Senses of objectivity. Henri Poincaré and Ernst Cassirer in the context of structural realism

• Authors: Luty Damian

Title variants

PL

Sensy obiektywności. Henri Poincare i Ernst Cassirer w kontekście realizmu strukturalnego

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Celem artykułu jest częściowe uzasadnienie negacji tezy, którą nazywam tezą o genezie realizmu strukturalnego. Dotyczy ona postulowanych w obrębie pewnej metafi lozofi cznej narracji związków między współczesnymi stanowiskami zwanymi epistemicznym realizmem strukturalnym i ontycznym realizmem strukturalnym, a poglądami fi lozofów z początku XX wieku. W artykule rekonstruuję wymienione dwa stanowiska, postulowane związki, jakie mają one mieć z dwoma fi lozo-fami, Henri Poincarém oraz Ernstem Cassirerem, a następnie przedstawiam, dlaczego te postulowane związki są nietrafnie rozpoznane. Niesie to za sobą wnioski dotyczące swoistości wymienionych stanowisk oraz pojęć obiektywności i rzeczywistości w ich kontekście.

EN

The goal of the paper is to, at least partly, justify the rejection of what I term the thesis of the origins of structural realism. This thesis deals with the connections, postulated by a certain metaphilosophical narrative, between the contemporary positions of epistemic/ontic structural realism and the views held by physicists and philosophers from the early 20th century. In the paper I summarize the above-mentioned positions and the relationships they are supposed to have enjoyed with the philosophy of Henri Poincaré and Ernst Cassirer. I then proceed to illustrate why such relationships are ill-founded and present conclusions about the unique nature of both structural realism and the notions of objectivity and reality in their context.

Keywords

EN

Henri Poincaré Ernst Cassirer epistemic structural realism ontic structural realism conventionalism idealism realism objectivity

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 18
• Issue: 67
• Pages: 17

Dates

published

2020-03

Contributors

author

Luty Damian

• Adam Mickiewicz University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy

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Identifiers

DOI

10.33392/diam.1171

ISSN

1733-5566