PL EN


2015 | 1(10) | 14-30
Article title

Why Legal Conventionalism Fails

Authors
Content
Title variants
PL
Dlaczego konwencjonalizm w prawie zawodzi
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
The term “legal conventionalism” covers a set of broadly discussed legal theories explaining the fact of law’s existence by reference to the “conventional rule of recognition”. Some of them are aspiring to be so-called “fully fledged theories of law” and explain the normativity of law by reference to the same fundamental, conventional fact. The article presents some recently discussed views (including the ideas of E. Lagerspetz, A. Marmor, S. Shapiro) alongside with counter-arguments showing why conventionalism fails. Eventually, the basic points of critique can be shaped in terms of the distinction between instrumental and substantial reason.
PL
The term “legal conventionalism” covers a set of broadly discussed legal theories explaining the fact of law’s existence by reference to the “conventional rule of recognition”. Some of them are aspiring to be so-called “fully fledged theories of law” and explain the normativity of law by reference to the same fundamental, conventional fact. The article presents some recently discussed views (including the ideas of E. Lagerspetz, A. Marmor, S. Shapiro) alongside with counter-arguments showing why conventionalism fails. Eventually, the basic points of critique can be shaped in terms of the distinction between instrumental and substantial reason.
Year
Volume
Pages
14-30
Physical description
Dates
published
2015-01-01
Contributors
author
References
Notes
EN
Document Type
Publication order reference
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-46bd2af6-1614-4b6e-a205-9324aa9f77b3
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