PL EN


Journal
2014 | 22 | 1(85) | 85-104
Article title

Stanowisko biologicznego eksternalizmu w kwestii architektury umysłu i natury percepcji

Authors
Title variants
EN
Biological Externalism Approach to the Architecture of the Mind and the Nature of Perception
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The paper presents an attempt to apply the term “biological externalism” to a couple of related positions regarding the general architecture of the mind and the nature of perception: (1) enactivism, also called by its founders, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, neurophenomenology; (2) Thelen’s theory, which emphasizes the role of body and action in cognitive processes; (3) radical enactivism of Noё, O’Regan, and Hurley, which eliminates the category of experience; (4) Clark’s combination of computationism with connectionism. Such conceptions, due to their treatment of the category of embodiment cognition and epistemological externalism in regard to the content of perceptual representations, not only have the same conceptual roots, but also the same aim, namely revision and replacement, or transformation and reconstruction of traditional computationism, which is still the dominant force in cognitive science.
Journal
Year
Volume
22
Issue
Pages
85-104
Physical description
Contributors
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-3b251731-92c7-4ebb-9ece-f8f227e82ee7
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