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2017 | 26 | 1 | 115–135
Article title

Vagueness is a Kind of Conflation

Authors
Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
This paper sketches an understanding of conflation and vagueness according to which the latter is a special kind of the former. First, I sketch a particular understanding of conflation. Then, I go on to argue that vague concepts fit directly into this understanding. This picture of vagueness is related, but not identical, to a number of existing accounts.
Year
Volume
26
Issue
1
Pages
115–135
Physical description
Dates
published
2017-03-15
online
2016-07-26
Contributors
author
  • Department of Philosophy University of Connecticut 101 Manchester Hall, Unit 1054 344 Mansfield Rd. Storrs, CT 06269 USA, davewripley@gmail.com
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-61f25cd8-3b16-4dc0-9c16-4223bb015a26
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