Głosowanie na walnych zgromadzeniach akcjonariuszy jako instrument ładu korporacyjnego w rękach OFE: analiza przypadku Aviva OFE
Pension funds and corporate governance: The case study of Aviva OFE
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The purpose of this study is to examine whether pension funds in Poland, as a significant shareholder of listed companies, usually a minority, engage in corporate governance using the right to vote at general meetings. In particular, it examines whether pension funds refrain from voting or voted against the resolutions on matters which violate their rights of minority shareholders. Also, the study makes an attempt to assess whether the recent legal changes have altered the nature of the pension funds’ voting behavior. The analysis is based on data from the reports on general meetings of portfolio companies published by Aviva OFE for 2007 and for 2012, when the fund took the vote on the 980 and the 1822 respectively. The research results show that Aviva OFE was involved in corporate governance through voting at the general meeting being against resolutions, which clearly violated the interests of the shareholder, such as related to the executive remuneration and property issues. It is interesting that in most cases the fund voted with management on personnel matters or financial matters such as distribution of profit or coverage starts, even though their Corporate Governance Standards declare their willingness to participate effectively in the nomination and appointment of supervisory boards members. There was almost none of the resolutions relating to transactions with related parties, which may indicate a violation of the rights of minority shareholders, who should be able to express an opinion on this subject especially in highly concentrated ownership structure of listed companies in Poland.
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