UWAGI POLEMICZNE DO TEKSTU KATARZYNY KUŚ WYOBRAŻENIA OBRAZOWE JAKO ŚWIADECTWA NA RZECZ PRZEKONAŃ MODALNYCH

• Authors: Jacek Jarocki

Title variants

EN

POLEMICAL REMARKS ON THE TEXT BY KATARZYNA KUŚ IMAGING NOTIONS AS TESTIMONIES TO THE MODAL BELIEFS

• Languages of publication: PL
• Publisher: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
• Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 61
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 171-178

Contributors

author

Jacek Jarocki

References

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