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Journal
2011 | 29 | 80-92
Article title

The two-dimensional argument against materialism and its semantic premise

Authors
Content
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Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
David Chalmers argues that zombies are possible because they are ideally conceivable and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on the physical. In this paper I discuss the most influential criticism of the conceivability-possibility principle in the current literature. According to that criticism, the conceivability-possibility principle is unjustified because it depends on a certain unjustified assumption concerning the semantic conditions under which necessary statements can be true a posteriori, namely that a posteriority is due to contingency at the reference-fixing level, so that a necessary statement can be true a posteriori only if at least one of the concepts flanking the identity sign refers contingently.
Keywords
Journal
Year
Issue
29
Pages
80-92
Physical description
Contributors
author
  • Uniwersytet Szczeciński
References
  • Chalmers [1996] – D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, 1996.
  • Chalmers [2002a] – D. Chalmers, Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?, [in:] Conceivability and Possibility, T. Gendler, J. Hawthorne (ed.), Oxford University Press 2002.
  • Chalmers [2002b] – D. Chalmers, On Sense and Intension, “Philosophical Perspectives” (16) 2002, p. 135-82.
  • Chalmers [2003] – D. Chalmers, Consciousness and Its Place in Nature, [in:] The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, S. Stich, F. Warfield (ed.), Blackwell, Oxford 2003.
  • Chalmers [2006] – D. Chalmers, The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, B. McLaughlin (ed.), Oxford 2006.
  • Chalmers, Jackson [2001] – D. Chalmers, F. Jackson, Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation, “Philosophical Review” (110) 2001, p. 315-361.
  • Hill, McLaughlin [1999] – C. Hill, B. McLaughlin, There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers’ philosophy, “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research” (59) 1999, p. 445-454.
  • Levine [2001] – J. Levine, Purple Haze, Oxford University Press, 2001.
  • Loar [1997] – B. Loar, Phenomenal States, [in:] The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (ed.), MIT Press, 1997.
  • Loar [1999] – B. Loar, David Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind, “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research” (59) 1999, p. 465-472.
  • Kripke [1980] – S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Blackwell, Oxford 1980.
  • Papineau [2002] – D. Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford University Press, 2002.
  • Papineau [2006] – D. Papineau, Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, [in:] Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, T. Alter, S. Walter (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2006.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-61501cd0-b6c1-4a00-9138-8012bdd36a4a
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