Polityka stabilizowania koniunktury w warunkach Paktu Stabilności i Wzrostu

• Authors: Lubiński Marek

Title variants

EN

Stabilization policy, and the Stabilization and Growth Pact

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Celem opracowania jest ocena rozwiązań przyjętych w Pakcie Stabilności i Wzrostu z perspektywy ich oddziaływania na możliwości prowadzenia polityki stabilizowania koniunktury. Analiza ta została osadzona w szerszym kontekście refleksji nad kryteriami optymalnego obszaru walutowego. W dalszej kolejności przedstawiono przesłanki teoretyczne uregulowań przyjętych w SGP. Następnie omówiono podstawowe argumenty przeciwników i zwolenników Paktu. Przeprowadzana analiza prowadzi do wniosku, że trudno byłoby uznać SGP za rozwiązanie fortunne. Nie oznacza to bagatelizowania argumentów za jego przyjęciem, jednak nie zawsze przełożyły się one na właściwe regulacje, które zresztą nie są egzekwowane w praktyce.

EN

The objective of the paper is to assess solutions adopted by the Stability and Growth Pact considering their impact on possibilities of pursuing business situation stabilizing policy. The analysis was incorporated into a broader context of reflecting on criteria of the optimal currency zone. Next theoretical basis for regulations adopted in SGP have been presented, followed by primary arguments of the Pact opponents and proponents. The analysis conducted proves that SGP might be difficult to consider a fortunate solution, which does not mean disregarding arguments for its adoption. Yet, the arguments could not always translate into proper regulations that are not practically exercised.

Keywords

PL

Pakt stabilizacji i wzrostu; polityka stabilizacyjna

EN

stability and growth pact; stabilization policy

• Publisher: Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
• Journal: Prace i Materiały Instytutu Rozwoju Gospodarczego SGH
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 82: Polityka gospodarcza w warunkach integracji z Unią Europejską
• Pages: 49-75

Dates

published

2009

Contributors

author

Lubiński Marek

• Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie, Katedra Ekonomii Rozwoju i Polityki Ekonomicznej

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Identifiers

ISSN

9503