Western Denial and Russian Control. How Russia’s National Security Strategy Threatens a Western-Based Approach to Global Security, the Rule of Law and Globalization

• Authors: Gunneriuson Håkan , Bachmann Sascha Dov
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The Russian National Security Strategy of 2015 aims at achieving autarky from Western influences on global security, the rule of law and global trade. Russia aims at attaining this by applying a holistic mix of military, political and economic means to weaken the West and to strengthen its own role as a global player. The Russian approach builds on a strategy of reflexive control which as such is an old method, but the outcome of the application of this approach results in hybrid warfare which as such is a new emerging concept of warfighting. This short article looks at one particular aspect of this Russian strategy, namely using Hybrid, or non-linear, Warfare against its Western direct neighbours in particular and the West in general. We will discuss the underlying cultural logic in Russia’s actions and will reflect on the impact of Russia’s utilization of the existing cultural asymmetry as a form of warfare in regard to the West. The examples used in this text are taken from the context of the conflicts of Ukraine and Syria, but have to be seen as constituting a part of an on-going global conflict aimed at NATO and the EU. The text builds on years of research within the hybrid threat, warfare respectively, context by both authors.

Keywords

EN

hybrid warfare; national security policies; East-West conflict; NATO policy and doctrines; exploitation of cultural asymmetries; disinformation strategies; state vulnerabilities; reflexive control

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
• Journal: Polish Political Science Yearbook
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 1 (46)
• Pages: 9–29

Dates

online

2017-06-01

Contributors

author

Gunneriuson Håkan

• Swedish Defence University

author

Bachmann Sascha Dov

• Bournemouth University
• Swedish Defence University

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Notes

EN

Identifiers

DOI

10.15804/ppsy2017101