Title variants
Intuicje moralne w dyskursie trafu moralnego
Languages of publication
Abstracts
The main aim of the author is to analyze the term “moral intuitions”, used in discussions pertaining to moral luck. He presents the contemporary psychological estimation of moral intuitions based on the research of Jonathan Haidt (Social Intuitionist Model) and philosophical moral intuitionism. He claims that these two approaches do not have one subject of interest; hence, psychologists and philosophers study two different phenomena, both of which can serve as grounds for discussion concerning moral luck. However, the author concludes that there are valid reasons to question the normative status of moral intuitions in both psychological and philosophical senses, proving the discussion to be very complicated. On the other hand, he names coherentism as a possible cipher to adequately describe or even solve the problem of moral luck.
The main aim of the author is to analyze the term “moral intuitions”, used in discussions pertaining to moral luck. He presents the contemporary psychological estimation of moral intuitions based on the research of Jonathan Haidt (Social Intuitionist Model) and philosophical moral intuitionism. He claims that these two approaches do not have one subject of interest; hence, psychologists and philosophers study two different phenomena, both of which can serve as grounds for discussion concerning moral luck. However, the author concludes that there are valid reasons to question the normative status of moral intuitions in both psychological and philosophical senses, proving the discussion to be very complicated. On the other hand, he names coherentism as a possible cipher to adequately describe or even solve the problem of moral luck.
Year
Volume
Pages
41-52
Physical description
Dates
published
2015-01-01
Contributors
author
References
Notes
EN
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-49102a95-2332-4d56-8897-dd0762007b8a
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