Rabaty stosowane przez przedsiębiorstwa dominujące w świetle orzecznictwa Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej w latach 2011–2015

• Authors: Bułakowski Kamil

Title variants

EN

Rebates applied by dominant undertakings in the light of 2011-2015 ECJ judgments

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Niniejszy artykuł został poświęcony problematyce udzielania rabatów przez przedsiębiorstwa dominujące w świetle unijnego prawa konkurencji. Zagadnienie przedstawiono w świetle bardziej ekonomicznego podejścia (more economic approach) oraz w oparciu o wydane w latach 2011–2015 orzeczenia Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej – Tomra (2011), Intel (2014) oraz Post Danmark II (2015) oraz uwzględnia opublikowaną w październiku 2016 r. opinię Rzecznika Generalnego Nilsa Wahla.

EN

This article is dedicated to the problematic issue of rebate schemes applied by dominant undertakings under EU competition law. The said problem is presented in the light of the more economic approach, and in accordance with ECJ judgements published between 2011-2015: Tomra (2011), Intel (2014) and Post Danmark II (2015). Moreover, the article includes an analysis of the Opinion of the Advocate General Nils Wahls to the Intel Case, issued in October 2016.

Keywords

PL

Intel; more economic approach; nadużywanie pozycji dominującej; Post Danmark II; pozycja dominująca; praktyki wykluczające; rabaty; rabaty lojalnościowe; abaty warunkowe; Tomra

EN

dominant position; abuse of the dominant position; exclusionary practices; rebates; conditional rebates; loyalty rebates; more economic approach; Tomra; Intel; Post Danmark II

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 6
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 28-45

Dates

published

2017-09-30

printed

2017-09-30

Contributors

author

Bułakowski Kamil

• Absolwent Wydziału Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego; Junior Associate w zespole prawa konkurencji kancelarii Dentons

References

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Identifiers

ISSN

2299-5749

DOI

10.7172/2299-5749.IKAR.5.6.2