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PL EN


Journal

2014 | 16 | 1 | 9-26

Article title

KRYTYKA KONWENCJONALIZMU SPOŁECZNEGO NA PRZYKŁADZIE FILOZOFII SPOŁECZNEJ T. HOBBESA I J. LOCKE’A

Content

Title variants

EN
CRITICS OF SOCIAL CONVENTIONALISM ON EXAMPLARS T. HOBBES’ AND J. LOCKE’S THOUGHT

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

EN
The paper shows theoretical difficulties in Hobbes’ and Locke’s philosophical theory. The attempt at proving legitimacy of society hade been made by philosophers turned out to be pointless because of false anthropological presuppositions. Even though the term of human nature in axiological aspect is exremely negative in Hobbes’thought while neutral in Locke’s theory but both philosophers define man as a physical, self-directed, self-awareness individual. If such individuals in supposed state of nature have every rights and liberty then arises question of how assign such units to something other than individuals itself, this mean to public institution (state). The anthropological fallacy made the matter over much difficult and justification of social existence impossible, neither account of guarante civil safety do not justify the type of absolutist state or account of protection of property rights do not justify the type existence of liberal state, which has an insufficient competitives and power (minimal state). The state in both cases is rather an alienated from people, which treated public institutions and government as necessary evil in fact. It is since being based on the self preservation (Hobbes) or egoistic self – interest (Locke). In view on basis of social life, the philosophers failed to take spiritual and personal dimesion of human being. They did not notice that human nature is compositive, natural and rational inclinations to live with each others (in community) and humane desire for a versatile, personal development. According to fallacy their conception of society and state only partly is rational but it is a type of pragmatic rationality.

Journal

Year

Volume

16

Issue

1

Pages

9-26

Physical description

Contributors

  • Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

ISSN
1896-6896
ISSN
2353-1274

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.desklight-629bf69b-1116-441c-b385-e208fc6ed082
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