Konflikt zbrojny w Mali 2012- 2013 (część II)

• Authors: Danielewicz Krzysztof

Title variants

EN

Armed conflict in Mali in 2012-2013 (final part)

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

Based on the analysis of the armed conflict in Mali, it can be concluded that terrorist organizations, despite differences, are able to cooperate with each other very well and threaten the existence of entire countries. Negotiating with terrorists only strengthens their sense of power. Regional international organizations, such as ECOWAS, without real armed forces, ready for immediate use, are useless in quickly and effectively solving armed conflicts. Also the UN is not a very effective organization in solving armed conflicts, it only provides the legal basis for the effective use of troops by other states. In Africa, the fear of military attacks is causing African countries' reluctance to strengthen the armed forces, which leads to the inability to deal with challenges such as the conflict in Mali on their own. The use of mobile maneuvering units, using air support and reconnaissance information, gives excellent results in the fight against terrorist organizations.

Keywords

EN

Azawad; Mali; Islamic terrorism; war

• Publisher: Polskie Towarzystwo Geopolityczne
• Journal: Przegląd Geopolityczny
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 25
• Pages: 133-150

Contributors

author

Danielewicz Krzysztof

• Szkoła NATO w Oberammergau

References

• Cristiani, D., 2012, West Africa’s MOJWA Militants – Competition for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 10, no. 7.
• Escritt, T., 2012, Mali asks Hague court to investigate rebel crimes, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/18/us-mali-crisis-warcrimesidUSBRE86H0RA20120718
• Fessy, T., 2013, Gaddafi's influence in Mali's coup, „BBC News”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17481114
• Flood D.H., 2013, Between Islamization and Secession: The Contest for Northern Mali, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/between-islamization-and-secession-thecontest-for-northern-mali
• Hirsch, A., 2012, Mali braced for military intervention amid fears it could become ‘next Somalia’, „The Guardian”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/06/mali-braced-militaryintervention-somalia?newsfeed=true.
• Lecocq, B., Mann, G., i inni, 2013, One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts: A multivocal analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali Extended Editors Cut*, http://bamakobruce.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/lecocq-mann-et-alhippo-directors-cut.pdf.
• Mali: Avoiding Escalation, 2012, International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°189, 18 July 2012.
• Masters, J., 2013, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), http://www.cfr.org/world/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717.
• Matsili, B., 2015, La geopolitique ethnique et securite en Afrique, Przegląd Geopolityczny, 12, s. 147-158.
• Mben, H. P., Puhl, J., 2013,‘Gates of Hell’: Mali Conflict Opens New Front in War on Terror, Spiegel, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/malioffensive-opens-new-front-in-the-fight-against-terror-a-878750.html.
• Mben, H. P., Puhl, J., Thielke, T., 2013, Darker Sides': The Vast Islamist Sanctuary of ‘Sahelistan’, Spiegel online, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-lawless-sahel-offers-avast-sanctuary-to-islamist-extremists-a-880056.html.
• Morgan, A., 2014, The Causes of the Uprising in Northern Mali, Think African Press, http://thinkafricapress.com/mali/causes-uprising-northern-mali-tuareg.
• Oumar, J., 2012, Islamists seize Algerian consulate in Mali, Magharebia, http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2012/04/08/featu re-01
• Oumar, J., Yahya, M., 2011, Spread of Libya weapons threatens Sahel, Magharebia, http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2011/09/08/featu re-01
• Przybytek, B., 2018, Koncepcja władzy państwowej i prawa w państwach muzułmańskich i demokratycznych, Przegląd Geopolityczny, 23, s. 158-179.
• Sidibe, K., 2013, Security Management in Northern Mali: Criminal Networks and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms, IDS Research Report 77.
• Šimonovic, I., 2013, Islamists use fear, drug money to maintain control of northern Mali – UN rights official, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43258&Cr=+mali+ &Cr1=#.UfaVy40qzX5
• Vriens, L., 2012, Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, Islamists), (a.k.a. GIA, Groupe Islamique Armé, or al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha), http://www.cfr.org/algeria/armed-islamic-group-algeria-islamists/p9154.
• Wilczyński, P.L., 2016, Uzbrojenie armii państw muzułmańskich i ich przemysł zbrojeniowy, Część 1 – Afryka, Przegląd Geopolityczny, 16, s. 59-76.
• Zenin, J., 2014, West Africa: Nigerians in Gao – Was Boko Haram Really Active in Northern Mali?, http://allafrica.com/stories/201401210308.html?page=2