The Need for Revaluation of the Model Structure for Electricity Liberalization

• Authors: Andrzej Szablewski
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The question about an appropriate structure for the electricity industry has been extensively discussed in scientific literature and experts studies. Since the beginning of electricity liberalization, it was apparent for its promoters that such a structure (in this paper referred to as the model structure or ideal structural model) for the electricity sector should involve a separation of its four sub-sectors, i.e., generation, transmission, distribution, and supply. With the exception of transmission, each sub-sector should consist of many stand-alone type companies. Given the high degree of vertical and horizontal integration of the electricity sectors, their procompetitive restructuring (i.e., de-integration) became a standard component of electricity sector reform packages. This paper provides a concise review of the origins and justification of the initial model structure for electricity liberalization, as well as an overview of the restructuring developments in the early years of electricity liberalization. Some attention is also devoted to the EU’s unbundling initiatives. The core part of this paper discusses the first signs indicating the crisis of the initial structural canon. The paper concludes with some comments referring to the modified form for a model structure that is emerging. It involves vertical integration of generation and supply and allows a higher degree of horizontal concentration of the electricity competitive markets.

FR

La question de la structure de l’industrie de l’électricité appropriée a été beaucoup discutée dans la littérature scientifique et les études d’experts. Depuis le début de la libéralisation du marché de l’électricité, il était évident pour son promoteurs que cette structure (dans cet article elle est appelée “structure modèle”) du secteur de l’électricité devra contenir la séparation de ses quatre sous-secteurs (génération, transmission, distribution et provision). A l’exception de la transmission, chaque sous-secteur devra contenir plusieurs entreprises indépendantes. Étant donné le haut niveau de l’intégration horizontale et verticale des secteurs de l’électricité, leur restructuration pro-concurrentielle (désintégration), est devenue un composent standard des paquets des reformes du secteur de l’électricité. L’article présente une révision des origines et la justification du modèle initial de la structure de la libéralisation du marché de l’électricité, aussi que la révision du processus de restructuration dans les premières années de la libéralisation du marché de l’énergie. L’article discute aussi les initiatives d’unbundling de l’UE. La partie la plus importante de l’article présente les premiers signaux indiquant la crise de la structure initiale. Finalement, l’article contient commentaires concernant la forme modifiée de la structure modèle qui émerge. Elle content l’intégration verticale de la génération et la provision et permet le niveau plus élevé de la concentration horizontale du marché de l’électricité concurrentiel.

Keywords

EN

electricity liberalization; model structure; unbundling; internal electricity market; EU restructuring developments

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 4(4)
• Pages: 201-223

Dates

published

2011-06-01

Contributors

author

Andrzej Szablewski

• Institute of Economic Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences

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