

Vojtech Jurčák, Ivan Majchút
Slovakia

IRREGULAR ACTIVITIES AND ARMED FORCES

Summary:

Conflicts in the current world are a global security threat. Conflict resolution is not easy, unless the reason are the political tensions and disputes in the state or between states and the pursuit of resolving these disputes by peaceful or diplomatic forms are unsuccessful. Radicalized non-state actors, who are the other actors of the conflict, do not see the possibility of applying democratic means of solving the problem, and therefore resort to irregular activities with the aim to discredit the government, destabilize the state authority, activate riots, open acts of violence and so on¹. Necessarily this creates conditions for the use of armed force as an instrument of power of the state or peacekeeping force of the international crisis management organizations which are present in conflict resolution.

Keywords:

irregular activities, counterinsurgency, COIN, military activities

Irregular activities

For the purposes of this paper the term “irregular activity” we can define as: *the use or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority*².

Irregular activities become significant when they challenge authority or assume proportions that normal law enforcement cannot contain. From that point they form the basis for irregular threats in all parts of the operational environment that may include not only a state, but perhaps other regional partners. The threat of vulnerable states and regions may trigger multinational intervention.

Irregular activities may be divided into: insurgency; terrorism; criminality; disorder; subversion; etc.

¹ AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine, Brussels 2010, pp. 2-15

² AJP-3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), 2016, Lex-3.

Insurgency is normally characterized by a protracted struggle based on political, economic, social or religious ideology, using violence and subversion³. Insurgents normally feel they cannot, or will not, attain their goals through their country's established governing process. Typically, an insurgency operates from its strengths and avoids the strengths of the government. Insurgents typically seek concealment and support within the population. Insurgents will use subversion, propaganda and measured violence against the government and possibly the population⁴.

Violence against the government will act to destabilize, reduce the perception of legitimacy, and potentially cause the host nation government to overreact, further isolating it from the population, measured violence against the population may coerce it to remain neutral or provide tacit or material support. Terrorists, especially transnational terrorists, and leaders of major criminal enterprises may align with an insurgency, but not necessarily the ideology of the insurgents to take advantage of or foment instability. It is important to distinguish between the true insurgents and their cause and the pure terrorists and their ideals⁵.

The general definition of terrorism is not accepted. In our point of view, terrorism is defined as the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives⁶. Terrorist attacks generally create disproportionate effects on target population. Terrorist tactics may range from individual assassinations to mass murder bombings, and some terrorists have avowed to obtain and employ weapons of mass destruction.

Criminality pervades those states where governance is weak to nonexistent, and it seeks monetary gains unhindered by authority. It may coexist with other types of irregular activity. Trafficking in narcotics, arms, and human beings, as well as piracy are significant forms of criminal activities in unstable regions.

Civil disobedience is the refusal to obey civil laws in an effort to induce change in governmental policy or legislation. It seeks to disrupt or challenge authority, or draws an issue to the attention of the authorities as a result of some form of discontent or perceived injustice. Civil disobedience is characterized by the use of passive resistance or other non-violent means such as protest marches and sit-ins.

Subversion undermines the military, economic, psychological or political strength or morale of a governing authority. Subversion is most effective when

³ U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 2009, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

⁵ D. Kilcullen, *Countering Global Insurgency*, 2004, p. 18, <smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf> (10.12.2016).

⁶ *AJP-3.4.4...*, Lex-4.

consistently conducted over a long period. Non-violent subversive efforts include the use of political fronts, propaganda, agitation, infiltration of government agencies, and non-violent civil unrest.

Unlike common banditry, crime, or recreational brigandage and hooliganism, insurgent groups need popular support. For an insurgency to mobilize and grow, it has to have a core grievance which is viewed as legitimate and which often has a source of ideological inspiration but could also be founded in criminal ambitions.

Many forms of other irregular activities enjoy a symbiotic relationship with insurgency. Nonetheless, insurgents may well appear to conduct perfectly legitimate/legal activities whilst dissociating itself from irregular activity, undertaking such functions through a proxy. Insurgency, like irregular activity, is not constrained by the rule of law, but is likely to share a common centre of gravity with those prosecuting counterinsurgency, namely, the consent and support of the population.

Insurgency is considered an irregular activity, carried out by an organized group or movement. Terrorists, especially transnational terrorists, and criminal enterprises may align with an insurgency to take advantage of the unstable situation, or an insurgency may include some forms of terrorism and major criminal activities to reach its desired end state.

The capability and strategies of Irregular Activists

The intellectual, physical and moral components of fighting power provide a useful framework for understanding the capabilities especially of insurgents as well as other groups engaged in irregular activities⁷.

They could apply doctrine and operational lessons from other insurgents, military organizations and sources available on the Internet.

Networks of friendship, kinship and acquaintance stretch worldwide and are based on common cultural influences, ideologies and shared experiences. They are sometimes reinforced by specialized training, financial requirements and mutual obligations. Many individuals move across ideologically mutually sympathetic organizations and increasingly move from conflict to conflict, taking with them experience in conducting operations.

Irregular activists will not generally prevail against disciplined regular forces through physical means alone and have to seek to exploit asymmetric opportunities by applying their strengths against their opponent's weaknesses at a critical time and place. They do not necessarily seek tactical victories, but maintain a strategic long-term perspective and often aim simply to outlast or wear down their adversaries.

⁷ *AJP-01(D)*..., pp. 1-10.

Irregular activists use a variety of conventional and informal channels to fund their activities through banking networks, often facilitated by the Internet, charities and NGOs.

The motivations for irregular activists are based on the desire to effect or prevent change, for either personal or collective reasons. The motivation is often complex and diverse, but will always relate to an insurgent's cultural background and the context within which they choose to operate.

Often these groups will wish to maintain a state of instability and disorder to facilitate their activities and reinforce the dependence of the population. As such, they would generally oppose any re-establishment of state authority or control by intervening forces.

Mainly, the insurgents are characterized by sophisticated approaches and strategies to apply during the period of time. They may use different approaches at different times and places, applying tactics that best take advantage of circumstances. They may also apply a composite approach that includes experiences drawn from other approaches.

The most illustrative example is Chinese Mao's Theory of Protracted War which the aim was the seizing political power. According this theory, the first phase of an insurgency normally begins with the government having stronger forces than the insurgents. The second phase of an insurgency normally starts when force correlations approach equilibrium and the use of armed elements of insurgency becomes the most important, pervasive activity. The third phase of an insurgency begins when insurgents feel they that have superior strength and a portion of their military forces attempt to fight in a conventional manner⁸.

Activities for achieving the goals

Insurgents could primarily use the following activities or instruments for achieving their goals: violent activities; national and international propaganda; social assistance; social and political activism; international relations.⁹

Insurgent violent activities may take many forms, including actions of armed elements, terrorism, and riots.

Actions of armed elements is carried out by armed forces, generally small, organized into a military structure and commanded by a commander. Their method is harassing and interfering with the adversary. It normally starts with population support in a territory controlled by the adversary. It is a form of combat that eludes direct engagement. It also avoids being an identifiable target for the adversary. Consequently, armed elements primarily use surprise, mobility, and focused attacks followed by immediate dispersal and can occasionally include terrorist actions. Therefore, there is not a clear line distinguishing one method from another.

⁸ D. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare. Theory and Practice*, Pittsburgh 2006.

⁹ *AJP-3.4.4*, pp. 2-30.

Terrorism is a set of violent actions aimed at subjugating the population, weakening and undermining the influence of legal authorities' and interfering with their actions. In order to achieve maximum propaganda and psychological impact – enormously facilitated by the globalised media – terrorists use surprise, provoking a chain of attacks in time, targeting symbolic entities. Their aim is to create a climate of fear among the population without directly facing them, promoting groundless discouragement, undermining their morale, and making them feel helpless.

Riot is a modality of violence aimed to intimidate the population or interfere with public order by destroying public/private material goods causing direct engagement with security forces. Riots cause disturbances, and organized strikes and illegal demonstrations can have an attritional effect on government authority, presence and capacity. The press and other media can have a multiplier effect in this sort of action. Insurgency generally generates riots as a complementary form of irregular activities.

Insurgents need the local population and international public opinion to know and support their cause and to confront their adversary. Through social assistance insurgents win local support and legitimacy, especially in those countries where the state government is weak, corrupt or failed.

Local insurgencies can establish relations with other insurgent groups that are acting in other countries. Insurgents may also seek material support from other states, or moral support from individuals and NGOs or other organizations with worldwide influence.

Military Contribution

Armed forces are endowed with immense military power, versatility and an enduring ability to manage and project firepower, they have to operate in close coordination with non-military actors. The previous text shows that the deployment of military power in the operational environment, where irregular warfare is applicable, is focused on the use in the fight against insurgency so-called counterinsurgency – COIN. The use of military power in other potential irregular forms is less likely. In this case, it is possible to consider the application of the principles and strategies applicable to COIN. This cooperative and collaborative effort is required to stabilize the environment and to contribute to the defeat of COIN. Commanders must act as diplomats as well as soldiers.

Armed forces are, more than ever, operating where the human factor predominates and action on the ground and the capacity for discrimination in the use of force are vital for success. In operations that take place “amongst the people”, armed forces face opponents for whom asymmetric attack is the norm.

As every insurgency is unique, COIN will require the considered application of the full range of military activities. Operations in a COIN campaign combine offensive, defensive and stability activities in order to achieve the

stable and secure environment needed for the restoration of essential services and the further development of effective governance. While securing the host-nation (HN) population, NATO and HN forces must also neutralize the insurgent military wing. This effort includes a spectrum of activities, including combating and capturing irreconcilable insurgents, combating terrorism and shaping perceptions through information activities.

Military objectives

As stated, the aim of the military contribution to COIN is to secure the population and neutralize the insurgent. Analyzing this aim allows the commander to establish the following military objectives: secure the population; isolate the insurgents from their support; neutralize the insurgent armed organization¹⁰.

Achievement of these objectives will contribute to successful achievement of the political end state of defeating the insurgency and addressing core grievances.

The commander should identify what the military may be required to contribute to human security tasks, recognizing that military provision is a last resort and that the main responsibility lies with international organizations and the host nation government. Failure to provide for the populations' needs may undermine the foundations of stabilization as the people struggle for survival.

Defeating an insurgency requires armed forces to sever the insurgents from their support base by isolating them from their resources and the outside environment. This helps to provide the counterinsurgents with freedom of action for subsequent military action.

Denying insurgents access to safe havens and sanctuaries that may be present in the surrounding region will be an important element of any COIN, and this will need a high level of political as well as military involvement. In complementing these actions, armed forces may need to conduct operations to deny insurgent movement, possibly in partnership with neighbouring countries or international spaces. This peripheral posture, which could contribute to regional stability, may be enhanced through regional actors' situational awareness of insurgency issues, and in turn support the legitimacy of the military presence in the region.

Targeting the insurgent's organization places emphasis on neutralizing the mechanisms, systems, methodologies and structures of the insurgency. These efforts are aimed at neutralizing the insurgent's strategy and organization. It is vitally important to correctly determine the balance between actions focused on the population and the conduct of overt and covert actions focused on the insurgent's organization.

¹⁰ *AJP-3.4.4* ..., p. 4-2, Section III.

Neutralizing the insurgent's armed organization stops the insurgent's use of violence. It is a long-term effort, is often more psychological than physical, and is often achieved by involving the population. Depending on the situation, several approaches can be chosen or combined and should consider influencing or shaping key actors. One approach is to create conditions in which insurgents must concentrate and attack friendly forces in a conventional manner, which will make them more vulnerable to the strengths of military forces. Another approach could be to defeat the insurgency in detail, after isolation had been achieved by an adapted task organization of military forces committed to maintaining contact.

Building the capability and capacity of indigenous security forces is vital to effectively fighting an insurgency and should be seen as the optimal solution.

Operational Approach

We can use the NATO preferred operational approach to COIN – the Clear, Hold, Build (CHB) framework. CHB is civil-military action taken in COIN which combines foreign armed forces, host nation and civil actors. CHB encompasses offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities. CHB must be driven by an in-depth understanding of the operational environment¹¹.

CHB approach contains phases which are likely to be non-linear in progression and are linked to a series of decisive conditions that allows a transition of responsibility and authority to the host nation. This process requires a comprehensive approach and sufficient resources¹².

Insurgency contexts are complex and multifaceted. The scope and nature of the military contribution may vary. In such circumstances, a key part of the planning process involves an analysis of the conditions required to enable the earliest practicable transition of tasks to capable civilian actors and the host nation government.

Campaigns will pass through a number of transitions as they progress. Planning for them in advance is critical to the successful management of a campaign. Transitions usually involve the progressive handover of responsibility from the intervention force to other actors. Progress on transitions is essential to campaign success as it meets the expectations of the host nation government and its population, and demonstrates a momentum that underpins confidence in the overall operation.

CHB framework is the evolution of the shifting predominance of offence, defence and stability activities during CHB phases. CHB progresses based on the security situation; however, it should be noted that this is the ideal situation and the enemy will endeavour to unhinge the counterinsurgents' efforts.

¹¹ *SVD-30-44 Spoločná vojenská doktrína. Vedenie operácií proti povstaniu (COIN)*, Bratislava 2011, p. 89.

¹² *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 2006, p. 9-2.

Execution of Military Activities

Offensive Activities

Attack and Raid may be used locally to neutralize insurgents and to gather intelligence using joint assets. This will often be conducted in urban areas amongst indigenous people, and therefore particular attention has to be paid to avoid collateral damage which will inevitably undermine the legitimacy of the force¹³.

Defensive Activities

Because reconstruction and transformation are antithetical to insurgency, soft targets and foreigners are usually in the crosshairs of insurgents. The natural reaction is to conduct civil COIN where it is safe to do so, which means virtually writing off those areas where it could do the most material and political good. The field-level security of civil COIN personnel and operations must be treated as a major mission of security forces. Improved civil COIN capabilities may, but will not necessarily, reduce reliance on the use of force¹⁴.

Stability Activities (Security and Control)

Convoys are often vulnerable targets that need armed escorts for their protection. They can even be high-value targets because of their crucial importance for the counterinsurgents, such as the provision of logistic supplies food, water, ammunition, petroleum, medical supplies and humanitarian relief supplies for civilians and the protection of transportation assets. Insurgents will not content themselves with blocking convoys but will seek to destroy them, even at times attempting to take hostages. The vulnerability of those being escorted makes the mission even more difficult and, as a result, demands very detailed preparation and requires special training for military forces to react spontaneously to ambushes, obstacles, IEDs and attacks with indirect fire assets¹⁵.

Cordon and search is to search for and capture insurgents and equipment that may be among the population or sheltered in favourable locations. This type of activity should be limited and requires a very high level of secrecy in order to generate surprise. It is intelligence-led and triggered on the basis of accurate and targeted intelligence complemented by technological assets (such as unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic intelligence assets). Advantage over insurgents is obtained through isolation by using forces as “sealing off” elements and through the freedom of action allowed by a “covering” element.

The main objectives pursued are to re-establish the counterinsurgent’s authority over the population, to isolate the population as much as possible from the insurgents, and to gather the necessary intelligence leading to the elimination of the insurgent organization. Controlling the population requires conducting a census and even sometimes imposing a curfew.

¹³ *SVD-30-44...*, p. 94.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 139.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 175.

Stability Activities (Support to Security Sector Reform)

It is a much wider concept than rebuilding security forces alone and it is not a purely military activity: the legal system, the judicial process, detention and prison services, and the police may all require assistance that is beyond military capability and will rely on other services or nations to provide the expertise. This in turn requires a coordinated response and is part of a wider comprehensive approach. Within that framework the military contribution will vary but, when required, will be essential.

The training of host nation security forces is a vital aspect to defeat an insurgency using the domestic resources available and facilitating the rule of law. This is a core military function. Advisers and trainers are often tasked with mentoring these forces by involving them in ongoing operations and, in time, handing over to them the lead for the planning and conduct of security operations.

The process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is aimed at reducing the number of illegitimate armed groups by removing them from a specific context - disbanding their military structures, and equipping former combatants with appropriate civilian life skills and employment opportunities. It involves disarming and demobilizing armed groups and reintegrating former combatants who have not been absorbed into the armed or security forces of the host nation back into civilian life.

Stability Activities (Support to Initial Restoration of Services and Initial Governance)

The population must be protected from insurgents. It is crucial to avoid a situation in which counterinsurgents are dominant during the day and the insurgents are dominant during the night. Armed forces should communicate on the positive aspects of movement restrictions to the populace regarding their security, and of the patrolling in the villages that deny the insurgents any occasion to conduct retaliation actions against the locals, and securing the areas where locals are working.

The host nation government should foster reconciliation between the population and insurgents, including unknown, potential and captured insurgents. The main actor in the process is the population. Real efforts at reconciliation demonstrate the will to transcend temporary conflict and give hope to the population dealing with the daily consequences of insurgency. In this way, the treatment of detainees has a crucial impact, especially with respect to future insurgent recruitment and the general undermining of the insurgents. Once the loyalty of former insurgents is confirmed, their integration within the local armed forces will provide a useful knowledge of the insurgent system.

An innovation is the introduction of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The aims in each theatre are different, as are the command and control arrangements, but the underlying purpose is the same as coordinating reconstruction and development initiatives in individual provinces and extending the

jurisdiction of state and local government. At best, PRTs should be a reflection of a comprehensive approach and include not just military members but cross-government personnel, including those involved with agriculture, education, health, economy and industry.

Military units deployed in COIN

Military contribution in COIN can realize: Land Component; Maritime Component; Air Component.

As the population lives and works primarily on land, much of securing and protecting the population is accomplished by deploying manpower within the population with an enduring presence. This includes both NATO and HN security forces. However, HN forces can be the primary providers of manpower to maintain this enduring presence. The current COIN operational approach – direct, balanced or indirect – will determine the size, footprint and roles of, and the relationship between, HN and NATO land forces¹⁶.

For COIN, the maritime component plays a critical role in controlling the seas, which may be vital to isolating an insurgency physically and psychologically. The maritime contribution to COIN will continue to be vital because much of the world's population lives in littoral areas, including large coastal cities. Demographic projections also indicate that the population of these areas will continue to grow in overall numbers and relative to inland populations. A large proportion of this burgeoning population may live in poverty, which may be a key core grievance leading to insurgency. Due to the rise in population and potential unrest, the likelihood of COIN being conducted in the littoral areas also increases. COIN in littoral areas has important maritime considerations.

Air forces play a vital role in the military contribution to COIN. These forces are especially capable of countering different types of insurgency members, and of gathering information. Air contributions include CAS, including precision strikes, air interdiction (AI); airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); communication; combat support; and air mobility. Air, efforts in coordination with space forces and capabilities can provide considerable asymmetric advantages to counterinsurgents. If insurgents assemble a conventional force, air assets can respond quickly with joint precision fires or the ability to airlift ground security forces to remote locations to track down and eliminate insurgents. Air power enables counterinsurgents to operate in rough and remote terrain, areas that insurgents traditionally have used as safe havens. The air component may be the supported component in COIN when attacking approved insurgent sanctuaries that are outside land or maritime forces' operational areas.

Taking account, the above, COIN operations place a premium on land component (boots on the ground).

¹⁶ *SVD-30-44...*, p. 185.

Task organization for counterinsurgency operations is often substantially different from how units are task organized in conventional operations. During counterinsurgency operations, many units do not perform their traditional role. For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, many artillerymen have served in infantry, civil affairs, military police, or intelligence roles.

Possible military structure

Given the extended nature of COIN, tactical units must maximize all available assets to accomplish missions in each of the COIN LOEs and sustain Soldier proficiency, physical fitness, and emotional and psychological well-being. A means to maximize the employment of all assets is referred to as troops-to-task analysis. This process enables units to correctly assign tasks to units of appropriate size and capabilities.

Often conducted during planning process, staffs and tactical units begin troops-to-task analysis by determining a standard size element to use as a baseline (Infantry platoon, Armour platoon, Cavalry platoon, company, or others). The staff determines the forces available (often including HN security forces). Then, the staff or tactical unit lists and prioritizes each task and determines the forces required to accomplish each task using the baseline unit as a measure. Finally, the tactical unit and staff uses the commander's planning guidance to array forces and assign tasks.

In larger COIN efforts, American army create Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). They will usually provide the required command and control apparatus to conduct sustained tactical operations. Typically, a BCT's boundary is aligned with a Host Nation governmental boundary. BCTs also allocate resources to their subordinate battalions and coordinate with higher military headquarters, Host Nation government officials, HN security forces, NGOs, or US agencies.

Once a BCT is given an Area of Operation (AO), they, along with the Host Nation, should be the controlling headquarters for all other elements in their AO. This should include the temporary attachment for control, if not command, of any element that is physically within their AO. Examples would include the United States Agency for Internal Development (USAID), Corps of Engineers, Military Police, advisor teams, reconstruction teams, Host Nation security forces, or private contracting security firms, since these elements may not completely understand the intricacies in the BCT's assigned AO.

The military force conducting counterinsurgency operations will not always consist of manoeuvre forces. Counterinsurgency operations are manpower intensive and therefore infantry, armour, artillery, reconnaissance, and military police battalions are the primary tactical building blocks for combat in a counterinsurgency environment. The composition of the tactical force in counterinsurgency operations depends upon these available forces and the threat that is faced. Aviation, engineers, military working dog teams, special operations forces, and reconstruction teams are key force multipliers for the counterinsurgency force. In deciding how to use these forces, leaders assess the factors of

METT-TC. Normally, most ground combat elements are organized to fight as manoeuvre forces. However, the proper use of other forces can provide the counterinsurgency force with many advantages.

The Host Nation security forces must be included or, in some cases, drive the unity of effort of the counterinsurgent effort. HN security forces can be integrated in planning cells, share bases with US forces and, at a tactical level, conduct parallel planning in corresponding staff sections. Additionally, HN security forces give many benefits to counterinsurgency efforts.

Possible military capabilities

Units conducting counterinsurgency operations have identified the need for additional capabilities beyond their standard task organization. Human terrain teams, document and media exploitation teams, personal security detachments, detainee holding areas, Host Nation security force advisor teams, base commanders and base defence commanders, explosive ordnance disposal teams, company intelligence support teams, and tactical site exploitation teams have all proved useful during recent operations.

A *human terrain team* is a group of civilian anthropologists attached to brigades and battalions. This team helps the unit understand local cultures. These social scientists aid leaders in better understanding relevant cultural history, engaging locals in a positive way, and incorporating knowledge of tribal traditions to help resolve conflicts.

Document and media exploitation teams (DOMEX) process, translate, analyze, exploit, and share hard copy documents and electronic media collected during operations. This capability increases in importance as the rule of law is re-established and insurgents go to trial, rather than long term detention.

Due to the organization of brigade and battalion headquarters, commanders and sergeant majors lack the combat power needed to move freely around the battlefield. In recent operations, units have either built ad hoc organizations or tasked platoons to serve as escorts so that they can reconnoitre the AO, attend meetings, engage locals, check on Soldiers, and better visualize the fight. These are often called personal security detachments. Most theatres have implemented a three or four vehicle rule for convoys, which make this unit's strength at least twelve Soldiers strong.

A *detainee holding area (DHA)* is a temporary location used to field process and house any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force, and provide resources for intelligence exploitation. Detainees are kept here for a short period of time before being released or being sent to a theatre internment facility. The DHA generally consists of a semi-permanent structure designed to house detainees. Basic infrastructure includes shelter, latrines, basic hygiene facilities, medical care, interrogation facilities, and evidence holding areas.

Host nation security force *advisor teams* conduct operations to train HN military individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment and integra-

tion of land, air, and maritime skills; provide advice and assistance to military leaders; and provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures. These teams can be resourced by the BCT or battalion, or provided by DA. Their size and capability varies on the size of the HN security force being advised.

Base commanders and base defence commanders are typically internally resourced personnel and units of the brigade, battalion, and company level who command and control the base and supervise the defence of the base.

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support provides the capability to neutralize domestic or foreign conventional explosive hazards, which include unexploded ordnance (UXO), booby traps, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), captured enemy ammunition, and bulk explosive. EOD units detect, mark, identify, render safe, and dispose of explosive hazards. Also, EOD specialists work with intelligence personnel to conduct explosive forensics to help identify the makers of the devices, as well as their ever evolving methods of construction, placement, concealment, and detonation.

Human intelligence collection teams (HCTs) are teams with trained HUMINT collectors that collect information for people and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions, capability, strength, disposition, tactics, and equipment. The team uses human sources as tools and a variety of collection methods to satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements. They can conduct source operations and interrogate detainees.

A PSYOP team is a team that reinforces the effects of tactical and non-tactical operations, as well as discrediting and demoralizing the insurgency. Their actions enhance the probability of accomplishing the unit's mission.

A civil affair team (CAT) is a team that helps a unit establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between the unit and civilian organizations, governments, authorities, and populace in an area of operations. Civil affairs core tasks include populace and resource control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance, civil information management, nation assistance, and support to civil administration.

Company operations teams sometimes referred to as company intelligence support teams are a group of two to six individuals at the company level who enhance the company commanders' situational awareness of their area of operations by producing intelligence at the company level. They collect and analyze patrol reports, human intelligence reports, and battalion intelligence reports. As a result, they are able to conduct link analysis, conduct pattern analysis, create target folders, and enemy situation templates.

Site exploitations teams are teams at the company or battalion level that execute systematic actions with the appropriate equipment, to ensure that personnel, document, electronic data, and other material at any site are identified, evaluated, collected, and protected to gather information to be developed into

intelligence and facilitate future operations. They may collect biometric, physical, digital, and spoken data.

Conclusion

The rise of political, religious, and ethnic extremist ideologies fuels conflicts worldwide. The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Many states are unable or unwilling to exercise control over their territory or frontiers, leaving them open to exploitation. Weak or failing states suffering from stagnant economies, corrupt political institutions, environmental issues, poor public health or epidemic diseases, or those that are caught up in multinational competition for their natural resources too often become hotbeds for conflict. This conflict in turn provides a nurturing environment, protection, and cover for insurgents and transnational terrorists. The competition for the contested populations within these weak or failing states will be one of the key objectives of irregular activities.

Use of force in resolving conflicts in the state or between states is a last solution. It is declared in the UN Charter, as a basic document for the preservation of peace and security in the world. Peacekeeping force to be declared for the resolution of the conflict must be prepared to eliminate the irregular activities. Achieving the objectives of peacekeeping operations or missions we can expect if the peacekeepers have the necessary capability. This significantly reduces human casualties, material losses and reduces the time to resolve the conflict.

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