Zarys ekonomicznej analizy polityki regulacyjnej w sektorze telekomunikacyjnym

• Authors: Renata Śliwa

Title variants

EN

Outline of economic analysis of regulatory policy in telecommunications industry

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Artykuł stanowi próbę przedstawienia zarysu analizy polityki regulacyjnej przez pryzmat relacji ujawniających się między podmiotami w procesie regulowania sektora telekomunikacyjnego. Na tle rozbieżności celów tych podmiotów ukazano relacje pojawiające się w procesie regulacji sektorowej, których właściwy kształt wpływa na efektywność przedsiębiorstw sektora oraz dobrobyt konsumentów usług.

EN

The paper presents a trial of the depicting the approach to regulatory policy through the lens of intersubject relations in the process of sectoral regulation. The divergence of aims attached to different actors/subjects in regulated sector is the fundamentals of intersubject relations. The adequate shape of the relations determines the effectiveness of regulated enterprises as well as the welfare of service consumers.

Keywords

PL

polityka regulacyjna; niezależność regulacyjna; analiza polityki; konkurencja infrastrukturalna

EN

regulatory policy; independence of regulator; policy analysis; infrastructure competition

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 2
• Issue: 8
• Pages: 99-112

Dates

published

2013-12-01

Contributors

author

Renata Śliwa

• Małopolska Wyższa Szkoła Ekonomiczna w Tarnowie

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