2015 | 1(31) | 22-36
Article title

To what extent do some fundamental concepts of New Institutional Economics help explain the governance phenomenon?

Title variants
Na ile nowa ekonomia instytucjonalna pozwala wyjaśnić fenomen współzarządzania?
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The paper is an attempt to describe synthetically the relationship between the New Institutional Economics theory and the problem of governance research. The undertaking requires, without doubt, an in-depth research and extensive analysis, taking into account the various concepts developed by New Institutional Economics, and above all used to analyze the phenomenon of governance. Of necessity, the present paper is a far incomplete analysis of the problem, but allows one to present the basic commonalities and differences between the logic of economic analysis and its subject – which in this case is governance. For the purpose of this text, we define governance in accordance with the model of network governance as put forward by Leach et al. (2007).
Tekst stanowi próbę syntetycznego opisu relacji między nurtem Nowej Ekonomii Instytucjonalnej a problemem badawczym współzarządzania. Przedsięwzięcie takie wymaga bez wątpienia dogłębnych badań i rozbudowanego ujęcia, uwzględniającego poszczególne koncepcje wypracowane zarówno po stronie Nowej Ekonomii Instytucjonalnej, jak i przede wszystkim w analizie fenomenu współzarządzania. Z konieczności więc niniejszy tekst ma charakter dalece niekompletnej analizy problemu, jednak pozwala na przedstawienie zasadniczych elementów wspólnych, jak i rozbieżności między logiką analizy ekonomicznej a jej przedmiotem – który w tym wypadku stanowi współzarządzanie. Rozumienie współzarządzania na potrzeby tego tekstu ograniczone jest do modelu współzarządzania sieciowego w ujęciu Leach i in. (2007).
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