Polityka ostrożnościowa w ujęciu makro - cel, instrumenty i architektura instytucjonalna

• Authors: Olszak Małgorzata

Title variants

EN

Macroprudential policy - aim, instruments and institutional architecture

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Artykuł stanowi próbę określenia ram modelu polityki makroostrożnościowej państwa. Polityka makroostrożnościowa powinna zmierzać do zapewnienia tabilności finansowej poprzez ograniczenie ryzyka systemowego, przy czym głównym przedmiotem jej oddziaływania powinny być podmioty sektora finansowego. Ryzyko systemowe powinno być analizowane z dwóch perspektyw – czasowej (związanej z procyklicznością) i przestrzennej (związanej z powiązaniami między podmiotami sektora finansowego). W pomiarze i monitorowaniu ryzyka systemowego można wykorzystać wskaźniki wczesnego ostrzegania oraz metody statystyczne. Do ograniczania ryzyka systemowego mogą być zastosowane zarówno instrumenty używane tradycyjnie przez nadzór nad sektorem finansowym, jak też instrumenty nowo opracowywane w następstwie ostatniego kryzysu finansowego. Na architekturę instytucjonalną polityki makroostrożnościowej składają się: (1) zdefiniowanie podmiotu, który będzie pełnił funkcję nadzoru makroostrożnościowego, (2) określenie uprawnień nadzoru makroostrożnościowego, (3) wyznaczenie granic odpowiedzialności nadzoru makroostrożnościowego.

EN

The article attempts to present key elements of macroprudential policy framework of the state. The objective of macroprudential policy is to maintain financial stability, with the main focus on financial sector. This goal may be achieved by reducing the systemic risk. Analysis of systemic risk should be carried out from two distinct perspectives – time dimension and cross-section dimension. Measurement, assessment and monitoring of systemic risk may be conducted with the use of risk warnings as well as statistical tools. Macroprudential instruments aimed at limitation of systemic risk include tools traditionally used for microprudential purposes and newly invented measures. The elements of effective macroprudential policy institutional design include: (1) definition of a macroprudential authority; (2) giving powers to the authority; (3) ensuring accountability of the macroprudential authority as well as its transparency.

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Problemy Zarządzania
• Year: 2012
• Issue: 4/2012 (39)
• Pages: 7-32

Dates

published

2012-12-12

Contributors

author

Olszak Małgorzata

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Identifiers

ISSN

1644-9584