Conceivability, Possibility, and A Posteriori Necessity: on Chalmers’s Argument for Dualism

• Authors: Karol Polcyn
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Chalmers claims that the conceivability of zombies implies their possibility and he supports this claim by arguing that there is no gap between conceivability and possibility since no such gap can be generated by necessary a posteriori truths. I will argue that while Chalmers is right to the extent that there is no gap between conceivability and possibility within the standard Kripkean model of a posteriori necessity, his general conclusion is not justified. This is because there might be a posteriori necessity understood in some non-Kripkean way and Chalmers has not shown that no such alternative understanding of a posteriori necessity is available.

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2006
• Issue: 7
• Pages: 37-55

Contributors

author

Karol Polcyn

Identifiers

DOI

10.13153/diam.7.2006.197