The French System of Antitrust Enforcement: A Sui Generis Monist Model

• Authors: Pezza Andrea
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The paper examines strengths and weakness of the French system of competition enforcement, with the aim of contributing to the discussion on the institutional design of systems of competition law enforcement. In this regard, special attention will be devoted to choosing to introduce a clear separation between investigative and adjudicative functions within the same institution: while this solution ensures compliance with the impartiality principle, it also implies a lack of coordination between the board and the investigative services, which could have negative consequences for the administrative activity of the institution

FR

L’article examine les forces et les faiblesses de l’Autorité de la concurrence française, dans le but de contribuer au débat sur la structure institutionnelle la plus appropriée pour les autorités de la concurrence. À cet égard, une attention particulière sera accordée à l’introduction – dans le même Autorité – d’une séparation entre les services d’instruction et le Collège: une solution qui assure l’impartialité des choix pris par l’institution, mais qui détermine aussi une manque de coordination entre le Collège et le Services d’instruction qui peut avoir des effets négatifs sur l’activité administrative de l’institution.

Keywords

EN

competition law; France; impartiality; rights of defence; autorité de la concurrence

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 11(17)
• Pages: 131-141

Dates

published

2018-08-30

Contributors

author

Pezza Andrea

• Economic Law at University of Naples Federico II – Department of Law

References

• European Commission (1979). XI Report on Competition Policy, Brussels and Luxembourg: European Commisison, retreived from: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/26e12860-4710-46be-bcfc-60582d4e51b2/language-en (20.06.2018).
• Jenny, F. (2016). The institutional design of Competition Authorities: Debates and Trends. In F. Jenny, Y. Katsoulacos (eds.), Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries. International Law and Economics(pp. 1–58). Switzerland: Springer, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30948-4.
• Lasserre, B. (2008). La transformation du Conseil de la concurrence en Autorité de la concurrence, clé de voûte d’une régulation de la concurrence moderne, juste et efficace (pp. 1–28). Retrieved from: http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/du_conseil_a_l_autorite_jan09_bl_journal_societes.pdf (20.06.2018).
• Lasserre, B. (2009). La nouvelle Autorité de la concurrence. Concurrences 1, 1–12. Retrieved from: http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/concurrences_1_2009_itv_bl.pdf (20.06.2018).
• Lasserre, B. (2014). A fully-functioning administrative competition authority: the French example, speech delivered at the Competition Conference in Wien. Retrieved from: https://www.bwb.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Bilder/Veranstaltungen/121_10Bruno_Lasserre_Speaking_Notes.pdf (20.06.2018).
• OECD (2015). Roundtable on changes in institutional design of competition authorities – contributon by the French Autorité de la Concurrence for Item VIII of the 122nd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee, DAF/COMP/WD(2014)104. Retrieved from: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2014)104&doclanguage=en (20.06.2018).
• Temple Lang, J. (2011), Three possibilities for reform of the procedure of the European Commission in Competition cases under Regultion 1/2003. Ceps special report, 194-230. Retrieved from: https://www.ceps.eu/publications/three-possibilities-reform-procedure-european-commission-competition-cases-under (20.06.2018).

Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2018.11.17.7