Effectiveness of Judicial Review in the Polish Competition Law System and the Place for Judicial Deference

• Authors: Bernatt Maciej
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The article discusses the effectiveness and the intensity of judicial review in the Polish competition law system. First, it studies whether the judicial review offered by the 1st instance Court of Competition and Consumer Protection in Warsaw (SOKiK) is effective in practice. Next, the article analyzes whether Polish courts tend to defer to the findings of the Polish competition authority, UOKiK. Judgments of the Supreme Court concerning relevant market definition serve as case studies. Finally, the article discusses whether proceedings before the Polish competition authority ensure sufficient due process guarantees, the impartiality of decision-makers, and the overall expert character of UOKiK’s decision-making process. On this basis the article examines whether there are grounds for the reviewing courts to defer to UOKiK’s findings. The article concludes that currently the review undertaken by SOKiK happens to be superficial and thus ineffective. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s review of the determination of the relevant market is not deferential towards UOKiK’s findings. The Supreme Court substitutes its own definition of the relevant market for that of UOKiK and that of the lower courts. However, the article shows that there are no grounds at the moment for arguing for greater judicial deference. Proceedings held before UOKiK, despite recently introduced improvements, still do not offer sufficient due process guarantees or a division between investigatory and decision-making functions. In addition, UOKiK’s expertise is not sufficient for both institutional and practical reasons.

FR

L'article analyse l'efficacité et de l'intensité du contrôle juridique dans le droit de la concurrence en Pologne. Premièrement, il examine si le contrôle juridique mené par la cour de première instance, la Cour de la concurrence et de la protection des consommateurs à Varsovie (SOKiK), est efficace. Ensuite, l'article analyse si les tribunaux polonais ont tendance à se référer aux décisions de l'Autorité polonaise de la concurrence (UOKiK). Les arrêts de la Cour suprême concernant la définition du marché pertinent font l'objet d'études de cas. Enfin, l'article examine si les procédures devant l'Autorité polonaise de la concurrence assurent des garanties du procès équitable, l'impartialité des décideurs et le caractère expert du processus décisionnel de l'UOKiK. Par cette analyse, l'article tente à déterminer s'il existe des motifs que les tribunaux font preuve de déférence à l'égard des décisions de l'UOKiK. L'article conclut que la révision par le SOKiK est actuellement superficielle et inefficace. En même temps, la révision judiciaire de la détermination du marché pertinent par la Cour suprême ne fait pas preuve de déférence à l'égard des décisions de l'UOKiK. La Cour suprême change sa propre définition du marché pertinent par celle de l'UOKiK et des tribunaux inférieurs. Toutefois, l'article montre qu'il n'existe actuellement aucun motif de plaider pour une déférence judiciaire plus importante. Les procédures devant l'UOKiK, malgré les améliorations récemment introduites, n'offrent pas encore suffisamment de garanties du procès équitable, ainsi que la répartition des fonctions d'enquête et des fonctions décisionnelles. De plus, l'expertise de l'UOKiK n'est pas suffisamment présente autant que pour des raisons institutionnelles tant que pour des raisons pratiques.

Keywords

EN

competition law; antitrust; judicial review; judicial deference; due process; procedure; courts; administration; EU; Central and Eastern Europe; Poland

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 9(14)
• Pages: 97-124

Dates

published

2016-12-31

printed

2016-12-31

Contributors

author

Bernatt Maciej

• Assistant Professor, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, Department of European Economic Law (Jean Monnet Chair) and Scientific Secretary of the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies at the University of Warsaw

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Identifiers

ISSN

1689-9024

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2016.9.14.4