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2017 | 1/2017 (66), t.2 | 64 – 78

Article title

Rating kredytowy emitenta i inwestora – porównanie wpływu determinant

Content

Title variants

EN
Issuer- and Investor-Paid Credit Ratings – A Comparison of Factors

Languages of publication

PL EN

Abstracts

PL
Celem pracy jest analiza determinant ratingu kredytowego banków krajów europejskich. Dokonano przeglądu literaturowego na temat wpływu czynników na rating kredytowy i postawiono hipotezę, że siła oddziaływania poszczególnych determinant na credit rating banku jest uzależniona od tego, czy został on nadany na żądanie emitenta czy inwestora. Do analizy wykorzystano dane z bazy Thomson Reuters. Badanie przeprowadzono przy użyciu metod regresji panelowej. Jako zmienną zależną zastosowano długoterminowe ratingi kredytowe banków prezentowane przez agencje ratingowe w latach 2000–2015. Ratingi zdekodowano liniowo na zmienne liczbowe. Badanie wykonano na danych kwartalnych.
EN
The aim of the paper is to analyse European banks’ credit ratings factors. To this end, a literature review has been made about the impact of credit ratings factors and the following hypothesis has been put forward: The strength of the banks’ credit ratings factors depends on the issuer- and investor-paid notes. Thomson Reuters database has been used for the analysis. The analysis has been made by using panel data models. As a dependent variable, long-term credit ratings presented by credit rating agencies from 2000 to 2015 have been used. Credit ratings have been decomposed linearly. The study has been made using quarterly data.

Year

Pages

64 – 78

Physical description

Dates

published
2017-05-30

Contributors

  • Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Zarządzania

References

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  • Bellotti, T., Matousek, R. i Stewart, C. (2011b). Are Rating Agencies’ Assignments Opaque? Evidence from International Banks. Expert Systems with Applications, 38(4), 4206–4214, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2010.09.085.
  • Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, E. i Treepongkaruna, S. (2011). An Analysis of the Determinants of Bank Ratings: Comparison across Ratings Agencies, Australian Journal of Management, 36(3), 405–424, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0312896211426676.
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  • Bruno, V., Cornaggia, J. i Cornaggia, K.J. (2011). The Information Content of Credit Ratings: Compensation Structure Does Matter. Egan Jones Working Papers. Pozyskano z: https://www.egan-jones.com/public/download/studies/2012_The_Information_Content_of_Credit_Ratings_Compensation_Structure_Does_Matter.pdf.
  • Bruno, V., Cornaggia, J. i Cornaggia, K.J. (2015). Does Regulatory Certification Affect the Information Content of Credit Ratings? Management Science, 6(6), 1578–1597.
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  • Poon, W.P.H., Firth, M. i Fung, H. (1999). A Multivariate Analysis of the Determinants of Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 9(3), 267–283, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1042-4431(99)00011-6.
  • Poon, W.P.H. i Chan, K.C. (2010). Solicited and Unsolicited Credit Ratings: A Global Perspective. ADBI Working Paper Series, 244.
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  • Zhou, B. i Kumar, P. (2012). Economic Considerations in Litigation Against the Credit Rating Agencies. The Brattle Group Discussion Paper, (April), 1–16.

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

ISSN
1644-9584

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.desklight-63419cdb-ebc0-4fbb-9e50-2382186a4a95
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