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2019 | 3 | 1(7) | 104–121
Article title

Value Commensurability in Brightman and Scheler: Towards a Process Metaethics

Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
In the following paper, both Max Scheler and Edgar Sheffield Brightman’s rankings of value are compared. In so doing, Brightman’s table of values is found wanting along the lines of Scheler’s value rankings. The reason is, in part, that Scheler’s ordering of preference and hierarchy of feelings more readily explain what Brightman’s account presupposes: affective intentionality. What is more, we can apply Brightman’s test of consistency to Scheler’s account and find it more desirable than how Brightman defines what values are in his A Philosophy of Religion (1940). Between both thinkers an account will emerge that can help clarify the commensurability of values in experience-based accounts of value in both thinkers. In doing so, a blended account reaches three conclusions about how each personalist might adopt points the other would have suggested to him. (1) Love is the process of coalescement in rough outlines; (2) The ordo amoris should reflect the rational coherence of Brightman’s more systematic laws; (3) And the demand of coherence means that phenomenology in Scheler becomes a system of idealistic metaphysics concerning values despite the fact that Brightman thinks the moral law system will hold phenomenologically regardless of which metaphysical interpretation of reality holds sway about values.
Year
Volume
3
Issue
Pages
104–121
Physical description
Dates
published
2019-04-30
Contributors
  • Department of Fine Arts, Humanities and Wellness, Savannah State University
References
  • Brightman, Edgar Sheffield. Persons and Reality. Edited by Peter Bertocci. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958.
  • Brightman, Edgar Sheffield. A Philosophy of Religion. New York: Prentice Hall, 1940.
  • Brightman, Edgar Sheffield. Moral Laws. New York: Abingdon Press, 1933.
  • Buford, Thomas O. “Persons in the Boston Personalist Tradition.” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2006): 214–218. https://doi.org/10.1353/jsp.2007.0000.
  • Buford, Thomas O. and Harold H. Oliver, eds. Personalism Revisited: Its Proponents and Critics. New York: Rodopi, 2002.
  • Burgos, Juan. Introduction to Personalism. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 2018. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1zxskrz.
  • Burrow, Rufus. Personalism: A Critical Introduction. Saint Louis: Chalice Press, 1982.
  • Dorrien, Gary. “Making Liberal Theology Metaphysical: Personalist Idealism as a Theological School.” American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 24, no. 3 (September 2003): 214–244.
  • Everett, W. G. Moral Laws. New York: Holt and Company, 1918.
  • Frings, Manfred S. The Mind of Max Scheler: The First Comprehensive Guide Based on the Complete Works. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2001.
  • Hackett, J. Edward. Persons and Values in Pragmatic Phenomenology: An Exploration of Moral Metaphysics. Malaga, Spain: Vernon Press, 2018.
  • Hackett, J. Edward. “Why Ethics is a Normative Science,” Appraisal 11, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 14–24.
  • Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy. Translated by John W. Harvey. London: Oxford University Press, 1958.
  • Scheler, Max. Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values. Translated by Robert L. Funk and Manfred S. Frings. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
  • Scheler, Max. Ressentiment. Translated by Lewis B. Coser and William W. Holdheim. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2010.
  • Spader, Peter. Scheler’s Ethical Personalism: It’s Logic, Development, and Promise. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002. https://doi.org/10.5422/fso/9780823221776.001.0001.
  • Vacek, Edward. “Scheler’s Phenomenology of Love.” Journal of Religion 6, no. 2 (April 1982): 156–177. https://doi.org/10.1086/486932.
Document Type
Publication order reference
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-49eff09e-14c9-43d6-bf3d-846700cb17ec
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