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Lying and the Relevance-Theoretic Explicit/Implicit Distinction

Abstract

The focus of the paper is on lying in verbal communication. The main aim of the paper is to examine the act of lying with reference to the explicit/implicit distinction in the cognitive, relevance-theoretic, model of utterance comprehension (cf. Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995; 2004; Wilson and Sperber 2002; 2012), which rejected the maxim of truthfulness for the sake of the Principle of Relevance. The paper views lying in the context of interpersonal communication, as a pragmatic act and a linguistic strategy intentionally employed by the speaker to manipulate the hearer’s interpretation of an utterance. Since encoded linguistic meaning (logical form) falls far short of determining the proposition expressed by an utterance (explicature) and its implicatures, there is a potential for a liar to achieve his/her goal by influencing the interpretation process at different stages of pragmatic enrichment. Accordingly, an attempt is made in the paper to categorize lies by placing them along the explicit-implicit continuum, depending on the type of pragmatic task that is to lead the hearer to a false belief.

1. Introduction

Lying has been subject to extensive discussion and empirical analysis, and has received a number of various accounts in several fields of philosophy: Barnes 1994, Sorensen 2007, Martin 2009, Carson 2010, Saul 2012, to mention just a few. Within philosophy a lie has been classically defined in opposition to truth as saying something one believes to be false with the intent to deceive one’s listener: A lies to B iff A says that p (proposition) to B, believing that p is false, and thus intends to deceive B into believing that p is true (cf. Augustine c395, ed. Deferrari 1952; Bok 1978; Davidson 1985; Williams 2002). Recently, lying has been discussed in relation to deceiving and misleading, with conclusions that intending to deceive is not a necessary condition on lying (cf. “bald-faced lies”) (Sorensen 2007) and that there is no significant moral difference between lying and merely misleading, where lying is equated with deceiving by assertion and misleading with deceiving by particularized implicature, i.e. cases when the speaker says something true in order to conversationally implicate something
false (Saul 2012; Stokke 2013). There is a multitude of definitions of lying, but there is no universally accepted definition of lying. My aim here, however, is not to give a critical overview of these definitions. I am more interested in the linguistic, semantic-pragmatic analysis of lying as it turns out that although lying has been viewed from a variety of perspectives (philosophy of language, ethics, sociology, psychology, etc.), there are relatively few linguistic accounts of the phenomenon. Whereas the semantic accounts attempt to explain the meaning of the verb *to lie* within the framework of componential semantics (Puzynina 1981; Wierzbicka 1996) or prototype semantics (Coleman and Kay 1981), the pragmatic accounts (Grice 1975; Antas 2000; Meibauer 2005; 2011; 2014ab), which are the point of reference for our analysis, view lying as related to the speaker-intended meaning.

The present paper is an attempt to place and describe the phenomenon of lying within the relevance-theoretic model of communication (Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995; 2004; Wilson and Sperber 2002; 2012), which rejected the maxim of truthfulness on the grounds that “expectations of truthfulness – to the extent that they exist – are a by-product of expectations of relevance” (Wilson and Sperber 2002, 584). An empirical analysis of lies along the explicit-implicit continuum is preceded by a brief summary of selected pragmatic accounts of lying (section 2) and the relevance-theoretic account of truthfulness and deception, with the focus on “epistemic vigilance” (section 3). Since the paper views lying as a linguistic strategy intentionally employed by the speaker to manipulate the hearer’s interpretation of an utterance at the level of explicit or implicit content, section 4 is devoted to the explicit/implicit distinction as viewed within Relevance Theory. Finally, the analysis of selected data in sections 5 and 6 is to illustrate the potential of a liar to deceive the hearer by controlling different stages of logical form enrichment. As it exploits most of the theoretical tools described in the paper, it will, hopefully, reveal more about the nature of lying, contribute to the debate on the explicit/implicit distinction and show the interrelations between the two.

2. Pragmatic accounts of lying

2.1. Grice (1975): lying as the violation of the Maxim of Quality

Part of the linguistic research concerning lying has been rooted in Paul Grice’s inferential model of communication (e.g. Antas 2000; Meibauer 2005; 2011; 2014ab). As a component of his theory of conversation, Grice ([1975] 1989, 26) postulated the Maxim of Quality, which requires that the speaker should try to make his contribution one that is true. i.e. should not say what he believes to be false or that for which he lacks evidence. On Grice’s account lies are interpreted as covert
violations of the Maxim of Quality and the Cooperative Principle quoted in (1), where the hearer is meant to assume that the maxim of truthfulness is still in force and that the speaker believes what he has said.

(1) The Cooperative Principle
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice [1975] 1989, 26)

Thus, we deal with a lie when the speaker says the falsehood with the intention to deceive, as illustrated by (2) below:

(2) Context: John’s surname is Brown and B knows this.
A: What’s John’s surname?
B: Smith.

Apart from being observed and covertly violated, the Maxim of Quality can also be overtly violated, i.e. exploited/flouted with the result that it is obvious to the hearer at the time of the utterance that the speaker has deliberately and quite openly failed to observe the maxim and, therefore, the hearer attributes beliefs/implicatures to the speaker in order to preserve the assumption that the S was obeying at least the Cooperative Principle in saying what he said. This is the case with non-literal meaning, such as metaphor, irony, hyperbole or metonymy in (3a–d):

(3) (a) Metaphor: You are the cream in my coffee. (uttered by Mother to her child to mean “you are the best thing in my life”)
(b) Irony: A: John is a fine friend. (uttered to mean “John is not a fine friend” in the context when both A and his audience know that John, with whom A has been on close terms until now, has betrayed a secret of A’s to a business rival) (Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995, 34)
(c) Hyperbole: I’ve read this millions of times. (uttered to mean “I’ve read this many times, more than expected”)
(d) Metonymy: He drank the whole bottle. (uttered to mean “He drank the contents of the bottle”)

If we assume that an intention to deceive is a necessary condition on lying, we may have an explanation why non-literal use on Grice’s account does not count as lying. It is saying the falsehood with no intention to deceive.
2.2. Antas (2000): lying as a linguistic strategy and pragmatic act

One of the approaches rooted in Grice’s account of communication is Jolanta Antas’s (2000) account of lies and lying. Antas examines lie with respect to the issue of logical fallacy and ontology of truth. She claims that lying should not be equated with logical fallacy and the liar need not resort to ontologically fallacious claims to mislead his/her interlocutor. He/she may make the strategic use of objectively true statements to deceive the addressee, which puts lying in opposition to speaking the truth rather than to truth itself. To paraphrase, lie is an operator for untruthful speech. Accordingly, Antas postulates two levels of interpretation of Mary’s utterance in (4): (a) The explicit proposition that Valentino has been sick this week is true, (b) The implicated proposition that Mary has not seen Valentino lately is false, i.e. is an instance of lying.

(4) Context: Mary saw Valentino yesterday.
Speaker: Mary, have you seen Valentino lately?
Mary: Valentino’s sick with mononucleosis all week. (Antas 2000, 143, after Coleman and Kay 1981)

Antas also believes that the act of lying does not bear any grammatical exponents at the surface of its linguistic structure which would indicate the fact that it has occurred, as indeed the point of lying is to conceal rather than to make manifest. On her account lying is defined as a complex pragmatic act intended to deceive the addressee or to conceal something from the addressee (Antas 2000, 7). As an intentional speech strategy, it is analysed in the context of Grice’s conversational maxims and is claimed to be characterized by the speaker’s state of double awareness. The liar is a conscious user of speech, fully capable of telling the difference between truth and falsehood, and fully aware that the statements he makes or implies are unsound.

2.3. Meibauer (2005; 2011; 2014ab): lying as a speech act of insincere assertion

Another linguistic account of lying rooted in Grice (1975) has been presented by Jörg Meibauer, who views lying as a speech act of insincere assertion aiming at influencing the hearer’s belief (2011, 277, 280, 289), and analyses it in the context of Gricean theory of implicature and Searle’s speech act theory (1969). Lying is claimed to violate Searle’s sincerity condition, but fulfil the Essential Condition on asserting, according to which the maker of an assertion commits himself to the truth of the proposition expressed (Meibauer 2005, 1375).
Meibauer (2014ab) claims that the possibility of lying is built into the language, thus allowing speakers to manipulate the representation of truth according to certain social goals, and that lying is necessarily connected to an intention to deceive. He focuses on the cases of lying by falsely implicating while saying the truth as illustrated by (5b) below. Although (5b) is true, it falsely implicates (5c), that the captain is usually drunk most of the time.

(5) (a) *The Story of the Mate and the Captain*
A captain and his mate have a long-term quarrel. The mate drinks more rum than is good for him and the captain is determined not to tolerate this behaviour any longer. When the mate is drunk again, the captain writes into the logbook: *Today, 11th October, the mate is drunk.* When the mate reads this entry during his next watch, he is first getting angry, then, after a short moment of reflection, he writes into the logbook:

(b) *Today, 14th October, the captain is not drunk.* (Meibauer 2011, 284, after Posner 1980)

(c) Conversational implicature: The captain is mostly drunk.

Meibauer notices that the risk of being caught in the act of lying is reduced in the case of lying by falsely implicating. Conversational implicatures are cancelable, either by context or by an addition of cancelling material. The possibility of explicitly cancelling the implicature may be a motive for the speaker to prefer lying by implicating while saying the truth in the Gricean sense of “what is said” rather than simply lying by saying the falsehood, because the former gives him the chance of withdrawing in case of detection (Meibauer 2005, 1381; 2011). Besides, since it is the hearer who is responsible for the derivation of the false implicature, he cannot blame the speaker alone for communicating false meaning.

In order to encompass the case of lying while saying the truth, Meibauer proposes the extended definition of lying:

*Lie: extended definition*
A lied at t by uttering the declarative sentence σ iff (a) if the definition of the lie [as below] holds,
(b) or if A thereby conversationally implicated that q, but actively believed that not q. (Meibauer 2005, 1382; 2011, 285)

*Lie*
A lied at t,
iff (a) A asserted at t that p,
(b) A actively believed at t that not p. (Meibauer 2005, 1376; 2011, 281)
As can be seen, both Antas and Meibauer notice that a lie need not be told on the grounds of logical falsehood, which puts it in opposition to speaking the truth rather than to truth itself. The distinction between saying the falsehood and “falsely implicating” sets the discussion of lying in the context of an ongoing discussion about the semantics/pragmatics interface. One of the theories which has been deeply concerned not only with the semantics/pragmatics distinction, but also with the explicit/implicit distinction, which is the point of reference for our analysis of lying, is Relevancy Theory (cf. Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995, 2004; Wilson and Sperber 2012; Carston 2002; 2009), a cognitive approach to the study of human communication.

3. Relevance-theoretic account of truthfulness and deception

3.1. Rejection of the maxim of truthfulness

The cognitive, relevance-theoretic, model of utterance comprehension, as already mentioned, rejects the maxim of truthfulness. Wilson and Sperber (2002, 583) argue “that language use is not governed by any convention or maxim of truthfulness in what is said”. Instead, it is relevance that governs language use, and therefore, “expectations of truthfulness – to the extent that they exist – are a by-product of expectations of relevance” (Wilson and Sperber 2002, 584). According to Wilson and Sperber, evidence against the claim that speakers try to tell the truth are lies, jokes, fictions, metaphors, ironies, and more generally, so-called loose uses of language such as approximations and sense extensions.

The issue of lying appears in the relevance-theoretic account of communication as one of the problems raised by communication. As Wilson points out, the general problem raised by communication is that:

(a) A speaker may be mistaken about the facts or deliberately deceptive.
(b) But there is little point in understanding an utterance if you can’t believe what it conveys. (Wilson 2011)

Similarly, Sperber claims that communication carries a major risk for the audience of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed and it is because of the risk of deception that epistemic vigilance is indispensable. The honesty of speakers and the reliability of their testimony are claimed to be, to a large extent, an effect of hearers’ “epistemic vigilance”, that is, an ability aimed at filtering out misinformation from communicated contents (Sperber et al. 2010; Sperber 2013).
3.2. Epistemic vigilance

A speaker producing an utterance has two goals: to be understood and to be believed. Accordingly, the hearer has two corresponding tasks: first, to understand the speaker’s meaning (to identify the relevance of what is communicated [on the assumption that it is trustworthy] and recognize what the speaker intends you to believe) and, second, to decide whether to believe the speaker (to assess the trustworthiness of what is communicated and accept what the speaker intends you to believe) (Wilson 2011; Sperber et al. 2010). In other words, alongside the pragmatic mechanisms that help us understand utterances, there may be a set of “epistemic vigilance” mechanisms that help us decide whether to believe them. Sperber et al. (2010) distinguish two types of epistemic vigilance mechanisms:

(a) mechanisms for assessing the reliability of the speaker
   • whether the speaker is competent, i.e. able to provide true, reliable and relevant information
   • whether the speaker is benevolent, i.e. willing to provide such information and not deceive

(b) mechanisms for assessing the believability of the communicated content
   • whether communicated information is consistent or coherent with background assumptions.

Any inconsistencies or incoherences that appear in the inference process and are relevant to epistemic assessment are resolved automatically (Wilson 2011): (a) information from a quite reliable speaker overrides weak background beliefs; (b) information from a quite reliable speaker is overridden by strong background beliefs or by some form of conscious reasoning (Mercier and Sperber 2009; 2011). Reasoning is a tool for speakers to persuade by the use of argument and for hearers to resist being falsely persuaded by using arguments to assess what they are told.

I believe that it is because of epistemic vigilance that lying is a linguistic strategy much more difficult than giving a simple account of facts. Faced with epistemic vigilance, a successful liar must exhibit a high level of logical and cognitive efficiency and a mindreading ability. The speaker must predict the line of reasoning of the addressee and produce an ostensive stimulus relevant to the addressee in a way that is to lead him to false enrichments and implications, which I hope to demonstrate in the section devoted to an analysis of lying in explicit communication. I also think that sometimes the speaker can exploit the hearer’s epistemic vigilance in order to lie successfully. When the hearer takes the speaker’s benevolence for granted, he cannot recognize lies, but this issue calls for further research beyond the scope of this paper.
4. Explicit/implicit distinction in Relevance Theory

The paper views lying in the context of interpersonal communication, as a pragmatic act and a linguistic strategy intentionally employed by the speaker to manipulate the hearer’s interpretation of an utterance at the level of explicit content (Carston 2002; 2009; 2010; Carston and Hall 2012; Wilson and Sperber 2012). In Relevance Theory the explicit/implicit distinction reflects the distinction between the relevance-theoretic notions of explicature and implicature. An explicature of an utterance U is a communicated assumption which is a development of a logical form encoded by U (Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995, 182) and provides a premise for the derivation of contextual implications and other cognitive effects. Any other communicated proposition is an implicature. An elaboration of this definition is proposed by Carston (2002, 124), who claims that “an assumption (proposition communicated by an utterance) is an ‘explicature’ of the utterance if and only if it is a development of (a) a linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential subpart of a logical form”. A logical form of a linguistic expression, which provides input to an inferential process of deriving explicatures, is a semantic conceptual representation assigned to a natural language sentence by the grammar in the automatic process of decoding (Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995, 183]. The schematic logical form, an output of the decoding process, is a non-propositional and non-truth-evaluable semantic representation of the sentence employed in the utterance, which is merely the starting point for the derivation of the explicit content of an utterance and needs to be pragmatically enriched in order to become an explicature. The claim that “linguistically encoded meaning never fully determines the intended proposition expressed” (Carston 2002, 49) and has to be contextually enriched is known as the semantic underdeterminacy thesis.

The development of a logical form, i.e. the recovery of a unique truth-evaluable propositional form/explicature, involves: (a) disambiguation, (b) saturation (including reference assignment), which consists in finding the intended content (or value) for a linguistically indicated variable or slot, such as an indexical, and (c) free enrichment. As regards free enrichment, it involves supplying unarticulated constituents in the absence of any indication (overt or covert) within the linguistic form that this is necessary and ad hoc concept construction, i.e. adjustment of linguistically encoded conceptual constituents (Carston 2009).

5. Lying at the level of explicit content

Since according to the semantic underdeterminacy thesis (Carston 2002), encoded linguistic meaning (logical form) falls short (often far short) of determining the proposition expressed by an utterance (explicature) and its impli-
catures, there is a potential for a liar to achieve his/her goal by influencing the interpretation process at different stages of pragmatic enrichment. Accordingly, an attempt is made below to categorize lies by placing them along the explicit-implicit continuum, depending on the type of pragmatic task that is to lead the hearer to a false belief. In the following sections there are illustrated three different processes potentially leading to relevant, but intentionally false, enrichment: disambiguation, supplying unarticulated constituents and ad hoc concept construction.

5.1. Disambiguation

Context: A and B are gossiping about their friends, a married couple, who do not have children and whom A has not seen for a long time. B is on close terms with the married couple and knows that they do not have children because the woman cannot have children for medical reasons.

(6)  A: I’ve heard they don’t have children. Why?
    B: She can’t bear children… They are so noisy.

RT (Relevance-theoretic) interpretation: A assumes that B’s utterance is optimally relevant as an answer to A’s question (presumption of optimal relevance\(^2\)). On decoding the linguistic meaning, A observes that the logical form of a sentence uttered needs to be pragmatically enriched by reference assignment (the pronoun she) and disambiguation (bear). Although in the context of the preceding question two meanings of bear satisfy the hearer’s expectations of relevance (‘stand children’ and ‘have children’), the former interpretation is more relevant as it involves less processing cost in the context of the following utterance. What the speaker has done to influence the disambiguation process with the intent to deceive is to supply the linguistic context They are so noisy, which achieves relevance by providing a reason why the woman cannot bear children. The information in the logical and encyclopaedic entries of children and noisy directs A to choose the ‘can’t stand’ meaning of bear and thus arrive at the false explicature of B’s utterance that a married couple do not have children as the woman cannot stand children.

5.2. Saturation and supplying unarticulated constituents

Context: a conversation on the phone, a mother phones her husband in London from Paris at a time when their son is supposed to train on his bike for the school bike race and, surprisingly, the son picks up the phone. It is hot and sunny outside.
(7) A: Why aren’t you riding your bike?  
B: It’s raining [when? saturation] [where?] heavily.

**RT interpretation:** The relevance of an episode of raining lies in its location. The utterance would not be relevant if it was interpreted as “it’s raining anywhere”. It could be true, but not optimally relevant as an answer to Mother’s question. What makes it false is the location of raining, which, according to relevance theorists, is a constituent of explicature supplied in the process of free pragmatic enrichment of logical form. Thus, it is the presumption of optimal relevance that leads Mother to the enrichment which is false (“It’s raining now in London”) and which acts as a false premise in further reasoning leading to the conclusion that the son is not training for the race as it is raining heavily in his close vicinity. There is a probability that Mother’s epistemic vigilance will make the lie unsuccessful, but it does not change the fact that there is an attempt on the part of the son to deceive her. Mother can assess the reliability of the source and of the communicated content. First, using the strategy of Sophisticated Understanding, she may perceive her son as not benevolent to provide true information and, second, what he communicates may be inconsistent with her background assumptions, e.g. her knowledge about the weather in London from the weather forecast. The speaker’s informative intention may fail as the hearer does not accept the intended interpretation as true. Still, the communicative intention will have succeeded if the hearer has correctly retrieved the intended interpretation.

5.3. **Adjusting/modulating encoded linguistic meaning (ad-hoc concept construction)**

Context: George, intending to murder Frida, who is fatally allergic to peanuts, prepares a meal for her with peanut oil.

(8) Frieda (jokingly): Is it safe for me to eat the meal?  
George: There are no peanuts in it. (adapted from Saul 2012)

**RT interpretation:** In (8) the interpretation involves broadening of the encoded concept. In the context given, the interpretation that satisfies Frieda’s expectations of relevance, i.e. serves as an implicated premise in the inference leading to an implicated conclusion that the meal is safe for her, is the false explicature which contains the wrong interpretation of *peanuts* in the loose sense of “peanuts or anything else made from or containing peanuts”. George lies by allowing Frieda to believe that the denotation of the concept communicated is broader than (and so includes) the denotation of the encoded concept.
6. “Lying” at the level of implicit content: the case of misleading

Finally, let us reanalyse example (4), repeated below for the sake of convenience, within the relevance-theoretic framework.

(4) Context: Mary saw Valentino yesterday.
    Speaker: Mary, have you seen Valentino lately?
    Mary: Valentino’s sick with mononucleosis all week.

**RT interpretation:** The explicitly communicated truth-evaluable proposition that Valentino is sick with mononucleosis all week, which is believed to be true by both the speaker and the hearer, does not satisfy the H’s expectations of relevance on its own, but only as a premise in the inference process leading to the false implicated conclusion that Mary has not seen Valentino lately. The indirect answer involves more processing effort on the part of the hearer, but provides an explanation why it was impossible for Mary to meet Valentino.

As opposed to examples (6), (7) and (8), in which we deal with false explicatures, the explicature of the utterance in (4) is true and merely leads to a false implicated conclusion. If we assume after logicians that lying requires falsely asserting, the question arises whether “lying at the implicit level” should count as lying proper. The condition of falsely asserting seems to exclude cases of deceiving at the implicit level of communication from the typical examples of lying. It seems tempting to postulate that “lying at the level of implicit content” should be reanalyzed as “misleading”, which involves asserting truly in order to intentionally lead the hearer to a false belief.

7. Conclusions

Lying has been an underrepresented phenomenon in the pragmatic literature and as such it lends itself to an analysis from different perspectives. My main goal in this paper has been to examine the act of lying with reference to the explicit/implicit distinction in the cognitive, relevance-theoretic, model of utterance comprehension and to categorize lies by placing them along the explicit-implicit continuum, depending on the type of pragmatic task that is to lead the hearer to a false belief. I have pointed out that since encoded linguistic meaning (logical form) underdetermines the proposition expressed by an utterance (explicature), a liar can influence the interpretation process at different stages of pragmatic enrichment, such as disambiguation, supplying unarticulated constituents or ad hoc concept construction. I have also emphasized the fact that, faced with hearers’ “epistemic vigilance”, that is, an ability aimed at filtering out misinformation from communicated contents
(Sperber et al. 2010; Sperber 2013), a successful liar must exhibit a high level of logical and cognitive efficiency to deceive his/her interlocutor.

The analysis in the present paper has also led to the following general conclusions. Although there is no moral difference between lying and misleading, there is a linguistic difference. A hypothesis has been made that while lying takes place at the level of explicit communication, misleading takes place at the level of implicit communication. In Relevance Theory reinterpreting a substantial part of Gricean implicatures as part of truth-evaluable propositional content results in that lying mostly takes place at the level of what is explicated: the truth-evaluable proposition is false. Consequently, on the relevance-theoretic account, the notions of falsity/saying the falsehood and lying approximate each other in most of the examples, and only the cases of “lying” by implicated conclusion have to be reanalyzed as cases of misleading. Since Grice’s truth-evaluable “what is said” is confined to a result of linguistic decoding, disambiguation and reference assignment, on Grice’s account more instances of lying will be reinterpreted as misleading by deceiving at the level of what is implicated. In cases when what the speaker says is true and what the speaker implicates is false, the speaker accused of lying can always pretend he was not lying by saying *I didn’t say so*. In Relevance Theory, on the contrary, the S cannot hide behind the minimal proposition to defend his/her truthfulness as it is claimed that without free enrichment we are left with the subpropositional level of meaning not intended by the speaker.

Notes

1 The examples of hyperbole and metonymy reappear in handbooks on semantics and pragmatics.
2 Presumption of optimal relevance

An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an audience iff:

a. It is relevant enough to be worth the audience’s processing effort;

b. It is the most relevant one compatible with communicator’s abilities and preferences. (Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995, 270; Sperber and Wilson 2004, 612)

References


