PL EN


2013 | 92: Polityka gospodarcza w poszukiwaniu nowego paradygmatu | 49-71
Article title

Polityczny cykl koniunkturalny w dobie kryzysu

Content
Title variants
EN
Political Business Cycle in Crisis Time
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
PL
Próbując odnaleźć odpowiedź na pytanie dotyczące źródeł kryzysu finansowego zapoczątkowanego w Stanach Zjednoczonych na przełomie 2007 i 2008 r. oraz mającego obecnie miejsce w Europie kryzysu zadłużenia, autor zwraca uwagę na znaczenie działań politycznych, zarówno w kontekście potencjalnych źródeł sprawczych kryzysu, jak również, jako czynników determinujących naprawę finansów publicznych. Nawiązując do klasycznych teorii politycznego cyklu koniunkturalnego wskazuje argumenty mogące świadczyć, iż politycy prawicowi w pewnych warunkach zwiększają zadłużenie państwa. Teza ta nie jest powszechnie znana i akceptowana. Autor podejmuje próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, dlaczego rządy w obliczu kryzysu unikają wprowadzania niezbędnych reform. W efekcie rozważa kwestię, w jakim stopniu wybory polityczne wpływają na zadłużenie gospodarek. Jest to ukryta forma pytania o to, w jakim stopniu ustrój demokratyczny prowadzi do zadłużenia państw.
EN
In an attempt to address the question concerning sources of the financial crisis that started in the United States at the turn of 2007 and the current European debt crisis, the author indicates the significance of political activity in the context of potential factors triggering the crisis as well as the ones contributing to public finance situation. Referring to the classic theories of political business cycle, the author presents arguments that might prove that the right-wing politicians under some circumstances contribute to mounting indebtedness of the state. This thesis is not commonly known and approved. The author also tries to answer the question why governments in view of a crisis are reluctant to launch indispensable reforms. Finally, he discusses the extent to which political choices affect indebted economies. This discussion focuses on the concealed question to what extent democratic system brings about indebtedness to the state.
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
ISSN
0866-9503
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-3798f8a8-3028-4f7a-a97c-20772dc78630
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