EDITORIAL: DIALOGUE AND OTHER FORMS OF INTERSUBJECTIVE COMMUNICATION

• Authors: Czarnocka Małgorzata
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

We are pleased to present to our readers a monothematic issue of Dialogue and Universalism entitled DIALOGUE AND OTHER FORMS OF INTERSUBJECTIVE COMMUNICATION. The previous journal’s issue devoted to dialogue was published in 2013, and since then Dialogue and Universalism has published separate texts on dialogue and related issues. The topic of this issue is at the very heart of the journal’s thematic scope. However, it encompasses a broader problem area than dialogue itself, i.e., it also formulates and considers problems of other forms of intersubjective communication (in the broad sense of intersubjectivity), that is, problems of forms of communication other than dialogue, among others, problems of announcing and linguistically advocating particular aims in non-dialogical way, propaganda, conveying information, and forming and propagating disinformation, as well as problems of communication playing the role of a foundational and necessary means of action. The topic of this Dialogue and Universalism issue is so broad firstly because forms of communication belong to a common kind. The boundary between dialogue and other forms of intersubjective communication is not sharp; moreover, all forms share „family” (generic) features which are blurred. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss dialogue alone while completely excluding other forms of communication. In revealing the nature of dialogue, analysis of these other forms is useful—it allows us to discern both „family” features as well as characteristics that distinguish dialogue from other forms of communication. Secondly, dialogue in social practices lacks a stable, universal identity, as it appears as a complex of its (universal, as one might postulate) essence and cultural and social factors. Therefore, the line separating dialogue from other forms of communication in real sociocultural situations is variable and blurred—between them lies an area of indeterminacy which contains communication forms with uncertain or undefined identities. Thirdly, and most importantly, other forms of communication are as crucial to understanding the contemporary world as dialogue itself. The current dynamic development of intersubjective communication is playing a leading role in transforming the human world. Communication serves as a means of transmitting both knowledge and pseudo-knowledge, and also as a means of shaping individual and collective consciousness. It is also the foundation of action, including being one of the primary means of struggle—in business, politics, and so on. Unfortunately, dialogue itself does not currently seem to play a leading role. Most often, calls for dialogue are limited to hazy or empty slogans and declarations. These slogans camouflage the actual intentions of those who express them, and in any case they are rarely followed by a constructive activity in the social sphere. The texts in this issue are divided into two groups. The first group, titled DIALOGUE contains texts that consider existing philosophical concepts of dialogue and the authors’ own reflections on dialogue—reflecting the breadth of the issues at stake. The second group, titled COMMUNICATION TODAY, examines communication issues in the contemporary world. The first collection includes a text analyzing Aristotle’s ancient concept of dialogue and texts referring to contemporary philosophical considerations on dialogue. In the collection DIALOGUE it is worth paying attention to Michael H. Mitias’ concept of dialogue, which is extensively analyzed and discussed by Emily Tajsina, also by Muhammad Sultan Mubarok, Putri Ayu Mayang Sari, Ananda Aprilia Aulia Syara, Sri Herianingrum and also referred to in other texts of this Dialogue and Universalism issue. The unique character of Mitias’ concept becomes clear when compared with other contemporary philosophical concepts of dialogue, which explain it as follows (I quote after Michael A. Peters and Tina Besley): “[from]…the 'fusion of horizons’ (Gadamer), through dialogue as the 'ideal speech community’ and redemption of validity claims inherent in ordinary discourse (Habermas), to dialogue as the 'great conversation of mankind’ (Oakshott) and minimalist conversational ethics as the basis for civility (Rorty),” and, moreover, David Bohm’s concept, which has been drawn from Eastern sources.1 It is worth adding here other philosophers of dialogue: Franz Rosenzweig, Ferdinand Ebner, Eugen Rosenstock-Hussy, and Eberhard Grisebach. All of them maintain that dialogue is a form of conversation, as something linguistic. These conceptions follow the philosophical source of the word „dialogue”—dialegomai, which originates from ancient Greece and means “to become involved in a conversation with another.” Mitias, on the other hand, offers a clearly ontological conception of dialogue, by grounding dialogue in human nature. For Mitias, dialogue is the foundation of human life. Mitias’ conception is far more radical than others, especially than Franz Buber’s I and Thou anthropic concept, and than those mentioned above, who constitute the contemporary core of thinking about dialogue, theorizing dialogue as something merely linguistic. Mitias’ thinking is based on commonsense intuitions and convictions. Moreover, Professor Mitias and other authors in this volume expand the understanding and scope of dialogue beyond dominating philosophical meanings, precisely, by broadening the meaning of the participants in dialogue. In the philosophy of dialogue, the belief prevails that dialogue is a relationship between two human beings. Mitias, on the other hand, speaks also of dialogue between institutions, religions, and cultures. Mykhailo Beilin, Iryna Soina, Oleksandr Zheltoborodov, and Oleksandr Saltan postulate that dialogue is also a special relationship between humans and artificial intelligence, while Lidiya Gaznyuk, Yuliia Semenova, Olena Orlenko, and Hennadii Honcharov favorably present the dialogue between humans and wildlife, so they develop an idea similar to that postulated by Buber. Surprisingly, the notion of a much broader scope of dialogue than a meeting or conversation between two human beings is poorly investigated by today philosophy. Expanding the set of participants in dialogue in philosophical insights is grounded in intuitions and beliefs outside of philosophy, where is talk of dialogue between humans and artificial intelligence, and dialogue between societies, nations, and religions. Among other things, authentic authorities, relatively rare and largely ignored in mainstream media, call—unfortunately, generally unsuccessfully—for dialogue between states, even groups of states and especially hostile blocs of states. The idea of dialogue between religions is also present in the contemporary human world; it belongs to the progressive religious circles’ canon of thinking and initiates ecumenical endeavors. It is it is worth remembering here that the idea and postulate for perhaps the most desirable and basic expansion of dialogue, namely the idea of dialogue among civilizations, was proposed by Mohammad Khatami, former President of Iran at the United Nations in 1998. This way Mohammad Khatami responded to Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory. The UN subsequently declared 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations.2 Thus, it is outside philosophy, not within it, that one can find the most daring and progressive postulates for expanding the scope of dialogue. The ideas of Professor Mitias, the texts of Mykhailo Beilin, Iryna Soina, Oleksandr Zheltoborodov, Oleksandr Saltan, as well as Lidiya Gaznyuk, Yuliia Semenova, Olena Orlenko, and Hennadia Honcharov, the reflections of Rafał Pastwa, and other essays in this Dialogue and Universalism issue overcome philosophy’s backwardness in relation to the above-mentioned non-philosophical beliefs and ideas. The challenge of expanding the scope of dialogue participants to include artificial intelligence, wildlife, religion, culture, and so on is the nature of subjectivity. Participants in dialogue must be subjects, and the subject is philosophically considered inextricably endowed with consciousness. This raises the question of whether culture, religion, artificial intelligence, and nature (wild or not) are subjects, whether they should be assigned a specific equivalent of human consciousness, individual or collective, or whether the necessary attribution of subjectivity to consciousness should be rejected. The second part of this issue, entitled COMMUNICATION TODAY, examines communication issues in today’s cultural and social transformations. These transformations are not limited to the digital revolution, and especially not to the emergence of the Internet and its impact on individual and collective human life, nor to the role of social media. They also extend into the spheres of politics, business, culture, religion, and even science. We hope that reading so diverse, valuable and important considerations presented in this Dialogue and Universalism issue will be an inspiring intellectual experience.

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk; Fundacja Filozofia Na Rzecz Dialogu
• Journal: Dialogue and Universalism
• Year: 2025
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 7-10

Contributors

author

Czarnocka Małgorzata

• IFiS PAN Warszawa