Making “Reasons” Explicit. How Normative is Brandom's Inferentialism?

• Authors: Daniel Laurier
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper asks whether Brandom has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on which his normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom's claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This leads me to replace Brandom's conception of inferential relations as relations between deontic statuses with one according to which they are to be seen as relations between entitlements and acknowledgements of commitments.

Keywords

EN

Normative; Brandom, Robert; Inferentialism

• Publisher: Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie
• Journal: Forum Philosophicum
• Year: 2008
• Volume: 13
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 127-145

Dates

published

2008

Contributors

author

Daniel Laurier

• University of Montreal, Canada

References

• Brandom, Robert B. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
• Brandom, Robert B. “Modality, Normativity and Intentionality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, no. 3 (2001): 587–609.
• Broome, John. “Normative Requirements.” In Normativity, edited by Jonathan Dancy, 78–99, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.
• Broome, John. “Reasons.” In Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, edited by R. Jay Wallace et al., 28–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
• Dancy, Jonathan, ed. Normativity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.
• Millar, Alan. Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
• Rosen, Gideon. “Brandom on Modality, Normativity and Intentionality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, no. 3 (2001): 611–623. doi:10.2307/3071158.
• Sosa, Ernest, and Enrique Villanueva, eds. Philosophical Issues 15: Normativity. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005.
• Wallace, R. Jay, et al., eds. Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
• White, Heath. “Brandom on Practical Reason.” The Philosophical Quarterly 53, no 213 (2003): 566–572. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00332.

Identifiers

DOI

10.5840/forphil200813110

URI

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URI

http://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=forphil&id=forphil_2008_0013_0001_0127_0145