US UNDECLARED WARS: PRESIDENTIAL REQUESTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION/SUPPORT FOR USE OF FORCE

• Authors: Rzepcka Marta

Title variants

PL

AMERYKAŃSKIE „CICHE” WOJNY: JAK PREZYDENCI PRZEKONUJĄ KONGRES DO AUTORYZACJI/POPARCIA UŻYCIA SIŁY

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Niniejszy artykuł poświęcony jest prezydenckiej retoryce wojny, a w szczegól-ności prezydenckiej retoryce użycia siły. Na przykładzie prezydenckich wniosków do Kongresu o autoryzację/poparcie użycia siły artykuł analizuje elementy, które definiują i kształtują retorykę użycia siły, porównuje jej elementy z elementami retoryki wojny i ocenia znaczenie wyników analizy dla badań nad prezydenckim językiem wojny.

Keywords

PL

prezydent; Kongres; retoryka wojny; dyskurs użycia siły; przedłużona misja wojskowa

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Rzeszowski. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego
• Journal: Polityka i Społeczeństwo
• Year: 2018
• Issue: 2(16)
• Pages: 5-21 (17)

Contributors

author

Rzepcka Marta

• Centrum Języków Obcych Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, ul. Zelwerowicza 4, 35-601 Rzeszów, adres e-mail: [e-mail]

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Identifiers

DOI

10.15584/polispol.2018.2.1