THERE CANNOT BE GENUINE SENSATION WITHOUT A REAL SENSED THING

• Authors: Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this essay, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange refutes Kantian and occasionalist notions of sensation that have been smuggled into Thomism and Catholic thought. He maintains that sensation by its very nature requires an object that is sensed, since sensation without a sensible object is no sensation at all. To defend this position, he draws upon Aristotle, St. Thomas, and the Thomistic Commentators, arguing that the opposite position not only denies the distinctions between hallucination and sensation, bodily vision and imaginary vision, but also ultimately denies that the metaphysical certitude of the first principles of reason are materially resolved in that which is sensed.

Keywords

EN

sensation; hallucination; bodily vision; imaginary vision; impressed species; expressed species

• Publisher: International Étienne Gilson Society
• Journal: Studia Gilsoniana
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 4
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 165-179

Dates

published

2015-06-30

Contributors

author

Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange

• Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas (Angelicum), Rome, Italy

translator

Thomas DePauw

Notes

EN

Translated from Latin by Thomas DePauw. Edited by Edward M. Macierowski. Editio prima (the base for translation): “Non potest esse genuina sensatio sine reali sensato,” Studia Anselmiana 7–8 (1938): 189–201.

Identifiers

ISSN

2300-0066