Power on digraphs

• Authors: PETERS Hans , TIMMER Judith , VAN DEN BRINK Rene
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

It is assumed that relations between n players are represented by a directed graph or digraph. Such a digraph is called invariant if there is a link (arc) between any two players between whom there is also a directed path. We characterize a class of power indices for invariant digraphs based on four axioms: Null player, Constant sum, Anonymity, and the Transfer property. This class is determined by 2n – 2 parameters. By considering additional conditions about the effect of adding a directed link between two players, we single out three different, one-parameter families of power indices, reflecting several well- -known indices from the literature: the Copeland score, - and apex type indices.

Keywords

EN

digraph; power index; transfer property; link addition

• Publisher: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Journal: Operations Research and Decisions
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 107-125

Contributors

author

PETERS Hans

• Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands,

author

TIMMER Judith

• Stochastic Operations Research, Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands

author

VAN DEN BRINK Rene

• Department of Econometrics, Free University of Amsterdam, P.O. Box 15867, 1001 NJ Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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Identifiers

DOI

10.5277/ord160207