⁷ W.T. Drymmer, *W służbie Polsce...*, p. 137.

²⁸ A Whiting of the Information Department of the ND WP of 22 December 1920 No. 57882/II – online scan from the resources of the Piłsudski Institute.

²⁹ Jędrzejewicz, n.b., knew Marczewski very well because they both had been leading the POW units, which started from Warsaw to join the I Brigade. Cf. W. Jędrzejewicz, *Wspomnienia*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1993, p. 33.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 99.

A confirmation of the above information is an entry that lieutenant Marczewski Wiktor, admitted to the Polish Army by the Decree No. L. 620 of 7 May 1919, based on the court-martial decision was crossed off the list of the officers of the Polish Army by the Decree No. L.2141 of 20 May 1920.³¹ According to *the List of officers serving on June 1st, 1921*, by the name lieutenant Wiktor Witkowski (Marczewski's true name – author's note) in the column: allocation or the place of residence there was the Military Prison Lvov (inconsistencies in the date of entry and the date of Marczewski's escape can be explained by the classic inertness of the military administration). It seems that the above information on numerous malpractices: financial frauds and numerous malpractices have nothing to do with the romantic story of a commander sentenced for the cow confiscation in order to feed his soldiers. But they perfectly match (...) *the ugly, gloomy, suspicious, strict for others and for himself*³², and, at the same time, a ruthless counter jumper working in 1914 in the Warsaw placed Bruno's iron shop, who shot a policeman as a 20 year-old man.³³ The date of the sentence (i.e. May 1920) also does not match the period given by Drymmer (after the Battle of Warsaw) and suggests that Marczewski as (unfortunately) many other soldiers could have taken part in robberies on territories taken during the Kiev offensive.³⁴ W.T. Drymmer's fantasy on the alleged harm done to Marczewski by the Polish country has features of the mechanism of the cognitive dissonance reduction. Presenting Marczewski as unfairly treated and a fine and a good man allowed to get rid of any doubts as to his moral choices. It was also probably a goal of the story cited by Drymmer on the seizure by the Bolsheviks a POW member called „Hajduczanka”, who was supposed to be released by Marczewski when he found out that she was sent by Dymmer on an intelligence mission.³⁵ In reality the real name of 'Hajduczanka' was Wela Niewiarowska. She was arrested by the VChK in January 1920, i.e. four months before Marczewski's betrayal.³⁶

The most interesting thread regarding Marczewski's escape to the Soviet Union is the part of I. Dobrzyński's testimony – under the name Sosnowski – who was arrested by the NKVD in November 1936:

Capt. Witkowski was said to be sentenced in Poland to eighteen years in prison for communist agitation. He escaped from Dźwińsk with the help of POW members and Dymmer – an officer of the II Department. Witkowski was brought from prison in rags, barefoot, dirty like a devil. The problem of Witkowski was solved relatively quickly as he was actually sentenced. After that he was immediately released.³⁷

³¹ *Personal Diary No. 21 of 1920*, p. 419.

³² W.T. Drymmer, *W służbie Polsce...*, p. 37.

³³ Fancy salon under the name of 'Block and Brun' was one of the most fashionable places in Warsaw. It offered goods from all over Europe.

³⁴ Cf. The memories of the Kiev expedition member, J.K. Maciejewski, *Zawadiaka. Dzienniki frontowe 1914–1920*, Warsaw 2015, pp. 197, 222, 223, 285, 308.

³⁵ W.T. Drymmer, *W służbie Polsce...*, p. 137.

³⁶ I. Ziemiański, *Praca kobiet w P.O.W. – Wschód*, Warszawa 1933, pp. 107–108.

³⁷ Cf. А. Папчинский, М. Тумшис, 1937. *Большая чистка. НКВД против ЧК*, Москва 2009,

Dobrzyński's testimonies (apart that Marczewski lied the Bolsheviks on the fact that he was sentenced for a communist agitation and that he was a captain) indicate that it was W.T. Drymmer who helped Marczewski to escape. So, if the guard was really shot during the escape of Marczewski, the role of Drymmer becomes more criminal and the Bolsheviks, apart from the knowledge of friendship between Drymmer and Marczewski, had also strong pressure materials. The above information gives a picture of a strong emotional relation between W.T. Drymmer and W. Marczewski between 1914 and 1920 based on common and emotional important experiences. It could lead to – as it seems – assistance given by Drymmer during the escape of Marczewski from the Polish escort. Of course, a sentimental friendship between two young men does not mean the readiness for betrayal, but it could be used by the Soviets to make contact with Drymmer via Marczewski (like in case of Drymmer's relation with Steckiewicz). What is interesting, there is an excerpt in Drymmer's memoirs telling that Drymmer met both Marczewski and Steckiewicz during his work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the description the meeting was not accidental but staged by both renegades, i.e. Marczewski and Steckiewicz in trains from Moscow to Kharkov and from Moscow to Warsaw.³⁸ In both cases the renegades talked for hours with Drymmer, exchanging friendly memories from the Trust operations (during which Drymmer was suspected of collaboration with the OGPU). Aside from the truthfulness of Drymmer's memories, in which the facts are changes, mixed with fantasies and pure lies, the note can indicate that Drymmer was maintain contacts with the two colleagues not only during the service time in II Department of the Polish General Staff but also during his work in the MoFA.

In conclusion we should necessarily add that the above clues (and also the ones from the above mentioned article on W.T. Drymmer and Steckiewicz relations) referring to a possible relation of an unknown nature by Drymmer with representatives of the Soviet special services cannot be a charge of being an agent. It is only a hypothesis which allows to retrace the course of events and further studies.

Tadeusz Kobylański and Tadeusz Kowalski

As far as the previous analysis had to be a working one based on the friendly relations between Drymmer and Polish renegades working for the Soviet services, the case of Tadeusz Kobylański and Tadeusz Kowalski was of different nature because there are certain Soviet sources that confirm their collaboration with the Soviet counterintelligence.³⁹

There were no accusations against those officers until 1993. In a work by a Russian journalist Valeriy Gogol there appeared an excerpt on recruitment by A. Artuzov

<https://coollib.com/b/144998> [access: 28 VI 2018].

³⁸ W.T. Drymmer, *W służbie Polsce...*, pp. 136–137.

³⁹ Cf. K. Padaszek, *Sprawa Tadeusza Kobylańskiego – stan badań, nowe dokumenty i fakty*, „Dzieje Najnowsze” 2015, No. 3, pp. 171–191.

a Polish military attaché between 1923 and 1925, giving no personal details of that Polish traitor.⁴⁰ It was interesting because the name T. Kobylański as the OGPU agent was mentioned by an OGPU defector Eduard Opperput during an interrogation in Helsinki in 1927 and as such it was sent to the headquarters in Warsaw by the Polish attaché's office.⁴¹ That accusation, following the decision of the so called Bociański commission, in any way did not influence further lot of major T. Kobylański. In 2000 a historian working for the FSB, Aleksandr Zdanowicz, added some more information to the W. Gogol's book. He wrote that a Polish communist leaving in Moscow was supposed to tell A. Artuzov that Polish military attaché wanted to renew contact with Ignacy Sosnowski (i.e. I. Dobrzyński), known to him from the service time in the gen. Józef Dowbor-Muśnicki 1st Polish Corp.⁴² There was only an alias in the text, not the name.⁴³ In 2001 Aleksandr Papczinskij and Michaił Tumszys openly wrote

⁴⁰ "Artuzov himself recruited between 1923 and 1925 an attaché of the Polish Embassy in Moscow, a major of the General Staff and a person close to Marshall Piłsudski, a Japanese attaché assistant, an attaché of the Estonian Embassy. (...) His lectures were often attended by some heroes of the past operations to take a walk down memory lane, great intelligence officer like A. Fiodorow, S. Puzicki, R. Pillar, J. Olski." (...) Cf. В. Гоголь, *Бомба для Сталина. Внешняя разведка России в операциях суратического масштаба*, Москва 1993, Воскресенье, p. 23.

⁴¹ "Testimonies of the arrested burden Kobylański, Drymmer, Niedziński, Werner, Michałowski, Czyżewski as Soviet spies. The Finns believe that. It is necessary to deny it immediately. For now I have to stop the margrave's arrival, but more than desired arrival of major Talikowski, or major Pawłowicz and major Grudziński. The above comes from the talk in the Finnish General Staff few hours earlier today." Cf. AAN, Attachés, docket number A II/94, a note by the attaché in Helsinki to the II Department, No. 743 of 24 April 1927.

⁴² This information was repeated on the Polish ground by professor P. Wiczorkiewicz, however, he identified mistakenly lieutenant colonel I. Boerner as the GPU agent. Cf. P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Kłęska bez bitwy. Sowiecki wywiad wojskowy w latach 1937–1938*, „Wiadomości Historyczne” 2000, No. 5.

⁴³ "Operational work regarding the White Guard underground and Savinkov followers was often mixed with revealing and liquidating spies centers of England, France and, of course, Poland. This is why Sosnowski, whether he wanted that or not, even indirectly, took part in the Polish intelligence activities. But in 1924 he had to get into a direct contact with the offensive again. And it all went the following way. One summer day A.Ch. Artuzov was called by a Polish communist living in Moscow and was informed that a friend of the communist from the pre-revolutionary era working in the Polish Embassy approached him. That man (let us call him Polański) asked for a meeting with Sosnowski, his ex-colleague from the Dowbór-Muśnicki Corps. The Polish military diplomat came with the following conditions: Sosnowski is coming alone for the meeting, to the place and on time chosen by Polański. And again A.Ch. Artuzov was faced with a choice, either to include Sosnowski in an offensive play or not. Artur Christianowich really understood that a provocation or even a blackmail was probable with regard to Sosnowski. And you did not have to go far to find a reason for that. Let us take for example the fact that in Warsaw there was living a modest musician of the opera theater – Dobrzyński – a brother of Ignatij Ignatyevich. Polish intelligence could also use the card of family ties. Nevertheless, other interests were more important. The Czeksists got pretty much from the Sosnowski's meetings with Polański. The work of Ignatij Ignatyevich in that field was appreciated by the OGPU chairman W.R. Mieńżyński. It was his idea that the OGPU council gave Sosnowski in 1924 a badge of the honourable Checkist, and in 1926 – a "Mauzer" gun with the inscription »For the ruthless fight with counter revolution«. Cf. А.А Зданович, *Свой или чужой? – Свой!*, in: *Исторические чтения на Лубянке 1999 г.*, W.M. Коммисаров (ed.), Москва 2000, FSB, p. 99.

about the data and circumstances of T. Kobylański's recruitment.⁴⁴ Eight years later, in the rereleasing of their work, they added to their revelations⁴⁵ an archival link showing that they had not had an access to the personal files of T. Kobylański but only to the investigation file made public due to the *glasnost* (publicity) period in the USSR regarding Karol Roller⁴⁶ (in fact a Pole named Leopold Czylok⁴⁷), shot in 1937. There was an abstract from I. Sosnowski's testimony in the investigation file. Next, the information on T. Kobylański's collaboration with the Soviet intelligence was reproduced by further Russian authors. Nevertheless, in any of their works further details of the collaboration nor any references to archival materials other than mentioned above did not appear.⁴⁸ Because Russian archives do not reveal any data

⁴⁴ Parczinskij A., Tumszys M., *Щит, расколотый мечом. НКВД против ВЧК*, Moscow 2002, Современник, pp. 254–255.

⁴⁵ "More successful counterintelligence operation is the recruitment of some employees of the Polish Embassy attaché office in Moscow. The main role played here Sosnowski, who aroused the interest of the Polish intelligence as he was working in the OGPU organs. Those, not believing in the honesty of the former chief of the information office of the II Department, tried to bring their ex-colleague to the Polish intelligence. Former Polish attaché, Tadeusz Kobylański, was an interesting figure for recruitment. The surveillance materials obtained by the Operational Unit and the Counterintelligence Unit of the OGPU presented that Polish diplomat »(...) as a gambler, heavy drinker and a speculator«. The Chekists had waited for the attaché recruitment for a very long time until fortune helped. Once an employee of the Polish Embassy named Kowalski came to the secretary of the Polish Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) named Dzierżyńska. He asked for a contact with Sosnowski (they both had worked in the II Department between 1919 and 1920. Dzierżyńska passed her guest to the deputy chief of the OGPU Counterintelligence Unit, R.A. Pillar, who organized the meeting with Sosnowski. Kowalski said that he was outrun in his career by his subordinates in Warsaw and simply sent to Russia, where was a Polish resident (as well as the French) of the military intelligence. He had only one request: 'Give me the money'. They gave him the money (the Mount of 3,000 USD), and he started betraying agents who were working for the Polish intelligence (...) [ORAF UFSB Kursk oblast. Archival investigation case No. P-6791 regarding Roller K.F. L.64]. Artuzow proposed Sosnowski via Kowalski to recruit Kobylański as well. Kowalski claimed that the attaché was in fact ready for cooperation with Checkists. He had huge debts and his wife needed even more money (according to Kowalski, she was a very spoiled woman), due to that he was seeking a serious earning. There was also one more additional moment of naughty nature. It turned out that Kobylański "(...) was in love with Kowalski as in love with a woman, or even more" and he was ready for much to attract the attention of his colleague [ORAF UFSB Kursk oblast. Archival investigation case No. P-6791 regarding Roller K.F. L.64]. All that led to the recruitment of the Polish diplomat." Cf. Папчинский А., Тумшис М., 1937. *Большая чистка. НКВД против ЧК*, Москва 2009, Эксмо.

⁴⁶ ОРАФ УФСБ по Курской области. Архивное следственное дело № П-6791 на Роллера К.Ф. Л. 64.

⁴⁷ Leopold Czylok, dob. 24 September 1896. During World War I he served in the Austro-Hungarian army. In 1916 he was taken captive by Russians, he was fighting on the "white" side. After being arrested by the WCzK He started service in the counterintelligence (KRO WCzK-GPU-OGPU); *Разведка и контрразведка в лицах. Энциклопедический словарь российских спецслужб*, А. Диенко, В. Покатов (ed.), Москва 2002, pp. 351, 542–543; К. Дектярев, А. Колпакиди, *Внешняя разведка СССР*, Москва 2009, А. Папчинский, М. Тумшис, *Щит, расколотый мечом...*, pp. 298, 406, 459–463.

⁴⁸ Свеченовская И., *В постели с врагом*, Moscow 2005, Нева; А. Колпакиди, Д. Прохоров, *Внешняя разведка СССР*, Москва 2001, Эксмо; К. Diegtiariew, А. Колпакиди, *Внешняя*

of the collaborators of the security institutions apart from K. Toller's files which was somewhat an accident – following the rehabilitation process of the victims of Stalinist repressions, there are rather no chances for a written confirmation of data from the file. In this case we can only analyse the materials cited by Russian authors and further analysis of the clues to lend colour to the accusation of T. Kobylański on his alleged collaboration with the Soviet services.

The whole information, given earlier in original, comes down to the following facts. The counterintelligence surveillance (Rus. Контрразведывательный отдел – KRO) showed that T. Kobylański was a compulsive cards player who liked parties (original Russian word *кутежи* does not mean diplomatic balls) who dealt with speculation. Because such set of features always rises interest of special services, the KRO OGPU was to consider him as a promising candidate for recruitment. The occasion for recruitment by the Soviet counterintelligence came up without much effort. The recruiter was a Polish diplomatic post employee named Kowalski. He came to Zofia Dzierżyńska, who was working as a secretary of the Polish Office of the CK WKP(b) (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – Rus.: *Центральный комитет Коммунистической партии Советского Союза*), asking for contact with I. Sosnowski (I. Dobrzyński), whom he allegedly knew from the common service in the Polish Army. Z. Dzierżyńska contacted T. Kowalski with the deputy head of the KRO OGPU Roman A. Pilar, who was supposed to contact the Pole with I. Sosnowski. During their talk T. Kowalski was supposed to explain that he was ignored in promotions in Warsaw and was sent to a post in Moscow to work both for the II Department and the French intelligence. The expectations of the Polish guest of the OGPU came down to money that he finally received (the amount of 3,000 USD). A. Artuzov proposed T. Kowalski to be a recruiter of T. Kobylański, which he approved. He said that the attaché was ready for cooperation with the Chekists because he had serious debts and also because his wife, a woman of promiscuous lifestyle, had quite excessive financial demands, so T. Kobylański was seeking additional source of money. He also added that T. Kobylański was to be homosexually in love, which could help the recruitment. This short piece of information forced from I. Sosnowski by NKVD tortures is almost true. The description of T. Kobylański given by I. Sosnowski was to a large extent true, as it may seem.⁴⁹ The confirmation can give a Soviet satiric publication „Freak” of February 1929. There was a picture of T. Kobylański with the information that the Polish attaché was caught in the past as smuggling to the USSR *known rubber stuff*⁵⁰ (it was about condoms). In the personal

разведка СССР, Moscow 2009.

⁴⁹ P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Uwagi o działalności agentury sowieckiej na odcinku polskim po roku 1921*, in: *Polski wywiad wojskowy 1918–1945*, A. Peplowski, P. Kołakowski (ed.), Toruń 2006, pp. 102–119.

⁵⁰ “In February 1929 a satiric journal »Freak« (Rus. Чудак), issued by the ‘Ogoniok’ Editing Company (...) placed a photo of the Polish attaché in Moscow (between 1925 and 1928), major Kobylański, with a comment that in the past he had been caught as smuggling to the USSR »*known rubber stuff*«... Charge d'affaires in the Polish matters in the USSR, A. Zieleziński turned to

files of T. Kobylański there is also information that he was punished by the honorary court chaired by gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski⁵¹, for breaking a marriage promise to his colleague's, lieutenant Marian Bobrowski's⁵² wife, made to seduce her. The accurate analysis of that case is very interesting and it confirms, at the same time, his description done by the Soviet counterintelligence. The following excerpts come from the honorary court resolution for officers at the Ministry of Military Affairs⁵³:

He got engaged voluntarily to Wiera Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska in September 1926 in Warsaw. She was then married to lieutenant ret. Marian Jastrzębiec-Bobrowski. He wanted to marry lady Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska so he started a divorce case of Mr. and Mrs. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowski. He committed himself before Mr. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowski to marry his wife after he leaves to Paris and Nice with her as fiancée and introducing her in the house of his married sister. During their stay abroad, in October 1926, he broke up with Mrs. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska, as he gives, because of disclosed, negative character traits and her way of behaviour. According to her he broke up because of an unjust accusation that she was a bad Polish citizen and she was politically engaged, which, however, had not been established. He broke up with her, despite he knew her personal situation. He had to realize that breaking up the relationship, positive to him in his personal and professional situation, for her it was going to be negative both morally and materially. In her society circles she was going to be brought into disrepute because she left her husband and got the divorce (October 15th, 1926). Because of the lack of any financial means and any assistance from him, major Kobylański, having no relatives in Poland she was in an exceptionally difficult situation. (...) After the broke up in October 1926 in Warsaw they met in the Oaza restaurant where she threatened that if he would not do anything in her case she was going to carry on with a claim in the Honorary Court for Officers, he pointed a gun at her and threatened that he would kill her if she does not stop causing him distress.⁵⁴

Karski, a chief of the I Western Unit, with a protest against the »Freak« publication... After getting apologies from the National Committee of Foreign Affairs, the Polish mission wanted a refutation in »Izwestiya«, but there was only the note from the »Freak« editors.” Cf. Кен О.Н., Рупасов А.И., *Западное приграничье. Политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) и отношения СССР с западными соседними государствами, 1928–1934 гг.*, Москва 2014, Алгоритм; Фонд ‘Историческая память’, Москва 2000, pp. 140–141.

⁵¹ “By the sentence of the Honorary Court for Generals L. 29/27 of 25 May 1928 he was imposed with a reprimand penalty for the officer’s dignity misconduct, i.e. he made a commitment to a woman that he did not want or was not able to comply with.” Cf. CAW, the II Department, docket number I.303.4.401, duplicate of the resolution of the Honorary Court for Officers at the Ministry of Military Affairs L. 86/LXIII of 14 March 1927 in the case of major Tadeusz Kobylański.

⁵² P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Uwagi o działalności agentury sowieckiej...*, p. 113.

⁵³ Central Military Archive (further: CAW), the II Department, docket number I.303.4.401, duplicate of the resolution of the Honorary Court for Officers at the Ministry of Military Affairs L. 86/LXIII of 14 March 1927 in the case of major Tadeusz Kobylański.

⁵⁴ CAW, the II Department, docket number I.303.4.401, duplicate of the resolution of the Honorary Court for Officers at the Ministry of Military Affairs L. 86/LXIII of 14 March 1927

To understand fully the meaning of the above excerpt speaking a lot about mentality of T. Kobylański we need to remember that W. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska was a Russian. In 1924 she converted into Roman catholic church to marry a Polish retired officer M. Bobrowski. In September 1926 she re-converted and got divorce to be able to marry T. Kobylański. So, while in Moscow the Polish attaché shared his life with a Russian woman (of immoral behaviour, according to the OGPU), who had numerous affairs and who had high financial demands (as T. Kowalski informed the OGPU). This is due to what T. Kobylański testified in the honorary court:

(...) after a very short time he was convinced that Mrs. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska was a person of low propriety, masked by a certain and relatively superficial refinement; a person of every-day scandals; a person who had fancy whims; he proposed her breakup on 29th and 30th of September 1926; that despite tears, promises and a threat of suicide he got to know that Mrs. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska did not change her attitude; he also claimed a huge lack of delicacy and tolerance for his patriotic feelings and his position; he made a final decision on the breakup on October 8th, 1926 and damaging information on Mrs. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska, which came after her arrival to Paris were not the reason for the breakup anymore, because the decision had been taken already on October 8th in Nice.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, it was not the huge consumerist and romance needs of the future wife the reason for T. Kobylański's decision but a warning from his II Department comrade, major Janusz Iliński, that there are records of Mrs. W. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska in the database of the II Department. Having that information T. Kobylański while in Paris, broke the engagement and (...) *told Mrs. W. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska that she was a bad citizen of Poland and that she was politically involved, and that was the reason why he was ordered to break up with her.* It is not clear though, who gave T. Kobylański the order to break up the engagement. The description of his fiancée was supplemented by Michał Mościcki in his testimony⁵⁶:

(...) Mrs. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska made usually a negative impression on him due to her requests to major Kobylański, like for example requests for buying different things while looking at the shop windows. Major Iliński announced Mr. Mościcki about the instruction to influence major Kobylański so that he would break up with Mrs. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska. He supported the decision by the file she had in the II Department, in which there was a report on her and her former

in the case of major Tadeusz Kobylański.

⁵⁵ CAW, the II Department, docket number I.303.4.401, duplicate of the resolution of the Honorary Court for Officers at the Ministry of Military Affairs L. 86/LXIII of 14 March 1927 in the case of major Tadeusz Kobylański.

⁵⁶ Son of the Polish president and T. Kobylański's brother-in-law, to whom he owed his professional career.

husband that during their stay in Baltic countries they blackmailed the II Department. They threatened that in case major Kobylański did not marry her he would absolutely not come to his post in Moscow and his further service would be questioned.

The sentence is not fully understood, because there is also a statement by the II Department in *the Duplicate*, which unequivocally claims that the Polish intelligence did not have any information on any disloyalty of Mrs. W. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska towards Poland but it did have serious charges against her former husband who had collaborated with the II Department.⁵⁷

The II Department was fully aware of the awkward situation of major T. Kobylański, who compromised himself as an intelligence officer by his private life. It can be confirmed by the information that his colleagues from the II Department, rittmeister Leon Kniaziołucki and Capitan Marian Chodacki persuaded him to break up the engagement: (...) *because Mrs. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska as a Russian and having a specific way of behaviour was not a proper woman to be a wife of major Kobylański, as a Polish attaché in Moscow and brother of Mrs. Michałow Mościcka.*⁵⁸

The picture coming from *the Duplicate* is, however, incomplete. It comes from it that M. Mościcki got to know about one of Mrs. W. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska's love affair from the lieutenant ret. Tadeusz Kowalski, i.e. – if we take Roller's testimonies – a further traitor working for the OGPU. That one, in turn, testified that he heard about it from captain W.T. Drymmer, whose wife had reportedly spent some time in summer 1926 in the same spa with W. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska.

Wiera's friends, who also were in the spa, firmly denied any love affair. And Wiera defending herself before the honourable court testified that captain W.T. Drymmer proposed her in 1924 in Tallinn to pay her husband's debt in an undignified for a woman way. That one, however, recollecting the case, described it totally opposite. He claimed that the Bobrowski couple deceived financially the II Department, while he presented himself as the one who had claimed from the very beginning that they should not have worked for the intelligence:

After some discussions and some observations of them I wrote to the Intelligence Unit that in my opinion the Bobrowski couple were absolutely not suitable for the intelligence, they were already compromised in Tallinn, had debts and were

⁵⁷ "Mrs. Jastrzębiec-Bobrowska is known as Marian Bobrowski's wife. He was working for the II Department. The II Department had no idea on the harmful activities of Mrs. Bobrowska against Poland and about her disloyalty as a citizen of the II Republic of Poland. There was no blackmailing the II Department strictly speaking from Mrs. Bobrowska and her husband. But Mr. Bobrowski in financial matters connected to the intelligence service was not loyal to the II Department. There was no information on the immoral behavior of Mrs. Bobrowska".

⁵⁸ CAW, the II Department, docket number I.303.4.401, duplicate of the resolution of the Honorary Court for Officers at the Ministry of Military Affairs L. 86/LXIII of 14 March 1927 in the case of major Tadeusz Kobylański.

around some people of concern. I will send them to Russia on a direct written order. Mrs. Wiera Bobrowska could be a very good person for a cabaret, she was pretty, young and coquettish but totally ridiculous.⁵⁹

However, instead of demanding the swindled state money next, W.T. Drymmer allegedly stated to M. Bobrowski that he was compromised in Estonia, and sent him together with his wife to Poland. Upon his arrival: *Bobrowski was famous for some dark businesses and his wife in Berlin. The II Department got finally that they had been deceived. Wiera Bobrowska was forbidden to come to Poland.*⁶⁰

It should be added that also in that piece of memories W.T. Drymmer was not truthful, because the archive documents show that on June 1st, 1924 M. Bobrowski made a deal with the II Department, according to which he was to establish a company in Moscow called 'Nadzieja' as a cover for intelligence post led by W.T. Drymmer. The Polish intelligence paid him 1,000 USD as an advance and regular salary in the amount of 120 USD monthly. M. Bobrowski was, however, not granted a visa for the USSR, so the plan did not work out. What is worse he was not able to give 1,000 USD down payment back. His next proposal of establishing the same company in Berlin was not accepted by the Polish intelligence.

But the scandal was not the T. Kobylański's trial before the honourable court but the book by Mikołaj Breszko-Breszkowski⁶¹ describing the story, which was the reason of major Kobylański's dismissal from the attaché post in Moscow.⁶²

The above story speaks a lot on the Kobylański's social life and confirms his friendly relations with W.T. Drymmer. And the relation between Kobylański and T. Kowalski had a long story because they both had started in the POW, both had also served in the Commander-in-Chief General Military Aide Office between November and December 1918.

The information on Kowalski's collaboration with the II Department and the French intelligence is confirmed by documents. The fact that he left the Polish Army in 1923 despite his well connections (including with T. Kobylański, with whom he was related) was also a confirmation of his work for the Polish intelligence. We know about his work for the French intelligence, which the II Department of the General Staff also knew, from a writing by lieutenant colonel I. Boerner of September 1923: (...) *a PAT's representative in Moscow, Mr. Tadeusz Kowalski*

⁵⁹ W.T. Drymmer, *W służbie...*, pp. 123–124.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 124.

⁶¹ N.N. Breszko-Breszkowski, *Kariera młodej kobiety*, part II: *Noce Warszawskie: romans współczesny*, Warszawa 1927. It is interesting that the book, which clearly points out Wiera Jastrzębiec as a source of information for its author, indicates that T. Kobylański paid for his journey with Wiera around Europe a huge amount of 8,000 USD. No one paid attention to that excerpt that – if true – pointed out that the bon vivant and card player had huge financial assets. To compare, an average annual salary in the USA in 1920 was 1,407 USD, in 1930 – 1,388 USD. Cf. http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/his/e_prices1.htm [access: 12 X 2017].

⁶² R. Majzner, *Attachaty wojskowe...*, p. 454.

leaves for Warsaw on September 4th on holiday until September 18th. I send this information to you because Mr. Kowalski was at the same time a chief of the French intelligence post in Moscow.⁶³

Archives indicate that T. Kowalski knew closely rittmeister Stanisław Próchnicki, with whom he cooperated in intelligence work. This is interesting because the activity of rittmeister S. Próchnicki in Moscow was known to the OGPU, which – as we can assume – was fully controlled it by their double agents there.⁶⁴ What is interesting there, there was a plot linking T. Kowalski with the Trust affair. When the chief of the station, captain Mieczysław Kotwicz-Dobrzański left Moscow, its “U6” post had been taken by a new officer named T. Kowalski until his final replacement came. The decision was taken by the Polish attaché following recommendations of M. Kotwicz-Dobrzański himself.⁶⁵

Next element from the OGPU testimony was that T. Kobylański was dealing with the then popular black market speculations, that two crucial clues indicate. First, an article from the *Freak* paper suggests that T. Kobylański was caught smuggling⁶⁶, leaving aside vague allegations on ‘the rubber staff’. It was about a foreign diplomat, so the newspaper office had to have confirmed pieces of information, as one may assume, or it was performing an OGPU provocation. Second, according to professor Robert Majzner⁶⁷, the time major Kobylański spent in Moscow is the same as captain Jan Grudzień worked in the attaché office there, who was involved in speculation activities (inter alia golden clocks and rugs) while being the attaché assistant. In his black market activities he was using the Polish diplomatic mail for the cooperation with colonel ret. Taras Wołkowiński as his contractor in Poland. He also established contacts (of trade and social nature, as concluded) with the OGPU agents.⁶⁸ The way the Polish attaché

⁶³ CAW, the II Department, docket number I.303.4.1726, writing with a note *Do rąk własnych Szefa Oddziału II*.

⁶⁴ We can conclude that Rittmeister S. Próchnicki’s sources were controlled by the OGPU from the fact that already on August 9th, 1924 the People’s Commissariat for External Affairs (Rus. Народный комиссариат иностранных дел) called the then Polish *charge d’affaires* to tell him that the activity of rittmeister S. Próchnicki was very well known to the GPU but it was tolerated because they did not want any repercussions from the Poles against the Embassy in Warsaw. Because Warsaw publicized the case of Kazimierz Kobecki, who was accused of espionage, Moscow decided not to do that and deemed him *persona non grata*.

⁶⁵ “Mr. Kowalski has to do his job and send the materials via the Latvian post to Mr. Captain to Riga. At the same time I recommend Mr. Kowalski to you, Mr. captain, as my possible successor if the II Department does not find anyone else. He is an ex officer (lieutenant) of the II Department. He knows the intelligence work and I think that he will accomplish his duties well. If you agree, Mr. Captain, with my project, please hurry up because Mr. Kowalski had already arranged his things in Moscow and wants to leave the city as soon as possible.” Cf. CAW, the II Department, docket number I.303.4.2106, writing of the Intelligence Post „O.5–I” No. 9 of 23 October 1923.

⁶⁶ Diplomatic mail was not a subject to any control and it is hard to assume that T. Kobylański trade in them personally, so it had to be any go-between from the diplomatic post, like Piotr Olszewski, who was employed in 1933 for the next attaché, lieutenant colonel T. Kowalewski.

⁶⁷ R. Majzner, *Attachaty wojskowe...*, p. 542.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 472–473.

office was functioning (lack of space) forced close contacts between officers working there. In this context it should be assumed that there was no possibility that major Kobylański's assistant would deal with illegal activity without any knowledge of his superior (and also without his probable and active cooperation). There are no evidence for that, but such situation seems highly probable.

The thread of T. Kobylański's homosexuality (or rather bi-sexuality) in Sosnowski's testimony as a quote from T. Kowalski is difficult to prove. In the inter-war period homosexuality was carefully hidden because it had to deal with serious social consequences. In this field we can come across another clue – in 1931, when T. Kobylański was working in a Polish diplomatic post in Bucharest as an adviser to the legation, captain Niezbrzycki described the situation on the post in the following manner: (...) *relations in the post here awful. The atmosphere soaked with erotic, homosexuality dominates.*⁶⁹ Although captain J. Niezbrzycki in no way accused in his notes T. Kobylański of homosexuality because the allegations referred to the attaché assistant, rittmeister Alfred Łoś⁷⁰, nevertheless in his first message he wrote about the atmosphere of homosexual erotic on the post, which can imply that there were more people involved. Naturally, these are only speculations, based on information given by a man who was making serious allegations against different people, but we cannot reject them in a situation it is a logic supplement to the information forced by tortures from K. Roller.

To sum up, we should state that the information given by I. Sosnowski are confirmed in the facts we have nowadays. Archive materials show that T. Kobylański, while staying in Moscow, had some features regarded by Soviets as the basis/reason for an effective recruitment: he was exceptionally social and – as his love affair with Wiera proves – he was very fond of women. The above cited archive documents undermine the thesis that I. Sosnowski's testimonies were false – forced by tortures. Each element of the statement cited by the Russian historians has its confirmation in documents, although there might be some inaccuracies caused by the time (I. Sosnowski testified more than 10 years after the events he was describing, probably beaten and under a strong stress). The usual argument that during the interrogations by the NKVD people were ready for everything to avoid pain, in this case is not applicable. And I. Sosnowski testified what had confirmation to a large extent in facts and his testimonies were brief, with no colour and over interpretation. Inaccuracy in testimonies (for example, the above cited excerpts of *the Estreat* to prove a free-living nature of T. Kobylański speak about a fiancée not a wife) – as already mentioned – is obvious. I. Sosnowski, probably tortured, was telling the interrogators all what he remembered – however, it did not guarantee full accuracy of the memories. We should also take under consideration that a majority of his information was second hand information, i.e. from T. Kowalski.

T. Kowalski's behaviour, who – according to the piece cited by Russian historians – established contact with the Soviet intelligence motivated by the will

⁶⁹ A. Peplowski, *Wywiad polski...*, p. 193.

⁷⁰ A. Peplowski, *Wywiad a dyplomacja II Rzeczypospolitej*, Toruń 2004, p. 144. Unpaid bills from brothers were the proof. However, it was not established whether A. Łoś was a gay.

of profits and using acquaintanceships within the OGPU, the Polish renegades from the pre-POW period – refers fully to a psychological mechanism caused by pathologic system solutions in the Polish army. Officers earned not much and, at the same time, they were supposed to meet high social expectations, like for example living a life according to the officer's code. They were usually single men with busy and unresolved personal lives that – which is obvious – involved costs. They were also deprived of stabilization because of constant changes of garrisons and usually living for today. Such situation cause not only certain emotional results but most of all it plunged them into debts, which were problematic for the whole pre-war officer staff. The memoirs of the Abwehr officer from Gdańsk, Oskar Reile confirm that the debts and desire for additional income were the main motives of the officers' betrayals. His Polish agents in the Polish Army, quite big group, did not show any signs of ideological motivation for the cooperation. It was only the possibility to get rich that attracted them.⁷¹

What is more, the above cited sources indicate that there was a strong correlation between the three officers of the II Department of the Polish General Staff, i.e. T. Kobylański, W.T. Drymmer and T. Kowalski. They all started in the POW, they all worked in the Polish intelligence in the USSR and they all were in constant contact with people under full operational surveillance of the OGPU. They all had also some particular character features, that resembled in their social lives, and, finally, they all took up positions in the Polish MoFA.

There is also one more element, which can be a clue of T. Kobylański's links to the OGPU – it is a note sent by him to the chief of the II Department of the Polish General Staff, lieutenant colonel Tadeusz Schaetzel:

What refers to the assessment of the "M" source, bearing in mind his previous work, I am of the opinion that – like the Japanese source – it gives true materials in case of less important subjects, in case of the basic stuff it gives false information. At the same time, I would like to point out that for the last 3 years there was no situation that the "M" source gave a comprehensive answer. Most up-to-date questions stay without any answer at all and three fourth of the materials are sent by the "M" source at his will.⁷²

To understand the real role of this note we need to get the analyses of the OGPU activities to authenticate their agents. The most important element of this note is the date it was sent. T. Kobylański, who had been in Moscow since April 1924 and hold the positions of the 1st attaché assistant, *attaché ad interim*, and, finally, an attaché⁷³, after almost 3 years of stay in Moscow and – as we should assume – being informed on the cooperation with the MOCR-Trust monarchists, he suddenly formulated such serious allegations against the Trust. And, what is important, he did that few months before the

⁷¹ O. Reile, *Der Deutsche Geheimdienst im II. Weltkrieg. Ostfront*, Augsburg 1989, pp. 75–91.

⁷² CAW, the II Department, docket number I.303.4.1803, a letter to the head of the II Department, colonel Tadeusz Schaetzel of 11 January 1927, *Ocena współpracy z Organizacją „M”*.

⁷³ R. Majzner, *Attachaty wojskowe...*, p. 542.

final end of the OGPU operation in the situation that the Soviet leadership had decided on its breakup some time earlier. In his note T. Kobyłański does not refer to any event or information that could suddenly change his assessment of the “M” organization, on the contrary, he uses his three-years experience of observing the cooperation with the Trust. What happened then that he suddenly started to suspect the monarchists, if – for three years – they (...) *did not respond in a comprehensive way and in basic topics they were giving false information*⁷⁴? How could it happen that T. Kobyłański, who suspected for three years that in basic topics (i.e. as one can suspect, priorities for the intelligence) the II Department of the Polish General Staff was deceived by monarchists, he did not informed about that the headquarter? I think, this information can be read both ways: either as a conviction of T. Kobyłański to lie just as others did⁷⁵ (although this had no sense; since March 1923 he could not perform recruitment activities and was responsible for general supervision of the intelligence posts on his territory⁷⁶; then if T. Kobyłański formulated allegations against the Trust, he would only be able to prove in Warsaw his insight as a supervisor), or as an element in the agent’s authentication. If we recall E. Opperput’s testimonies to the Finns which were next passed to the Poles (*testimonies of the arrested convict Kobyłański, Drymmer, Niedziński, Werner, Michałowski, Czyżewski. The Finns believe that, it is necessary to deny it as fast as possible*⁷⁷), the role of the note sent three months before self-exposure of the Trust seems to be different. Because the Soviet used a subversive but effective method of authenticating their agents, i.e. **it was them who accused their agents and, at the same time, they made sure the agents had such intelligence experiences to compromise the formulated accusations.** The additional element of the authentication mechanism applied by the GPU was accusing both the real agents and totally innocent people. Due to such mechanism it was easy to reject accusations as confabulation.

Summary

In my opinion the methodology of reasoning presented in the beginning, despite its heuristic nature, remains within the historical study’s methodology.

Accepting the fact that the Soviets had agents in the Polish MoFA and taking the hypothesis – coming from the intelligence practice – that recruiting those agents

⁷⁴ CAW, the II Department, docket number I.303.4.1803, a letter to the chief of the II Department, colonel Tadeusz Schaezel of 11 January 1927, *Ocena współpracy z Organizacją „M”*.

⁷⁵ It is a lie, in which the lied party has a hidden interest in believing the false (for example a husband who prefers his wife’s assertions on her fidelity rather than to face the consequences of a divorce after proving her lies). In case of special services such situation occurs when a post officer, having some doubts about his agent’s reliability, prefers to “believe” that his source is truthful because it allows the officer to be promoted and to be awarded due to his sources activities.

⁷⁶ CAW, the II Department, docket number I.303.4.1741, a letter from the chief of the II Department to attachés in Moscow, Riga, Rewl, Belgrade, No. 5028/II.Inf.III.B.3 of 24 March 1923.

⁷⁷ AAN, Attachés, docket number A II/94, the note of the attaché in Helsinki to the II Department, No. 743 of 24 April 1927.

they reached for those of easy access to⁷⁸, we can hypothesize on the whole foreign policy of the II Republic of Poland since the mid-1930s to the start of the War with Germans on September 1st, 1939. Despite the lack of access to Russian archives it allows to fill with hypotheses the lacking links in the chain of events on the way to the fall of the Polish Republic. Even if such reasoning has some speculative elements, it allows to understand the phenomenon not understandable until now: why the II Republic of Poland, against its strategic assumptions from the beginning of the 1920s and some noticeable, almost obvious facts, stayed blind for the Soviet threat until September 17th, 1939.

The conclusion, even if based partly on heuristic reasoning, has its cognitive worth and should be a reason for further studies.

Abstract

Based on the archive information released by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, the author of the text comes to the conclusion that the Soviet intelligence had its agents in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1930s. At the same time, a diversity of information gathered by the Soviets and the then model of intelligence that forced the activity of intelligence networks, not single agents, shows that there were many sources placed in the Polish MoFA. Coming from this conclusion, the author hypothesizes on the identity of Soviet agents and for this purpose he uses the intelligence modus operandi and historical information on the possible contacts of the MoFA's employees with the Soviet intelligence during their previous service in the II Department of the Polish General Staff.

Keywords: II World War, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, infiltration, INO GUGB NKVD, Soviet intelligence, modus operandi.

⁷⁸ It can refer to people who were – which we cannot exclude – in any kind of contact with Soviet services since 1920s.