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2010 | 15 | 1 | 65-89
Article title

Conflicting Higher and Lower Order Evidences in the Epistemology of Disagreement about Religion

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Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
This paper concentrates on the issue of what happens to the confidence one has in the justification of one's belief when one discovers an epistemic peer with conflicting higher and/or lower order evidences. Certain symmetries surface during epistemic peer disagreement, which tend to make one less confident. The same happens in religious disagreements. Mostly externalist perspectives are considered. The epistemology of ordinary disagreements and that of religious ones behave similarly, such that principles used in the former can be seen to apply also in the latter.
Year
Volume
15
Issue
1
Pages
65-89
Physical description
Dates
published
2010
Contributors
author
  • Huston-Tillotson University
References
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  • Frances, Bryan, “Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20, no. 1 (2012): 1–21. doi:10.1080/09672559.2011.629366.
  • Fumerton, Richard. “You Can’t Trust a Philosopher.” In Disagreements, edited by Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield, 91–110. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0006.
  • Haddock, Adrian, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, eds. Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001.
  • Inwagen, Peter van. “It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything Upon Insufficient Evidence.” In Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today, edited by Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder, 137–153. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996.
  • Kelly, Thomas. “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.” In Disagreements, edited by Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield, 111–174. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007.
  • Kraft, James. “An Externalist, Contextualist Epistemology of Disagreement about Religion.” Ars Disputandi 9, no. 1 (2009): 11–30. doi:10.1080/15665399.2009.10819994.
  • Kraft, James. “Religious Disagreement, Externalism,and the Epistemology of Disagreement: Listening to Our Grandmothers.” Religious Studies 43, no. 3 (2007): 417–432. doi:10.2307/20006390.
  • Lackey, Jennifer. “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.” In Social Epistemology, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0015.
  • Ludlow, Peter, and Norah Martin, eds. Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 1998.
  • Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
  • Sosa, Ernest. “The Epistemology of Disagreement.” In Social Epistemology, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0014.
  • Thune, Michael. “Partial Defeaters and the Epistemology of Disagreement.” The Philosophical Quarterly 60 no. 239 (2009): 355–372.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
URI
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=53739334&lang=pl&site=ehost-live
URI
http://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=forphil&id=forphil_2010_0015_0001_0065_0089
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-47158573-75cb-4f37-b0b5-4b0a6cfd18b6
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