EN
The article is an attempt to examine what meaning is attributed by the Constitutional Tribunal to the concept of judgment on the basis of Article 79 (1) of the Constitution. The content of the so reconstructed definitions has been referred to those attributes which, in terms of the doctrine of administrative law, are typical of material and technical actions of public administration authorities. As a result of this comparison, it is concluded that the basic criteria for clarification by the Court of the term "judgment" (induction of direct or indirect legal effects, the result of application of a legal norm, the imperious character) are also applicable to the material and technical activities. Therefore, the arguments used by the Polish constitutional court, which are assumed to justify the exclusion of those actions from the scope of Article 79 (1) of the Constitution, are not sufficient. Their validity may be undermined by the counterarguments raised by the legal doctrine of administrative law. Accordingly, it is proposed to use such a criterion which leaves no doubt that a material-technical action by an authority is not a judgment within the meaning of Article 79 (1) of the Constitution.