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THE PRINCIPAL ASSIGNMENT OF PHILOSOPHY IN CULTURE**

Every intelligent activity of man aims at achieving a desired goal. The more it strives to be academic, the more precisely this goal is determined, given sufficient methodological rigor. It might seem that in the case of philosophy it cannot be otherwise. It is not only an exceedingly intellectual activity, but also the original source of learning. However, in its scope of ultimate assignments there is a considerable misunderstanding. One can find various ideas in it, such as those in which the goal of philosophy is to get to know divine and human matters (Cicero), save human souls (Porphyry), explain the meaning of existence (Husserl), criticize language (Wittgenstein), get to know the essence and truth of being (Heidegger), unify human speaking and activity (Davidson), reconstruct the types of linguistic competencies (Habermas), develop a theory of rationality (Putnam). It is enough to open Władysław Tatarkiewicz's *Historia Filozofii (History of Philosophy)* to be convinced about the many meanings of the idea of philosophy and fall into some trouble.¹ This seems to be confirmed by Peter A. Redpath, who writes that the majority of today's philosophers are

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¹ Cf. Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii* (vol.1-3, Warszawa, 1990). For instance: „[...] there were thinkers that considered philosophy to be closer to poetry than to science; there were others, for whom philosophizing was a practical activity, as it satisfied some needs while providing no cognition. Among those who did not believe in achieving the scientific aims of philosophy, there were some who philosophized without scientific aspirations, or some others who reduced philosophical aims to narrower classes, less valuable objects, or less universal principles” (*Id.*, vol. I, p. 13).

not able to agree among themselves as to anything – including the terminology which they use, and in particular as to the very term *philosophy*.²

The term *philosophy* is composed of the Greek words *filia* (love) and *sofia* (wisdom), which etymologically is translated as the love of wisdom. In ancient Greece the term *sofia* (wisdom) meant knowledge, education, skill or even ability. Therefore, the title *sofos* (wise man) was applied not only to the learned and philosophers but also to politicians and lawmakers. As an example there is the honored statesman Solon of Athens, whose service on behalf of the state was accompanied, among other things, by such wise sayings as “nothing above limits,” “avoid such pleasures which bring sorrow,” or “discover unclear things based on those that are clear.” The founder of the term *philosopher* is Pythagoras (according to others it is Heraclitus), who in this concept was to contrast the study of the essence of things with striving for fame and money. On the other hand, the term *philosophy* was first used by Herodotus to indicate intellectual curiosity aimed at enriching knowledge. After him, this word was used to describe, among other things, the love of truth, the contemplation of truth, the art of proper thinking and speaking, observing and getting to know the essence of things, meditating on reality, inquiring into the causes of existence.³

The many and various directions and positions lead directly to the question about the identity of philosophy, to questions such as who is a philosopher, what comprises the specifics of his profession, and so on. Contemporary culture usually proposes the reply that philosopher is as much as the thinker.⁴ It might be that someone could be content

² Peter A. Redpath, *Odyseja madrosci*, trans. into Polish by M. Pieczyrak (Lublin 2003), p. 17.

³ See Adam Aduszkiewicz, Piotr Marciszuk and Robert Pilat, *Edukacja filozoficzna dla klasy I gimnazjum* (Warszawa 2001), pp. 7-8; Andrzej Maryniarczyk, „Filozofia,” in *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. III (Lublin 2002), p. 453; Herbert Schnädelbach, „Filozofia,” in *Filozofia. Podstawowe pytania*, ed. E. Martens and H. Schnädelbach, trans. into Polish by K. Krzemieniowa (Warszawa 1995), pp. 60-61.

⁴ The philosopher sometimes is regarded as a day-dreamer who considers undecidable and useless problems (cf. <http://prace.sciaga.pl/21224.html> - 01.10.2005).

with such a response, however certainly any inquiring man could not. Since, if the philosopher is a thinker, then what is the difference between one thinker, in the sense of a philosopher, from another thinker, in the sense of a mathematician, logician, or even poet? Are not mathematicians, logicians and poets also thinkers? The world in which we have come to live seems helplessly to remain in the pose of deep uneasiness, like the student taking an exam who is caught not knowing a basic definition. We therefore live in a world that learned how to distinguish an astronomer from an astrologer with precision, as well as a doctor from a charlatan, but we are not able to distinguish philosophy from that which philosophy is not, and without reflection we ascribe the title of philosopher to all, even evidently unreasonable thinkers.

It is not possible not to notice the chronic lack of agreement among philosophers on matters of determining the nature of philosophy, which harmfully influences its identity, and at the same time its ability to determine its cultural functions. Meanwhile, getting to know the essence of philosophy (its self-consciousness) appears as a principle assignment of philosophy in culture, whichever way the latter is to be understood.

Even though Herbert Schnädelbach clearly objects to the possibility of explaining the name *philosophy* independently of the given concept of philosophy, we will try to undertake this assignment and determine its concept, taking an indirect approach first.⁵ For this goal, let us answer the question regarding what philosophy never was and what it cannot be in order to remain itself.

In a philosophy textbook, *Edukacja filozoficzna (Philosophical Education)*, we read that before philosophy came about, myth ruled human thought. Even several decades ago, it was believed that myth is the primitive reply to natural phenomena, and that its role was reduced with the advancement of knowledge. Meanwhile, studies on myth continue to intrigue many researchers, and without interruption over thousands of years, myths are also inspirations for the most remarkable

⁵ See H. Schnädelbach, p. 61.

artists throughout the world.⁶ From the above remark, two important conclusions result. First, philosophy appeared in the context of myth, which originally ruled over human culture. Second, myth did not become forgotten, but actively exists in this culture. From reading further in the quoted book, myth fulfills exactly the same function in culture that philosophy tries to accomplish. The same problems related to the beginning and nature of the world face both philosophy and myth. Along with the appearance of philosophy, human questions about causes, essence, or even the meaning of phenomenon, things, people, or the world have not changed—only the way of giving a reply has changed diametrically.⁷ As Peter A. Redpath has noticed, philosophy arose as an activity whose goal was to de-mythologize or de-mystify Greek religion. It was to accomplish this by breaking the monopoly on education, which until then rested in the hands of ancient poets, and to propose to all people—if they will only use their natural reason, without escaping into inspiration—participation in wisdom, which until that time was reserved for poets and gods.⁸ If then we are looking for a response to the question of what philosophy never was, then the response must be: philosophy was never myth. The negative criterion for determining philosophy, therefore, is myth.

Barbara Kotowa realizes that in the popular understanding of myth, it is quite unequivocally associated with some kind of universal—functioning in the social sphere, and therefore currently acknowledged—untruth, with something reminiscent of fiction, or even false-

⁶ A. Aduszkiewicz [and others], p. 9.

⁷ See *Id.*, pp. 9-19.

⁸ P. A. Redpath, p. 25. Cf. Henryk Kieres, „Mit,” in *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. VII (Lublin 2006), p. 287: “Historically the very first myths, i.e. the myths *without author*, are featured with anthropological determinism, fatalism, and pessimism. Their view of the world and man is wrong and unverifiable (as it expresses opinions); therefore such myths are historical documents of the first reflections about the world. In the same way ancient Greek humanists and philosophers assessed the myths, and that is why they took the trouble to de-mythologize the knowledge about the world, and clean up the culture from cognitively and morally destructive images concerning the causes of the world and the sense of the human life.”

hood.⁹ The results of contemporary research carried out on myth seem, however, to cast doubt on its popular understanding.

According to Marian Golka, myth is a form of awareness defined by a feeling of truthfulness distinguished—in turn—by the impossibility of objectively verifying the degree of its truthfulness as well as its falsity. Thus, this explains why it is placed somewhat outside the category of truth and falsity (as well as beyond many other polar categories—such as mystification and rationalization, past and present, and the like).¹⁰ Despite the attempt to distance myth from truth and falsity, the above determination itself is not immune to philosophical analysis. If behind the feeling of truthfulness there stood no rational explanation, then myth would find itself outside the limits of intellectual discourse, which would sentence it to a completely unproductive state in culture. However, it is not possible to deny myths their obvious cultural functions and “achievements” in this realm, and hence it entails that this same feeling of truthfulness, whose source is the myths themselves, is necessarily linked with rational reason and undergoes the qualification of truthfulness. The eventual impossibility of objectively verifying the degree of its truthfulness would only move myth from the position of knowledge (*episteme*) to the position of opinion (*doxa*). This nevertheless does not relieve it of possible qualifications, of course not in the category of truth, but in probability. In the light of the above quote, myth possesses the status of hypothesis, waiting not for its verification, as this is not possible here, but for a moment of its own demission and replacement by a stronger feeling of truthfulness related to another myth.¹¹

The only alternative, it seems, for rational arguments can be the emotive side of mythological persuasion. At the same time, however, everything accompanied by human feelings would be counted in the body of myth. Then, myth would be completely an offshoot of human

⁹ Barbara Kotowa, „Postmodernistyczna demityzacja poznania,” in *Mity. Historia i struktura mistyfikacji*, ed. Z. Drozdowicz (Poznań 1997), p. 43.

¹⁰ Marian Golka, „Mit jako zwornik kultury i polityki,” in *Mity...*, p. 9.

¹¹ Then myth appears as so-called *useful fiction*. See H. Kieres, „Mit,” p. 287.

thoughts, words and deeds, in a word—all of human culture, as the thinking, speaking and acting of a man is always followed by his feelings. Nevertheless, the statements about the presence of myth in the entire personal human life do not have to refer solely to emotions. For example, Leszek Kolakowski explains its presence by the fact that it is impossible to overcome disproportions between the small amount of human knowledge and the great extent of the need for it. According to him, a man is characterized by the tendency to give general judgments while possessing only particular empirical information, which eventually seems inevitably to lead to reaching for myth. Though L. Kolakowski clearly distinguishes myth from technology, he does not sway from attributing mythical beginnings to human logic, which indirectly eliminates the initial statement on the existence of something not related to myth in human culture.¹² Myth stops being something external to a worldview, and stops competing with philosophy about the reasons for one's outlook on the world. In exchange, it becomes an element simultaneously constituting philosophy and a human worldview.

Meanwhile, the Italian *Enciclopedia filosofica* neither cuts myth from truth, nor even permits its ever-presence in culture. We can read there that the term *myth* in its proper sense is, more or less, designated as a made-up story, whose goal is to make it easier to understand a fact, truth, or spiritual demand. It is distinguished from other literary genres, such as legend (a saying that in the background includes some historical fact and applies to its nature), or novel (which by definition is something completely made-up), or fairy tale (which possesses a pleasant or moral goal).¹³ The above description of myth clearly justifies the thesis of its competition with philosophy in virtue of its competence in the area of accounting for truth.¹⁴ Myth is not an abstraction from truth; what is more, it aspires to preach, convince, and help to

¹² See Leszek Kolakowski, *Obecnosc mitu* (Wrocław 1994). Cf. Andrzej Mis, „Mit,” in *Słownik pojęć filozoficznych*, ed. W. Krajewski (Warszawa 1996), p. 125.

¹³ See V. Dellagiacomma and G. Santinello, “Mito,” in *Enciclopedia filosofica*, vol. IV (Firenze 1969), p. 682.

¹⁴ It enables one to compare, e.g., a philosophical attempt of explaining the fact of evil in the world with the myth of Pandora.

understand it. Its main feature inheres in its capacity to disrupt the proportion between truth and its justifications. If the truth is an agreement between an idea and a thing (*adaequatio intellectus et rei*), then mythological justification of truth draws strength from its metaphorical perfection.

The relationship of myth to truth is specified by Henryk Kieres. He states that myth is nothing other than one of the forms (aside from utopia and ideology) of useful assimilation of fiction to truth. Though it is an attempt mentally to grasp the whole of human experience, while philosophy, with its goal in giving unity to this experience, uses theory, myth refers to art. As a consequence, the thoughts which compose myth are linked not by their veracity (adequacy with the real world), but their coherency (internal non-contradiction). H. Kieres admits that it is easy to confuse myth with philosophy, since both these forms of organizing human experiences account for the human view of the world, and in particular the view of man captured in the perspective of the final goal of life as well as the methods of achieving it. Myth, however, despite the fact that generally it is artistically non-contradicting, when nevertheless read literally (word for word)—remains false. For it is composed of metaphors (figures of speech) that construct a world that often only exist intentionally (fictionally), and not in reality. Thanks to its non-contradiction (inner sense and comprehensibility) and metaphors, myth has the effect not only on the senses and emotions of its recipients, but also on their minds, where it produces an illusion of reality (illusion of its own veracity).¹⁵

In the light of the above analyses, it is clearly seen that not all of man's thoughts are marked with the presence of myth. What is more, not even every fiction imagined by man deserves such a name. Myth is only one such human invention (fiction, fantasy) that, despite its disjuncture with reality, pretends to be truth about the very same reality. Only such a fiction is myth that attempts to give an account of the real world. Myth is not, therefore, the same thing as art, because if it were, all operations on intentional beings and all imaginings would have to

¹⁵ See Henryk Kieres, *Trzy socjalizmy* (Lublin 2000), pp. 55-79.

be mythical. It is something more serious, usurpation of fantasy in order to become a vision, or usurpation of art in order to become a theory. L. Kolakowski accurately points out the hiatus existing between narrowness of human knowledge of the world and the greatness of the need for it. However, man would be sentenced to mythical arguments in cognition only if this precipice became an abyss. And the very disposing of knowledge about the world, even in a not so large realm, points to the real cognitive possibility of man, which deprives myth of the right to exist.

From its beginning, philosophy was the competitor of myth, since it was tied to getting to know the world existing independently of the human subject. H. Schnädelbach makes clear that to the works of ancient philosophers, which without a doubt did not have any titles, posterity always ascribed the same title: *about nature* (*peri physeos*). They spoke of *physis*, that is, for the Greeks, about that which in the world exists apart from man. Following the echo of their natural religion, they grasped this whole as divine, beautiful, and well organized (cosmos—order, attire, world order), toward which one can take an exclusively theoretical attitude (from *theoria*—being a seer, vision, looking). Since this *physis*, or this *cosmos*, which they expressed with the word *logos* (word, speech, justification, come-to-the-conclusion), they were already very early on called *physiologists* or *cosmologists*.¹⁶ The cognitive aspirations of philosophy from the moment of its beginning clearly strove for emancipating men from the influences of mythical thinking. It seems to be a sufficient argument for seeking the bases of philosophy on the antipodes of myth (meant as antithesis of philosophy). Since mythical argumentation forces human thinking to search for the truth in itself, the source of philosophical justification must be found on the opposite cognitive pole—in the world of real beings, existing apart from man. This allows one to describe philosophy using a direct approach, i.e. by pointing to its constituting factor, which is agreement (*adaequatio*) of thought with the thing that really exists.

¹⁶ H. Schnädelbach, p. 61.

However, objections toward philosophy based on agreement of human thinking with the real world of people and things that surrounds us are raised by, among others, the supporters of the so-called non-classical definitions of truth. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz enumerates four positions that question truth in its classical understanding: the coherence theory of truth, the consensus theory of truth, the evidence theory of truth, and the pragmatic theory of truth.¹⁷ Each of these is an attempt to determine the truth as agreement of thought (opinion, judgment) with a final and irrevocable criterion. Yet, their consequences inevitably turn philosophy from the world of real people and things toward inexhaustible layers of human fantasy. K. Ajdukiewicz points out that the non-classical definitions of truth played a big role in the development of philosophy as such. For they became one of the starting points for idealism, which does not consider the world that surrounds us to be true reality, but degrades it to the role of some mental construction, and therefore a certain type of fiction, differing from poetical fiction only in that the latter is not constructed according to certain, criteriological, rules, with which we are ultimately directed in giving judgment.¹⁸ In the light of the above statement, the question arises as to the relation between non-classical theories of truth and issues of mythical thinking, in other words—between philosophical idealism and myth. Let us try then now to analyze briefly the coherence theory of truth.

In the coherence definition, truth appears as a concord of thoughts with each other. This means that only such a statement can and ought to be regarded as true that is in accord with other statements previously accepted. In other words, a given statement is true if it does not contradict any of the clauses previously acknowledged as such, and if it is in the state of joining the building of the system that these clauses create. K. Ajdukiewicz gives the example of a spoon immersed in a glass of water. The visual information of the observer shows that the spoon is bent, but touching it, on the other hand, shows that it is straight. In

¹⁷ See Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, *Zagadnienia i kierunki filozofii* (Kety-Warszawa 2004), pp. 22-25.

¹⁸ Id., 29. Cf. H. Kieres, „Mit,” pp. 287-289.

such a situation the observer must decide which witness is true. The truth of the statement based on touch is accepted, since only it can agree with the rest of observer's knowledge. According to the proponents of this position, the witness of senses is illusive (leading to contradiction), and that is why it does not fulfill the conditions of the ultimate criterion of truthfulness. The conditions of such a criterion are fulfilled, in their view, only by the concord of a given statement with the rest of the statements previously accepted as true.

The coherence position toward truth, however, places philosophy in a difficult situation. For it is, as it seems, a perfect philosophical argument, but on behalf of myth. Coherentists could defend themselves against such an accusation, admitting that they mean the concord of a given thought not with just any other, but only with thoughts to which sense experience also pertains. However, as K. Ajdukiewicz points out, thoughts based on sense experience can build different systems of coherent statements. As a result of this, the situation might arise in which a considered statement could be compatible with statements of one system, but not in accord with statements of another system: the same statement could appear at the same time true and false. If the coherence definition of truth possessed only such a line of defense, it would be open to obvious doubts. However, there is another more refined way of justifying this position. Since the truthfulness of a given statement is ultimately decided by its agreement with statements based on empirical knowledge, does this mean agreement with the theses confirmed only by the current experiences, or by both current and future experiences? To maintain their position, coherentists stand on behalf of the second option. It allows them to state that at the present moment, when future experiences remain still unknown, no statement can be determined to be true or false. Today, all they have is faith that this will become possible in the indeterminate future. The acceptance of such a view means a rejection of the concept of universal truth (common and eternal) on behalf of local truth (regional and temporal). However, this practically leads to the rejection of all irrefutable statements: all of human knowledge becomes in fact fallible.

The coherence theory of truth seems to deplete philosophy of its argumentative strength in its dispute with myth. What is more, it indirectly becomes a philosophical justification of myth. Since truth is temporally irresolvable, then nothing stands to hinder myth from pretending to be an element of human knowledge about the world. It is difficult to deny myth certain ties to experience (as its topics are issues of the vital problems of man) and inner coherency, which in sum would contribute to justifying its explanatory ambitions. However, from the philosophical point of view, the coherence theory of truth is unacceptable not only due to the negative consequences, most of which myth seems to take advantage of, but primarily due to its internal contradiction. All of the doctrine regarding the undecidability of statements is based on a statement that itself unconditionally does decide about something. This statement claims that at the present moment it is not possible to decide about any statement whether it be true. The coherentist position toward truth, therefore, ought to be qualified as internally contradictory.

Rejecting the classical definition of truth, and stating that affirming unchanging and ultimate truth is an impossible thing would suggest that coherentism has something in common with skepticism. Skeptics, however, maintaining that truth can not be affirmed, justify their cognitive pessimism by negating all the theories of truth (classical as well as non-classical). They begin their reasoning by reminding us of the obvious demands of methodological rigor. Now, in order to predicate truth about something, one must possess an appropriate criterion. The essence of the skeptical argument concerns precisely the quality of this criterion, or—speaking more precisely—the impossibility of obtaining it. Skeptics maintain that in predicating truth, we would have to know from the start that our criterion is truthful, that it always leads to truth. In order to be convinced about its truthfulness, we would have to use another criterion, which in turn should be put to the test; but again to be convinced about the truthfulness of the second criterion, we would have to use another...and in this way without end. The error of regressing *ad infinitum* is therefore the corner stone of the skeptic's thesis that

truth can never be predicated about anything. Skepticism, however, with all its persuasive strength, is not in the state—just like the previously considered coherence definition of truth—of defending itself against the accusation of internal discrepancy. On the one hand, as K. Ajdukiewicz points out, in affirming the thesis of the skeptics we would say that nothing can be accounted for. However, in saying that the thinking of the skeptics justifies their thesis, we would accept against the skeptical thesis that something can be correctly justified, namely at least the very thesis of the skeptics.¹⁹ The skeptics understand this difficulty perfectly well; that is why they also resolutely say that they do not definitely consider anything, but only say what they suppose. The problem is that when a philosopher resigns from uttering his decisive (resolute) voice, then he creates space for all types of narration, including myth. The only chance for philosophical victory over myth is the orientation of human cognition of the real world of people and things. For the reality of the world that surrounds us is the appropriate catalyst separating philosophy from myth, as well as the element establishing philosophical identity.

The awareness of the presence of myth in culture stimulates a deeper philosophical reflection on knowing a world existing independently of us. The effect of such reflection is certainly the classical theory of truth, according to which truth is the agreement (*adaequatio*) of thought with reality. K. Ajdukiewicz says that the essence of the classical definition of truth can be expressed in the following way: thought *m* is true—this means: thought *m* states that it is so and so, and in reality it is so and so.²⁰ Thought is therefore true only then, when its content is in accord with the state of really existing things. For example, the thought that the Earth has a greater mass than its Moon is true, since the Earth has a greater mass than its Moon; and the thought that dogs bark and do not meow is also true, since dogs really bark and do

¹⁹ K. Ajdukiewicz, p. 27.

²⁰ Id., p. 26. K. Ajdukiewicz carries on: „With the latter expression of the classical definition of truth, there are connected some logical difficulties, which demand particular carefulness in using it.” *These logical difficulties* find their resolution in Alfred Tarski’s theory of truth.

not meow. In turn, the thought is false when its content is not in accord with the state of things really existing. Therefore, the thought that the Moon contains a greater mass than the Earth and that dogs meow and do not bark, are not true, since in reality the Earth possesses a greater mass than the Moon and dogs bark and not meow.

Turning attention to the relationship of thought with reality uncovers a certain essential detail for these considerations. In light of the classical definition of truth, human thought appears originally as intentional being, i.e. oriented (set, directed) to reality. Only secondarily does any given thought become a purely intentional being, i.e. oriented to other thoughts. The cognitive dialogue of thought with a thing is not only unfamiliar to the nature of all myth, but is also the reason why people in general have begun to philosophize.²¹ For philosophy is what assists a man to intellectually apprehend things such as they are in this world or as they are related to this world, and it is what helps to escape ignorance.²² Any philosophy that prevents knowledge of the real world is nothing else than a falsification of human knowledge. Such falsification primarily comes about by philosophical idealism, which seeks support in the non-classical theories of truth and affects human culture. K. Ajdukiewicz discerns this, and in his assessment of these theories, he stresses that all of them discern the essence of truth in accord with criteria, i.e. methods, that ultimately decide whether a given statement should be upheld or revoked. Study dedicated to the discovery of these main criteria of our judgment are often interesting and instructive, but yet, identifying the essence of truth as the correlation of one's thoughts with those criteria is a falsification of the concept of truth.²³ Philosophy departing from truth can be followed by the man departing from philosophy. If contemporary philosophy, as P. A. Redpath writes, has lost its value in the eyes of many Western people, this has happened mostly because philosophy is no longer perceived in the West as an assistance to escaping ignorance. All the more, rarely is philosophy

²¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 982b20.

²² P. A. Redpath, p. 20.

²³ K. Ajdukiewicz, pp. 25-26.

seen as the means that enables us to learn how things behave around us, and to discover the existence and nature of real things.²⁴ That is why the return to things that are really existing is the essential condition for the return of philosophy to self-awareness and high cultural status, which it has deserved from its beginning.

In the light of these considerations, philosophical contemplation on philosophy appears not only possible, but also essential. And since it comprises part of human culture, the principle assignment of philosophy in culture is to justify the identity of philosophy itself. In comparison to myth, it enables us to know things as they are in the real world, or as they are related to the real world.

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THE PRINCIPAL ASSIGNMENT OF PHILOSOPHY IN CULTURE

SUMMARY

The following article is focused on the question of the primary task of philosophy in culture. The problem of philosophy itself is the starting point here. The author observes a chronic discord among philosophers on what philosophy is that undermines the identity of the afore-mentioned as well as disables it from determining its tasks in the culture. Thus, he attempts to determine the nature of philosophy indirectly. The author indicates what philosophy is not and has never been from its beginning, and can not be if it be itself. According to the author, myth is an effective negative criterion with which to determine the true character of philosophy. Philosophy's aspiration to emancipate itself from myth's influence justifies the effort to search the foundation of philosophy in contradistinction from myth, and enabling a determination of philosophy directly by indicating its constitutive factors. To philosophize is to know things as they are in the real world, or as they are related to the real world. A reflection on philosophy is not only possible, but also necessary. Since philosophy is part of human culture, the author concludes that the primary task of philosophy in culture consists in justifying the identity of philosophy as such.

KEYWORDS: philosophy, culture, myth, truth, idealism, realism.

²⁴ P. A. Redpath, p. 20.