PL EN


Journal
2005 | 6 | 49-69
Article title

Physicalism and the Explanatory Gap

Authors
Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
The source of the intuition of the explanatory gap has never been well understood. It has not been clear why there should be some troublesome explanatory gap given that we have all the empirical evidence for the truth of psychophysical identity. I argue that there is a very natural intuition which explains why the explanatory gap is real and I defend my account against physicalists who deny that the explanatory gap has any significance. On my account, our inability to explain consciousness in physical terms shows that psychophysical identity, even if justified, is not fully intelligible.
Keywords
Journal
Year
Issue
6
Pages
49-69
Physical description
Contributors
author
  • Uniwersytet Szczeciński
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-39edcd97-f8c3-4559-b04f-075b44d666ad
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