Abstract

The initial traces of mutual relations between Paris and Ankara date back to the 16th century. During the Ottoman Empire, bilateral relations between the Empires flourished in terms of economic relations where France enjoyed capitulations. The French-Turkish relations encompass both alliances and wars. Currently there exist serious dissidences in terms of democracy, human rights and freedom issues. Apart from that Paris's opposition of Turkey's future full European Union membership blocking five chapters and accepting genocide claims against the so-called Armenian genocide, Turkey's Kurdish question constitute a huge obstacle for the future development of French-Turkish relations.

Key words: Turkey, France, genocide, Ottoman Empire, capitulations.

JEL codes: F5, N4

Introduction

The Turkish-French relations bear a historical aspect that goes back to the 16th century. Ottoman-France alliance continued almost three centuries that played an important role in power politics of Europe. Once the Ottoman Empire entered to the collapse period, the nature of mutual relations dramatically changed; besides, as Napoleon I occupied Egypt – a former Ottoman territory – mutual relations gained a complex character. The period of Enlightenment and in particular the French Revolution had a profound impact on the reformers of the Ottoman Empire and subsequently on the young Republic of Turkey.

Among many other factors, due to dissimilar views on European identity, religion as well as some historical issues (the so-called Armenian genocide), human right violations and freedom of expression, Turkey and France in the course of last decades encountered a tough period. Besides, France opposition to Turkey's full European Union membership also constitutes a serious obstacle in terms of mutual relations and France's “blockage on 5 chapters of accession negotiations, during the last five years despite its international commitments,
has created a discord in political relations”. One may find it rather unexpected for these two countries that both enormous cultural and historical legacy to have such tense relations in contrast to the centuries-long ties.

The main objective of the article is to study Turkey’s relations with France with a focus on history of mutual relations between Paris and Ankara. Accordingly, within the frames of the article it will be an attempt to determine the historical background of bilateral relations.

History of Turkish-French relations

Regardless of the fact that mutual relations between Turkey and France have a long history characterised by friendship, fruitful cooperation as well as mutual involvements, which date back to the alliance of François I and Suleyman the Magnificent in 1536, recently bilateral relations between Ankara and Paris have proven to be a period of a strain. Therefore 1536 is marked as the beginning of the Turkish-French relations with the Franco-Ottoman alliance between François I and Suleyman the Magnificent as the French emperor was in a desperate need for alliance and assistance from the Ottoman Empire. Trade agreements between the countries were concluded and lasted until their abolition with the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. Since 1935 France has continuously had its diplomatic representation in Turkey. France and Turkey have been in the state of war three times in the history. The first war fought by these two countries was in the end of the eighteenth century during Napoleon’s campaign to Egypt and Syria between 1798 and 1800. The second confrontation took place during the First World War, in particular during the Gallipoli campaigns. The third of these wars was during the Turkish War of Independence and is known as the Cilicia War or the Franco-Turkish War of 1920-21. The region of Cilicia had been a focus of interest for France for a long time. On the basis of French-Armenian agreements the French Armenian Legion was established with the aim to take part in the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. After a period of the French-Armenian occupation in several regions of Turkey, the Treaty of Cilicia was signed in March 1931. However, it failed to end the war and was replaced with the subsequent Treaty of Ankara signed in October that year. Despite these three clashes, the Turkish-French relations throughout the history can be described as relatively peaceful and friendly.

Economic dimension of mutual relations

When discussing the mutual relations between France and Turkey it is necessary to emphasise the economic relations that played a crucial role between the countries. In fact, the close cooperation between these two states in the field of economy and trade provides for a strong foundation for a sound relationship. Turkey constitutes France’s fifth biggest market outside the European Union and Switzerland and 12th worldwide. The French Chamber of Commerce in Turkey is as old as 128 years. French exports to Turkey have more than doubled in the recent years. Moreover, France constitutes Turkey’s 7th supplier worldwide and is one of the biggest investors in the country. There are some four hundred French companies operating currently in Turkey, which employ altogether about one hundred thousand people. The French are significantly visible in the Turkish high-technology sector. The boldest examples in this regard include Renault’s first electric family saloon car produced in the Turkish city of Bursa, one of the world’s most modern electric transformer plants as well as intense activity in the field of transport and wind turbines sectors of Alstom in Gebze, the fact that Turkish Airlines is one of the France’s Airbus biggest customers, to name just a few examples. Among numerous French companies operating successfully in Turkey, Thales, GDF Sues, Schneider Electric, Air Liquide, Safran, Dessault Systems, BNP, AXA, Groupama can be enumerated. Moreover, the French Carrefour, Leroy Merlin and Decathlon have enormous presence in the retail sector of the Turkish market. Eventually it is imperative to underline the reality that in the history of mutual relations economic capitulations affiliated to France constituted a vital ground in terms of economic relations.

Political aspects

In terms of political relations there has also been a remarkably visible cooperation between France and Turkey. Within the NATO alliance both countries take part in missions in Afghanistan and the Balkans, just to enumerate two examples. In the recent years, Turkish foreign policy has developed significantly and opened to a great extent leaving a broad field for cooperation. There are common areas of focus of foreign policies of both countries and these include the Near and Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Recently, Turkish interest in influences in some African countries has also been growing offering new possibilities for a joint Turkish-French cooperation. With the Arab Spring challenging old values and principles, yet another opportunity for cooperation emerges, as both Turkey and France support these changes in the Arab world and acknowledge the efforts to establish

democratic and pluralistic institutions. What is more, Turkey and France belong to the most active members of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People aiming at a resolution of the conflict in Syria and putting an end to Bashar Al-Assad’s regime.

Challenges

Turkey’s EU prospect and France

The most burning recent issue determining the Turkish-French relationship was France’s strong opposition to the Turkish aspirations to join the European Union. These objections were in particular emphasised by the former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, which attitudes, in turn, were strongly rejected by the Turkish decision makers. As a matter of fact, Turkey has been Europe-oriented since the 1856 Congress of Paris when Turkey, still Ottoman, was accepted to join the “Concert of Europe”. What is more, Turkey, despite its location outside the European continent for the most part, is a member of the Council of Europe, the OECD and NATO. In addition to this, the Ankara Treaty signed over 50 years ago was in practice an expression of the Turkish orientation towards Europe and the European Union. Throughout all this way of Turkey towards Europe, there were no major objections expressed on the part of the French until the debate over the European Constitution a few years ago. In fact, Chirac supported the Turkish membership and, for instance, in 2004 he made a statement that it would be a mistake to refuse Turkey to access the European Union given the important efforts the country had made in order to access the European Union\(^5\).

Turkey is not the first state to the EU accession of which France opposed. A strong objection was also made towards Great Britain accession which can be best illustrated by Charles de Gaulle’s words:

“The Common Market is a sort of prodigy. To introduce into it now new and massive elements, into the midst of those that have been fit together with such difficulty, would obviously be to jeopardize the whole and the details, and to raise the problem of an entirely different undertaking”\(^4\).

Although these words referred to another country’s accession, they seem to be valid illustrating the French attitude towards the Turkish aspirations to integrate with Europe. This refers in particular to president’s Sarkozy sentiments against the Turkish accession to the European Union observed with a particular

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\(^5\) Hershco T., Sarkozy’s Policy in the Middle East: A Break with the Past?, Insight Turkey, vol. 11, no. 2, 2009.

intensity during the six-month EU presidency of France between June and December 2009. This attitude became clearly visible soon after his election in 2007 when he affirmed in his annual speech to the diplomatic corps that he would block the opening of five specific chapters of the accession negotiations which could allow Turkey to access the EU. In his *Testimony*, Sarkozy defines his views as follows:

“I oppose the views regarding the entry of Turkey to the EU. I fully understand the strategic expectations. However, these expectations can be fulfilled through a strategic partnership agreement. However, entry of a country, whose 98% land is outside European continent, who will be the most populous country of the Union in the coming 20 years, and moreover whose culture mainly carries several aspects of Islam into the EU, will create an overall transformation within the EU, thus will weaken the initial idea of founding fathers of the EU in terms of a political union eventually leading to a chaos... However, if we are late to tell the Turks that they cannot be members, this will be a very impolite behaviour.”

President Sarkozy’s objections were determined by fears concerning the fact that the Turkish accession would deepen the gap between the centre and the peripheries of the European Union member states and the EU could not afford such a big enlargement as Turkey. Another reason for the anti-Turkish attitude was the reheated debate on the Armenian issue (to be discussed later in this paper):

“I cannot understand why Turkey cannot be asked to fulfil its historical responsibility towards Armenia. Chirac, who had the courage to accept the French involvement with the Nazi regime regarding the Jews, should be able to do and should have done so”.

For Sarkozy, a full membership of Turkey was not in line with France’s political culture and foreign policy priorities. He would advocate the association option within the Union of the Mediterranean rather than a full membership:

“[...]France will not oppose the opening of new chapters of negotiations between the European Union and Turkey in the months and in the years ahead, on condition that these chapters are compatible with the two possible visions of the future of their relations: either membership, or as close an association as possible without going as far as membership... I do not want to be a hypocrite. Everybody knows I am only favourable to an association.”

Sarkozy’s views can be explained by his vision of a strong Europe. He tended to perceive Turkey as any other Middle East country to some extent.

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7 Ibid.
The Historical Background and the Present State of Turkish-French Relations

He associated Turkish full EU membership with weakening of the European Union, whereas France would play a key role in the vision of a strong, contained, united European continent. According to Sarkozy, Turkey needed to further review its tradition of secularism and values as a democratic state. It is, however, remarkable, that through opposing the Turkish EU membership Sarkozy’s view stood in contradiction to the EU value system reflected in the Copenhagen criteria which emphasised the value of “unity in diversity”. The French opposition against Turkey’s EU accession during Sarkozy’s term of office created a dilemma for the EU value system, not to mention other, strategic, economic and political factors.

The risks connected with denying Turkey the accession to the European Union can be best illustrated by the words of the Turkish President Abdullah Gul asked about the prospect of national referenda on Turkish EU accession:

“If the people say no, we shall respect their decision. But one must be honest. Everything depends on how things are presented. If one says that Turkey will take a share of Europe’s cake, of course the people will say no. But if one explains that Turkey will make the cake bigger, then it is different. Turkey has a very large potential.”

Attitudes towards Turkish accession to the European Union changed with the election of François Hollande for the office of France’s president in 2012 and France is now ready to develop relations with Turkey as they appreciate the fact that the country constitutes an important partner to France and the European Union. Hollande acknowledges the fact that Turkey is an important player on the international and regional scene and its economy will be of great advantage for the united Europe. France is also aware of the fact that this works both ways and Turkey needs the European Union as it constitutes almost fifty percent of Turkey’s foreign trade and ninety percent of its foreign investment.

In the light of this shift in attitudes and progress towards liberalisation of visa policies, the negotiations and the mutual relationship between the two countries seem to have a perfect ground for development. France is not open and willing to work with Turkey on the promotion of liberties and human rights and Turkey, as illustrated by the words of Turkish president Abdullah Gul to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in October 2012, is willing to accept EU support in this regard:

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9 Lagro E., Why is President Sarkozy Actually against Turkish Accession to the EU? Facts and Challenges, Perceptions, Spring-Summer 2008.

10 Turkey Though French Eyes. First Quarter of 2011 of the French Debate on Turkey, European Stability Initiative 2011.

“Turkey’s relations with the EU, the United States and its NATO allies are not just a foreign policy and security choice, but are based on common values which should lead Turkey to continue down the road of reforms”12.

Despite the shift in attitudes towards Turkey’s EU accession, there is an unresolved issue that seems to impede any progress and stand on the way, namely the question of Cyprus. Solving the problem of Cyprus is one of the European Union’s pre-conditions for the Turkish membership. Efforts to reunify Cyprus have been failing for over forty years now. However, no such pre-condition was stated with regard to the Republic of Cyprus which accessed the European Union in 2004:

“For over four decades efforts to reunify Cyprus have all failed. Unfortunately, the latest round of talks, which began in 2008, for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, has also recently run out of steam. It had been hoped, perhaps rather naively, that a solution could be found in time for a united Cyprus to take up the EU’s presidency. This has not happened. While not declared “dead” the talks are expected to be frozen. This outcome has frustrated Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, which believe the Greek Cypriots have been purposefully dragging their feet, having no need for a quick solution given that they are already members of the EU and enjoy seats in international bodies around the world as they are recognized as the only legitimate government on the island. As a consequence of this frustration, Turkey, which maintains some 40,000 troops in Northern Cyprus and has considerable influence over decision making, partly by keeping the north afloat financially with over $1 billion in aid each year, has recently made a number of statements about a “Plan B” for Cyprus including pressing other Muslim states to recognize the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”13.

Despite the change in France’s position regarding the Turkish EU membership, the country is still in the position to take measures to facilitate the accession process. In fact, much depends here on the policies of the current authorities:

“François Hollande and the new government can today seize the window of opportunity opened in France by the presidential and legislative elections, which have showed a noticeable weakening of the capacity for mobilization of the Turkish issue. They can thus decisively contribute to re-dynamite accession negotiations with Turkey, and do away with the image of France in Turkey as the anti-Turkish shield of Europe. In order to do this, François Hollande could announce an end to France’s refusal to open the four chapters whose current blockage is entirely due to France (given that the fifth falls within the chapters blocked by the European Council as a whole)”14.

12 Ibid.
Armenian genocide issue

A very sensitive and difficult subject in the mutual relations between Turkey and France is the question of the so-called Armenian genocide. It is a reality that in the years 1915-1918, Ottoman Armenians living in the region under heavy condition of the First World War faced dislocation and many Armenians suffered to a great extent with heavy causalities. This very dislocation issue is considered to be genocide by Armenia and presently twenty states all around the world officially recognise Armenian genocide claims including France. Due to this very fact, the Republic of Turkey experiences series diplomatic crisis in international arena where it deteriorates its mutual relations with the states that recognised Armenian claims as genocide. Besides, every 24th of April turns out a diplomatic crisis between Paris and Ankara. Eventually Turkish-Armenian conflict and claims of Diaspora and Yerevan constitutes an official obstacle for Ankara for further EU negotiations and its future European Union membership.

The interpretation of the history constitutes both states to stand in different points. It is stated on the official website of Turkey’s foreign affairs that:

“French legislation of 2001, qualifying the events in Anatolia in 1915 as “genocide” has cast a shadow on bilateral relations. Regarding the same subject, a draft law aimed at penalizing even the questioning of Armenian claims was adopted on 22 December 2011 in the French National Assembly, and on 23 January 2012 in the French Senate. 82 French Senators and 76 deputies petitioned the Constitutional Council for the annulment of the above-mentioned resolution. As a result, the Constitutional Council of France abolished the resolution on the basis of unconstitutionality, due to restrictions it would have on freedom of thought and expression, on 28 February 2012. Turkey adopted a series of measures in its relations with France while the draft law was on the agenda”.

In December 2011, the French National Assembly passed a law the provisions of which included imprisonment sentences and fines of those who denied the Armenian genocide of 1915. This encouraged Sarkozy to pass the bill as he would gain popularity among the voters, most of whom in his constituency were a French-Armenian population. The law was passed in a rather controversial way, with not many deputies attending the session of the Assembly. After the law passed in January 2012, a heated public debate started on how the law violated the freedom of expression. Turkish ambassador in France was called to Turkey for consultations and returned with the aim to make it clear that not only did the bill violate the freedom of expression but it would also cause enormous harm to the bilateral relations between the two countries. In February, the Constitutional Court pronounced the law as unconstitutional basing; however, merely on the premises that it violated the freedom of expression. This, in turn, elicited Sarkozy’s furious reaction. Although Turkey managed to make its point
in this case, there was no winner in this situation:

“Yet, there was an ironic twist to what was happening. Although Turkey had
gotten what it had wanted after a tumultuous process, the outcome could not
be termed a Turkish victory. Those who had lent their signatures to contesting
the law were not necessarily favourably disposed toward Turkish viewpoints.
Some among them probably agreed that the events of 1915 were in the nature of
genocide. They did, however, subscribe to an understanding of democracy and
freedom of expression that did not allow preventing citizens from putting forth
ideas that differed from those of the majority or those of government agencies.
Some also felt that if an international tribunal had designated the unfortunate
events of 1915 as genocide, as in the case of the Gayssot Law that renders the
denial of the Jewish Holocaust a criminal act, then the Armenian law could have
been allowed to stand. [...] During the ordeal, it became all the more evident that
the shortcomings and the weaknesses of Turkey’s democracy did not strengthen
Turkey’s ability to make its case forcefully in the international arena”15.

The issue had far-reaching repercussions. After the bill was pronounced
unconstitutional, the Turkish government took numerous measures against
France and warned that this was only a beginning to a multi-step plan to
gradually introduce tougher measures. These included suspension of political
consultations, end to common military exercises, holding French ships from
entering Turkish ports and military aircraft to use Turkish airspace.

The issue of the so-called Armenian genocide had a significant influence on
the deterioration of the bilateral relationship and is sure to continue to cast its
shadow on the cooperation between the two states. In Turkey, there has been
a strong criticism of France in this regard. The French public opinion, in turn,
criticises the Turkish efforts to minimise, if not deny, the tragedy. Fortunately,
attitudes are on a good way to change, Turkey no longer escapes responsibility
as illustrated by the words of the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu:

“The Armenians have before them someone who is listening. This Foreign
Minister does not claim that nothing happened in 1915”16.

The immigration issue and the Kurdish question

The Turkish immigration and all the social phenomena connected to
it to France also play a role in the bilateral relationship and deserve to be
mentioned in the discussion on the French-Turkish relationship. Immigration
from Turkey to France in significant numbers began in the 1970s and later

15 Turan I., Back to the Drawing Board: French Armenians and Turkish-French Relations, The German
Marshall Fund of the United States 2012
16 Fabius L., France and Turkey. New Horizons for a Long-Standing Relationship, Fondation Robert
Schuman No. 262, 18 December 2012
intensified during the Kurdish crisis in the following decade. Turkish citizens constitute France’s eight biggest immigrant population and the biggest group of all immigrants from Asia amounting to as much as 18% of the entire immigrant population in France. What is more, France is the second biggest host country for Turkish immigrants in the European Union, right after Germany. The Turkish immigrant population in France can be characterised by several specific features. These include, just to name two examples, the lowest share of mixed marriages representing the tendency towards endogamous marriage prevailing among this immigrant group and the fact that Turkish immigrants tend to avoid identifying themselves with the areas they live in and embrace other values such as work, money and leisure thus making their relationship with the French less problematic than the one of other immigrant groups. General French attitudes towards the Turkish immigrant population can be described as assimilationist17.

Relations under François Hollande

Current Turkish-French relations, after a period of deterioration, are gradually improving. After the new president Hollande took office in 2012, he directly decided to speed up the process and scheduled bilateral meetings. He additionally met with the Turkish president on the occasion of the NATO summit in Chicago and with the Turkish prime minister during the Rio Conference on Sustainable Development. Much attention has been devoted to the situation in Syria, Middle East and the subject of the Arab Spring in the bilateral talks between both countries representatives as both parties underline the importance of trilateral cooperation to solve the issues troubling the region. A lot remains to be done in the fields of cultural and scientific cooperation, internal security, justice and business. Plans for opening a Yunus Emre Turkish cultural centre in Paris as well as joint university degree programmes in innovative fields are under way. There is also the need for strengthening relations in the fields of energy, convergence technologies, food industry, and space. Continuation to shared anti-terrorist measures is also on the agenda of bilateral Turkish-French relationship. Much has already been done in this regard. Interior ministers of both countries signed internal security agreements and both countries intend to cooperate closely in this field. As far as justice is concerned, plans on improving both judicial systems, counter fighting international drug trafficking, combating terrorism and domestic violence are made. In terms of business, close cooperation targeted at attracting French enterprises to invest in Turkey and Turkish companies to enter the French market is a priority. Here emphasis is put on the food sector and agricultural trade which, despite its enormous potential, still constitutes only a small percentage of the bilateral

trade. Joint economic partnership is being prepared to enter new markets together\(^{18}\).

In January this year, the French president François Hollande completed the first official visit to Turkey made by a French president since François Mitterrand’s visit to Ankara in 1992. Hollande met with the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The main goal of his visit was to facilitate putting an end to the recent impasse in relations mainly during Sarkozy’s presidency. Turkey may seem to still have much work to be done on the way to the European Union accession as illustrated by the words of a random Turkish citizen interviewed by the FRANCE 24 on the occasion of Hollande’s visit:

“Journalists are in jail, political thinkers are in jail, so many people are in jail. It makes you question how advanced democracy is in Turkey. I’m not very optimistic”\(^{19}\).

Although the Turkey’s EU membership is rather a long-term project, it must continue despite all the obstacles on the way:

“Just as you should not judge the European stance based on passing politicians like Nicolas Sarkozy, you should not judge the situation in Turkey or its potential membership in the European Union based on what the government of Mr. Erdogan does or not does not achieve”\(^{20}\).

The progress, which has already been made in these fields, as well as future prospects for cooperation make the future of bilateral Turkish-French relations seem very optimistic and set Turkey on the best way to achieve its important goal of accessing the European Union which has played an important role in the democratisation and modernisation of the country as well as economy and foreign policy success the country is enjoying these days.

### Conclusion

The history of Turkish-French relations goes back to early 16\(^{th}\) century when French King François was enslaved and his mother asked for Ottoman help; thus diplomatic relations had started. Following that the Franco-Ottoman alliance became a leading power balance against Spain in Europe. Mutual relations between France and Ottomans further flourished in terms of commercial area as France was granted capitulations in Ottoman lands.

Nonetheless the Franco-Ottoman alliance was seriously challenged as Napoleon I started his Egypt campaign and old alliance came across. In Gallipoli campaign, during the First World War, French troops were with

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\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Hollande tries to calm France’s complicated relationship with Turkey, FRANCE 24, 28 January 2014

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
Britain against Ottoman armies. Finally during Turkey’s Independence War local conflicts took place between French forces and Turks. The capitulations once used to be cooperation ground between France and Ottoman gradually turned out to be a serious disadvantage against Ottoman economy any it was abrogated in the Lausanne treaty.

Following the signature of Lausanne treaty Turkish-French relations followed a steady line regardless of the fact that Paris attempted to keep its economic privileges on Turkey. During Hatay’s annex to Turkey the nature of mutual relations were not damaged. As Turkey did not enter into the Second World War the very nature of relations continued and in the post-cold war period Ankara and Paris took part in the same party.

The end of the cold war brought an entirely new conjecture for mutual relations. Now that French decision makers publicly criticised Ankara in terms of democracy shortcomings, human right violations in terms of Turkey war against Kurdish separatist terrorist organisation called PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). Besides, this issue caused controversial discussion in public as regard to Turkey’s future EU membership.

In spite of the fact that the level of mutual relations was relatively smooth under Chirac Presidency, he said that “said that France will hold a referendum on Turkey’s entry into the EU when the issue arises, and any further EU enlargement will also be subject to a popular vote”\(^\text{21}\). Yet one may claim that Turkish-French relations experienced its worst period under the Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. President Sarkozy’s words Turkey has no place inside the European Union: “I want to say that Europe must give itself borders, that not all countries have a vocation to become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place inside the European Union”\(^\text{22}\).

It is an undeniable reality that the roots of mutual relations trace back to centuries; the current level of Turkish-French relation is far a way of being steady. Regardless of the fact that there exist commerce and trade activities between Paris and Ankara, Turkey’s European identity and its future EU membership constitute serious dissidences between the parties. Apart from that the Armenian issue and the Kurdish question also constitute a huge obstacle against future development of mutual relations.

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Tło historyczne i stan obecny stosunków turecko-francuskich

Streszczenie

Pierwsze ślady wzajemnych stosunków między Paryżem a Ankarą prowadzą do XVI wieku. W czasach Imperium Osmańskiego stosunki dwustronne między imperiami kwitły w sensie stosunków gospodarczych, gdy Francja korzystała z kapitulacji osmańskich. Stosunki francusko-tureckie obejmują zarówno alianse, jak i wojny. Obecnie istnieją poważne rozbieżności, jeżeli chodzi o kwestię demokracji, praw człowieka i swobód. Poza tym sprzeciw Paryża wobec przyszłego pełnego członkostwa Turcji w Unii Europejskiej, blokujący pięć rozdziałów [Traktatu] i akceptujący uznanie kwestii tzw. ludobójstwa
Ormian, kwestia Kurdów tureckich, stanowią ogromną przeszkodę dla przyszłego rozwoju stosunków francusko-tureckich.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Turcja, Francja, ludobójstwo, Imperium Osmańskie, kapitulacje osmańskie.

**Kody JEL:** F5, N4

Artykuł nadesłany do redakcji w sierpniu 2014 r.
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