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Journal
2014 | 22 | 3(87) | 5-26
Article title

Nonconceptual Content and Demonstrative Strategies

Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
In speaking of Demonstrative Strategy (DS), we may have two different things in mind. First, we can mean that demonstratives constitute and organize logicallinguistic activity. Zenon Pylyshyn convincingly argues that demonstratives play a crucial role as preconceptual functions associated with so-called visual indexes. At that level, demonstratives are regarded as elements initiating subsequent stages of logical-linguistic (or, generally speaking, representational) activity. I call this function of demonstratives “Initiating Function of Demonstratives” (IFD) and precisely distinguish it from their most obvious and common use, introduced to the debate on nonconceptual content by Gareth Evans and John McDowell, then discussed in detail by Bill Brewer, Sean Kelly, and their followers. I call it “Instantiating Role of Demonstratives” (IRD). In my paper I argue that both roles of demonstratives strongly support conceptualism as a view on the nature of content of a perceptual state.
Journal
Year
Volume
22
Issue
Pages
5-26
Physical description
Contributors
  • Zakład Ontologii, Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-3159a096-ab04-4ebf-bbab-c6d27464925f
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