Conflicting Higher and Lower Order Evidences in the Epistemology of Disagreement about Religion

• Authors: James Kraft
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper concentrates on the issue of what happens to the confidence one has in the justification of one's belief when one discovers an epistemic peer with conflicting higher and/or lower order evidences. Certain symmetries surface during epistemic peer disagreement, which tend to make one less confident. The same happens in religious disagreements. Mostly externalist perspectives are considered. The epistemology of ordinary disagreements and that of religious ones behave similarly, such that principles used in the former can be seen to apply also in the latter.

Keywords

EN

Philosophy of Religion; Theory of Knowledge; Justification (Christian Theology)

• Publisher: Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie
• Journal: Forum Philosophicum
• Year: 2010
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 65-89

Dates

published

2010

Contributors

author

James Kraft

• Huston-Tillotson University

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.5840/forphil201015118

URI

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=53739334&lang=pl&site=ehost-live

URI

http://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=forphil&id=forphil_2010_0015_0001_0065_0089