Non-democratic Elements in a Consociational Model: The Case of Lebanese Confessionalism

• Authors: Bahlawan Natalia
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The paper analyses the functioning of the Lebanese confessional model in practise and its dynamics after the 1975–1990 civil war. A growing wave of public discontent with sectarianism in the postwar period has called the legitimacy of the system into question. The paper investigates the sources of confessionalism's setbacks by focusing on two issues: the impact of confessionalism on the functioning of political institutions at the highest level as well as on the procedures for electing political representation (its electoral system). It illustrates the ways in which a model of consociational power sharing, democratic in principle, can degenerate towards an oligarchic regime.

Keywords

EN

Power Sharing; Lebanon

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych PAN
• Journal: Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia
• Year: 2017
• Volume: Tom 1
• Pages: 6-28

Dates

published

2017-06-01

Contributors

author

Bahlawan Natalia

• Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures of the Polish Academy of Sciences

References

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• This is even more sharpened as confessional communities and their leaders often seek external, regional patrons who in turn openly interfere in internal Lebanese politics. See: M. Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing. Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, Irish Academy Press, 2006; T. Fakhoury Mühlbacher, Democratisation and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather. The Case of Lebanon, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009.
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• Ibidem.
• The prime minister signs bills, decrees and treaties. Politicians can be designated as prime ministers multiple times, for example Rashid Karami was nominated 8 times, while Rafiq al-Hariri, a bussinesman and billionaire was holding this post for almost 10 consecutive years.
• The Speaker of the parliament is nominated for period of 4 years and this post since independence has been reserved for the Shiite community. It used to be rather representational and of minor importance for decades prior to the civil war, which reflected the historically marginal position of Shiites. This has changed however because in the postwar period Shiite political leaders demanded a greater access in the confessional sharing of power. See: ‘Lebanese Parliamentarism: Shadow Plays and the Death of Politics’, The Lebanon Report, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 28.
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• Including key decisions such as declaring martial law, signing international treaties, constitutional amendments, passing the budget, electoral law, personal status reforms, giving citizenship, denouncing ministers and nominations for higher government position that require absolute majority. Nominating a number of ministers without portfolios became a solution satisfying ambitions of some leaders and gaining their support for the new cabinet. Ibidem.
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• ‘Lebanon’s Supreme Soviet’, The Lebanon Report, No. 3, Fall, 1996, p. 4.
• Ibidem.
• Salamey, ‘Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options’..., pp. 97–99.
• See Karam, Le mouvement civil au Liban....
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• Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon..., pp. 124–125.
• https://en.annahar.com/article/594740-lebanons-new-election-law-explained (accessed 03.06.2017).
• Damascus regime would openly interfere in the list of candidates and the division of the electorates. See ‘Lebanese Parliamentarism: Shadow Plays and the Death of Politics’, The Lebanon Report, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 29.
• Members and volunteers of the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE), an NGO monitoring the election process since 1996, report on multiple cases of buying votes, correcting votes or ghost voting, by people considered dead or living abroad. During the last municipal elections in 2016, the act of buying votes was widely covered in the media – reporters were showing dollar bills offered voters at the ballot boxes.
• Salamey, ‘Consociationalism in Lebanon...’, pp. 90–95.
• The last municipal elections before 1997 took place in 1963. As the result of a grassroots campaign the Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri withdrew from his prior decision of prolonging municipal mandates for another time. See Karam, Le mouvement civil au Liban..., p. 179.
• See S. Atallah, ‘False Independence: Municipalities and Central Authority’, The Lebanon Report, No. 2, Summer 1998, p. 10.
• http://beirutmadinati.com/candidates/?lang=en (accessed 13.05.2016).
• Beirut shocks its old guard: a challenge to the stinkers: http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21698599-established-leaders-are-jolted-party-protest-beirut-shocks-its-old-guard (accessed 13.05.2016).
• See L. Diamond, J. Linz, S.M. Lipset (eds), Politics in Developing Countries. Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, pp. 7–8.
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• Salamey, ‘Parliamentary Consociationalism...’, p. 464.
• See M. Ottaway, Democracy Challenged. The Rise of Semi-authoritarianism, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003; L. Diamond, ‘Thinking About Hybrid Regimes’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, pp. 21–35.