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REGIONAL SECURITY THEORY: THE EAST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE. A LOOK BACK AT THE CHALLENGES ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM

Abstract:
This paper will discuss different theories of regional security and how they have evolved over time along with the successes and challenges of regionalism efforts in East Africa. A case study will be used to contextualize the utility of a regional security analysis. Through an analysis of the theory of regional security, this paper will answer the following questions: does East Africa qualify as a security complex? Can the theory of Regional Security be useful in understanding the multitude and varied security issues? Is the preoccupation with regionalism a luxury for those regions that do not face threats to survival or a necessity for regions that do? Can regional-based efforts combined with a shared sense of regionalism improve security in East Africa?

Keywords:
Regional Security, East Africa, Regionalism, Security Organisations

Regional Security – evolution of theory

Different forms of collective security have existed throughout history; it is after all the basis of communities, settlements and social groupings. It was the Enlightenment thinker Rousseau who articulated the political dilemma of collective security through his stag hunt parable: If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithfully at his post; but if a hare happened to pass within the reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple and, having caught his own

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prey, he would have cared very little about having caused his companions to lose theirs[2].

Traditional Realists were quick to utilize this dilemma as proof that international cooperation was implausible and unlikely to be taken seriously when formulating security policy. A conclusion that was rarely disproven until the European World Wars in which collective security in the form of coalition warfare was ultimately successful in defeating a common enemy. The Cold War intensified regional groupings initially by recognizing existing organisations that promoted unity such as the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations. Later 'spheres of influence' based on ideological camps dispersed around the world gained precedence. The definition of regionalism would further expand over time to include states united by shared experiences, in the case of the Non Aligned Movement, a shared condition of colonialism and marginalisation. For states in the Global South, Regionalism theory offered a means to participate in international security dialogue through what Buzan has called a "diffusion of power in the contemporary system" which in turn raises "the importance of the actors at the bottom of the power hierarchy for the functioning of the system as a whole"[3].

'New Regionalism' in the post-post-Cold War era, was largely shaped by economic, identity, cultural and environmental factors as increasing marginalization resulted from an accelerated globalisation process, becoming a greater threat than international security for many states. This phenomenon coincided with a global Neo-Liberal democratization process, the "New World Order," which also helped to facilitate cross border cooperation, as integration was seen as a tool to prevent conflict and to promote dialogue through increased civil society participation.

Kelly makes a case for using a regional level of analysis in IR as most states worry about their neighbours as opposed to other international actors. This, paired with a general loss of autonomy, the global rejection of imperialism and colonialism, the high costs of foreign interventions, and the fact that systemic IR is "too abstract and distant" for practical use[4]. Increased openness of systems, weak governance structures along with proximity make regional analysis more appropriate than traditional theories because: 1. Regions are structurally open to intervention from above, 2. Threats are unevenly geographically distributed, 3. Regional organisations facilitate joint repression in weak states rather than integration[5].

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[2] J. J. Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,* [in:] *Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy*, S. M. Cahn, Oxford 2002, pp. 517-532.
[3] B. Buzan, *People, States & Fear,* Sussex 1983, p. 113.
[4] R. E. Kelly, *Security Theory in the New Regionalism*, "International Studies Review 9", No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 197-229.
[5] *Ibidem.*

Buzan's theory of Regional Security Complexes (RSC), suggests that a region chooses the actors, the actors do not choose the region[6]. The RSC is defined by the dominant role that local issues and relations play in defining national security priorities and international disputes.

While the discourse on Regionalism has been traditionally Euro-Centric, the language of the theory also comes from alternative perspectives. The starting point for many African theorists such as Salih, Deng and Sesay is recognition that internal security is primary and interstate cooperation is secondary, success and failures of security complexes are thus judged on this understanding. Whereas, the Western theoretical approach led by Buzan, Fawcett and Hurrel, presumes the supremacy of Westphalian political organisation as a starting point for mutual understanding between states. The importance of recognizing this distinction regards stability and applicability. In the "New Regionalism" era no Western nation has been fundamentally undermined by internal threats, therefore the assumptions of the scope of the theory are limited to Western experience.

Unlike other International Relations theories like Realism and Liberalism which are characterised by well defined and widely accepted parameters, Regionalism is subjective and open to a wide range of interpretations. Shaw has coined the phrase 'regionalisms' in response to this subjectivity: *"[R]ecognition of the trilateral character of all social relations, especially since the end of the Cold War and the concomitant hegemony of neoliberal values, is an essential attribute (and advantage) of new regionalisms. 'States' here include official governmental organisations, from local to global (e.g. IFI and UN systems); economies include informal (and illegal?) sectors, as well as the more familiar world of MNCs; and societies incorporate not only indigenous and international NGOs, but also charities, cooperatives, grassroots groups, medias, new social movements, professional associations, religious organisations and sports clubs"*[7].

Given the subjectivity of the theory, the parameters for analysis are fairly flexible. Unlike Buzan and Waever's updated security complex, Fawcett has defined a region as sharing identifiable traits, "commonality, interaction and hence the possibility of cooperation"[8]. Much like Shaw, she has identified the plurality of regionalism as "a policy or project whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region"[9]. All actors involved in the construction of regionalism would aim at "promoting common goals in one or more issue areas," either through 'soft' regionalism (raising

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[6] B. Buzan, *op. cit.*

[7] T. M. Shaw, *New regionalisms in Africa in the new millennium: Comparative perspectives on renaissance, realisms and/or regressions*, "New Political Economy 5", No. 3 (Nov 2000), pp. 399-416.

[8] L. Fawcett, *Regionalism in Historical Perspective*, [in:] *Regionalism in World Politics*, eds. L. Fawcett, A. Hurrell, Oxford 1995, p. 24.

[9] *Ibidem.*

awareness) or through 'hard regionalism' (formalized arrangements*)*[10]. Whereas Regionalisation is about processes "which do not proceed from transfers of sovereignty nor result from the dynamism of multinational or transnational corporations"[11]. These processes have also been described as 'trans-state interactions," common in East Africa as they rely primarily on social, ethnic or religious bonds "that challenge state sovereignty through their capacity to avoid, penetrate or permeate state structures"[12]. In security terms, regionalisation is a process of redistribution of power. The following diagram illustrates Fawcett's analysis of regional security, the diagram uses Buzan's terms of a state comprising of identity, institutions and population in this example as applied to a region which is subject to the influence of constructed Regionalisms and organic Regionalization.

Diag. 1. Regional security

Source: own work.

[10] *Ibidem.*
[11] D. B a c h, *Global Politics of Regionalism in Africa*, [in:] *Global politics of regionalism: theory and practice*, eds M. F a r r e l l et al., London 2005, p. 173.
[12] *Ibidem,* p. 174.

Africa and East Africa

This section will provide the context for analysing the applicability of regional security analysis in East Africa through a discussion of why it constitutes a region. Beyond Pan-Africanism, which appeared in its African form during the independence struggles of the 1960s, the ambiguity of Africa as a region, or an "imagined community"[13] is the starting point for an analysis of what constitutes East Africa. The idea that Africa is a region is rejected given the commonly accepted definitions of what constitutes a region, namely a common history, culture and conflict paradigm with direct interaction between members (i.e. Somalia and Sierra Leone have never had any level of interaction outside of the artificially constructed African Union)[14]. Africa is a continent but not a region, while its members do share some commonalities, as a regional security complex, the states are not interdependent and therefore do not constitute a region according to Buzan and Waever, Shaw, US policy makers and African regional organisations.

East Africa

References to regionalism in the context of East Africa can be found in Buzan and Waever, Iyob, Salih and Francis. Because of a shared history, identity, sometimes language and religion but above all security/insecurity interdependence, many East African countries including Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Eritrea have much closer ties with the Middle Eastern security complex than with that of Western Africa or Southern Africa.

Historically, the nations of East Africa were not created at independence; this 'region' of the world is home to some of the oldest civilizations on earth. Longstanding political structures, rivalries, cultural and regional interactions have existed dating to the ancient kingdoms of Nubia, Axum, Kush and Buganda. In addition to historical identity, demographic distribution, cultural identity, informal trade networks have always fostered a sense of regional identity rather than nationalism. Most states worry about their neighbours, this couldn't be truer than it is in the East African region. These states have much more in common than mere proximity and their differences have been deep enough to lead them past the brink of war on numerous occasions; postcolonial era conflicts over the status of Eritrea in 1952, Somali nationalism over British border commission with Ethiopia in 1954, civil war in South Sudan in 1955. All of these conflicts created refugee pressure in the region and the formation of rebel groups supported by host countries and other parties external to the

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[13] *Ibidem,* p. 174.
[14] B. Buzan, O. Waever, *Regions and powers: the structure of international security,* Cambridge 2003.

region. The 1960s and 70s were defined by tyranny and rebellion, with various rebel groups being supported by various heads of state in a complicated web of diplomatic deceit and political backstabbing in an attempt to cling to power. The 1980s saw the rise to power of enlightened rebels, often called "the new breed of African leaders." Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, Rwanda's Paul Kagame, Eritrea's Isaias Afworki and Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi all underwent military training in Mozambique and Tanzania, attended the University of Dar es Salaam and took over their respective countries via a popularly supported coup d'état. The Neo-Liberal West celebrated the "New Breed" for the first two decades and was quick to turn a blind eye to actions they would have otherwise found disagreeable during this new era of cooperation in a region that was now being run by an amicable group of friends and colleagues. The honeymoon period ended with the cross border interference and plundering of neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, political violence in Ethiopia, plummeting development indicators in Eritrea, an unending civil war in Uganda and retaliatory marginalization and violence in Rwanda. Renewed border tensions, an escalation in rebellion and insecurity were the result of each regime in the area trying to undermine the stability of the other.

The literature suggests that Africa has been forced to look inward after being abandoned in the post Cold War policy shift. Such a shift in identity is a regionalism imposed on weak states through the construction of organisations. However, the literature also points to the more organic formation of trans-state regionalism, a process that undermines illegitimate regimes and reinforces ancient bonds between communities: What Hurrel has termed "prescription vs. description"[15]. Unlike other actors in the Cold War, the end of the era did not result in a significant shift of threats. East Africa in the Post Cold War Era and now in the Post 9/11 world has been faced with the continuity of the same old conflicts with the same root causes. The expansion of what constitutes a security threat has also determined the boundaries of the East African region: "The new regionalisms pose challenges to a range of more applied perspectives with profound policy implications. They do so, first, for development studies and policies, which are no longer concerned just with sustainable development or structural adjustments and liberalisations but also increasingly with more flexible varieties of regionalisms, along with the causes and consequences of increasingly protracted conflicts; hence the growing focus on, say, human development and security"[16].

This expansion to include human security issues in the regional security agenda will be further discussed in the analysis section.

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[15] A. Hurrel, *The Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory*, [in:] *Global politics of regionalism: theory and practice*, eds M. Farrell et al., London 2005, pp. 38-54.
[16] T. M. Shaw, *op. cit.*

Regionalism in East Africa

East Africa is a corner of the world that is continually defined externally by its regional institutions, international stakeholders, NGOs and Western foreign policies for security and strategic self interest[17]. Thus, the parameters and geography of which countries are included in the region are rarely consistent nor is the name; the (greater) Horn of Africa, Greater East Africa, the Great Lakes region, North East Africa. The literature on regional hegemony is also varied, Francis has pointed to Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia because of their historical imperialism in the region, Deng and Zartman to Ethiopia, de Waal to Kenya. Moving beyond the imagined African community, the East African region is a more natural, rational grouping, with populations across borders in all of the above mentioned states, shared history and common threats. This section will examine the key regional security organisations, their successes and challenges.

Security Organisations

There is a monumental task in creating security organisations in a region described as "a textbook illustration of the classical security dilemma, in which one party's efforts to achieve security merely increases insecurity – and hence countervailing security efforts-of its neighbours"[18]. The desire to do so was in part motivated by a New Regionalism approach formulated by former UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjöld, in which preventative diplomacy should "keep localized international disputes from provoking larger confrontations between the superpowers"[19]. However, practice has proven otherwise with various foreign interventions, observer mission and fact finding missions in the region from Somalia, to Rwanda to Uganda to Sudan, the strategic self interests of individual states in the region have often crossed into the international overlay. This region is often defined by the membership within its security organisations which include the East African Commission (EAC), the Inter Government Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), These organisations have been described as "practical expression to the concept of 'try Africa first'"[20] a shift away from international interventionism

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[17] D. J. Francis, *Uniting Africa: building regional peace and security systems,* Aldershot 2006.

[18] F. M. Deng, W. I. Zartman, *A Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement,* Washington 2002, p. 26.

[19] D. J. Francis, *op. cit.,* p. 224.

[20] A. Sesay, *Regional and Sub-Regional Conflict Management Efforts*, [in:] *Africa in the post-Cold War international system*, eds. S. Akinrinade and A. Sesay, Herndon 1997, p. 47.

led by the United Nations (UN) and the AU. The failed attempts of the 'international community' to prevent or end conflict in Rwanda and Somalia along with a lack of resource and personnel commitments and from Neo-Liberal states led the international security organisations to look to Africa for local expertise and commitments that might be more successful. Again, this encouragement to further development regional security recommendations was applied through international regionalism and internal regionalisation.

The EAC was originally founded in 1967 by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in an attempt to ward off super-power intrusion, in this way it is a responsive organisation, a reaction against what is seen as a external threat to sovereignty rather than an organic process of regionalisation. Described by Deng and Zartman as one of the "earliest and most ambitious experiments in regional cooperation in Africa,"[21] the early collapse of the EAC in 1977 was seen as symptomatic of deep-rooted mistrust in the region. In 2000 the EAC, was resurrected with 2 new members, Rwanda and Burundi added in 2007, along with a new mandate recognizing the importance of linking security and development in its "Memorandum on Foreign Policy Co-ordination." The coordination of Foreign Policies, which has been signed by Foreign Ministers from the original three countries, later expanded to the two newest members involves "taking a common stand at international fora in assisting each other in countries where they do not have Missions. This means that any of the three member states can appoint one Mission to represent their interests abroad. Nationals from the three countries will also be able to have visa applications processed in any of the Missions representing the region"[22]. This has coincided with justice initiatives including expedited extradition of wanted or suspected criminals and addressing the flow of small arms and human trafficking within the region. The EAC thus plays a central role in promoting practical cooperation with the common goal of sustainable development through improved security in the region. Unlike the AU and IGAD, the EAC is primarily an internally focused regional stability organisation, focused on shared responsibility among the five member states to achieve its 15 very specifically regional goals with a very modest international presence.

Comprising of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda, IGADD first formed in 1986 as the International Authority on Drought and Development but "failed to monitor any substantive progress towards its stated mandate of promoting food security and environmental protection"[23]. This was largely a result of ongoing tensions between states in the Horn, although an early warning system was set up, with a lack of resources and member participation (i.e. the well documented Sudanese and Ethiopian governments forcibly moving populations to manipulate

[21] F. M. Deng, W. I. Zartman, *op. cit.,* p. 26.
[22] *Profile: East African Community,* <Iss.org>, July 2006, (13.04.2009).
[23] D. Bach, *op. cit.,* p. 179.

humanitarian aid) prevention and response could not be carried out. In 1996 along with dropping drought form its acronym, IGAD expanded its mandate to include 4 areas of focus: Food security and environmental protection; infrastructural development; regional conflict prevention, management and resolution; and humanitarian affairs. It is now regularly used as a regional forum/interface for AU, European Union, UN and US initiatives[24]. Geographically, the boundaries of constructed East African states cut across many ecosystems, livelihood systems (i.e. seasonal grazing routes and ancestral tribal lands); therefore the rationale behind the creation of IGAD, regionally speaking, is sound. East Africa is home to the largest concentration of pastoralists in the world with an estimated 160 million people struggling to gain access to quickly diminishing arable land in a region of which 70% is either arid or semi-arid. In the past, 80% of conflict in the region has been a result of well armed pastoralists fighting over scarce resources[25], mitigating these conflicts had been the traditional role of IGAD's Conflict Early Warning mechanism (CEWARN). As such, IGAD has no mandate "to force member states to take appropriate action to prevent a potential humanitarian emergency or outbreak of violent conflict"[26]. The creation of the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), as part of the AU African Standby Force Protocol is a mechanism to intervene in state level security scenarios as outlined by the AU and is thus less an East African security mechanism. According to IGAD's website, it is merely a coordinating body to the brigade. Beyond standardization of training and doctrine among the troop contributing countries, the mandate of EASBRIG remains ambiguous.

Excluded from the East African Bloc, Egypt has historically had a negatively influential presence in the security of the region. From ancient contacts with the Nubians and slave trading in South Sudan, many wars with the Christian kingdoms of Ethiopia to overt/covert support of government and rebel groups in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda; Egypt has played a major role in shaping the insecurity of today. In no way is this exemplified better than the 1995 assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia which was later linked to the Sudanese government[27]. Egypt's motivating interest is control of the Nile headwaters, the Blue Nile in Ethiopia and the White Nile in Uganda, both of which originate outside Egypt's borders.

In another more recent example, through various attempts to reward the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) with scholarships and development projects, the Egyptian government has a vested interest in seeing the separation of the South from the Khartoum administration with plans to drain the Sudd marsh, where an estimated 25% of the White Nile evaporates, and increase

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[24] *Ibidem.*
[25] D. J. F r a n c i s, *op. cit.*
[26] *Ibidem,* p. 224.
[27] F. M. D e n g, W. I. Z a r t m a n, *op. cit.*

supply to Egypt in exchange for its assistance[28]. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), started in 1998 includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, D.R. Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and Kenya has been an attempt to "achieve sustainable economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources"[29]. In terms of security, inroads have been made in renegotiating the terms of the original 1929 Nile Water Agreement drafted by the British, thus mitigating tensions over perceptions of inequitable accessibility.

Successes for Regional Security

Given the failure of the New World Order of international Neo Liberalism to produce security and stability, regional attempts have seen some success in Eastern Africa. Previously taboo subjects including human security issues such as state sponsored violence are now being addressed as preconditions to attaining sustainable development targets[30]. Sincere initiatives to incorporate representatives from civil society, academia, nongovernmental organisations and corporations through track 2 and 3 diplomacy have proven successful in negotiating non-proliferation treaties, cessation of hostilities and memorandums of understanding on human security issues.

The Nairobi Declaration, signed in 2000 by the 10 countries in the region has been heralded as a success in regionalism. The Nairobi Declaration envisages a broad partnership between governments, multi-lateral agencies and representatives of civil society groups to stop the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) throughout the region. The Declaration aims to provide a "comprehensive and multi-faceted strategy" including "improvement of national laws and regulations governing the manufacture, trade, acquisition, possession and use of arms; weapons collection and destruction programmes; capacity building for law enforcement officers, such as the police, border control officers and customs officials." The Declaration also outlines provisions for "monitoring of arms transfers through the establishment of national databases and communication systems. Information exchange between regional law enforcement officers and public awareness programmes"[31]. Although the Declaration is neither comprehensive nor particularly well coordinated as of 2003, it is seen as a step in the right direction in terms of inclusion of various actors in the regional security dialogue.

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[28] This is a very brief summary of various events and initiatives over months working as an editor for the *Khartoum Monitor* newspaper.

[29] *Nile Basin Initiative,* <www.nilebasin.org> (30.01.2018).

[30] D. Bach, *op. cit.*

[31] T. Thusi, *Assesing Small Arms Control Initiatives*, "African Security Review 12", No. 2 (2003), p. 17-26.

One of the biggest successes in East African regional security has been IGAD's 'frontline states' strategy, delegating responsibility for mediation to the states that have the greatest vested interest in a particular conflict and its resolution. An example of IGAD's mediation efforts is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. After many years Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea played a big role in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the Khartoum Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in 2005[32]. The CPA, which included provisions for political power sharing, a Joint Integrated Defence Force, universal and minority rights for all Sudanese and Demobilization, Disarmament, and Rehabilitation projects was a hard fought achievement for regional reconciliation and cooperation efforts.

Mbabazi, McLean and Shaw stress the importance of recognizing the role of Track 2 and 3 diplomacy, which they define as diplomacy involving a range of actors including NGOs, civil society, think tanks and Universities engaging in field based peace building initiatives. This has been the major success of regional security in the case of East Africa, the ability to meaningfully include increasing numbers of non state actors, stakeholders and civilians in the security dialogue, regionally, at the AU and internationally. This is a success not replicated at the international level or in Africa more broadly.

Challenges for Regional Security

The challenges to maintaining and improving regional security in East Africa primarily include sovereignty issues around intrastate conflict, resource deficiencies, and historical mistrust among member states. Inter-state conflict, although an anomaly on the continent in general, when it has occurred it has been in East Africa (Tanzania and Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia and Ethiopia and Somalia). The greater issue for all states has been the suppression of internal conflict and direct challenges to regime legitimacy. Briefly, these include Somalia separatists in Puntland & Somalialand; Ethiopian rebellions in Ogaden & Afar; the Uganda civil war in Acholiland; Sudanese disenfranchisement in the South, Darfur and the East; Djibouti's Afar population seeking greater central government control; Eritrean Islamic fundamentalist movements; the implosion of D.R. Congo; Tanzania's political struggle and appeasement with Zanzibari separatists; Kenya's 'ethnically' charged political climate, and the battle between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi. These security threats have been exacerbated by the uncontrolled flow of arms into and around the region and as Hiroko concludes, "people are indiscriminately struggling for natural resources without considering the

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[32] D. J. Francis, *op. cit.*

consequences"[33]. To dismiss environmental insecurity as a secondary security concern is dangerous as it is often the flashpoint for conflict and a real threat to national and regional stability; it has created a climate of permanent emergency.

The regional security organisations, like the states themselves, are resource deficient so that even the traditional threats that can be agreed on are still difficult to mitigate. Shaw has cited the 1977 collapse of the EAC as a lesson to be learned regarding the imposition of regionalism citing that it was "a state-centric and highly formalized enterprise that could not survive the serious political quarrels among its member countries…the folly of rely on state based institutions"[34]. Iyob has pointed to sociological factors, the "social fabric of the societies of the Horn…remains patterned by the norms, mythologies and institutions that have justified exclusion based on ethnicity, religion, and regionalism." The clash between older and newer (North and South) states within the region "as they interact in a modern international state system premised on the legal equality of all its members"[35], has been one of the root causes of the human security problem.

Analysis

This section will examine the utility of regional security theory in the East African context. In terms of theoretical preconditions, new security threats, the process of region status and the future of regional security.

Peace as a precondition for Regional Security

On one side of the debate or as de Waal has termed it, the objective side, conflict "can only be resolved in a regionally orientated and comprehensive manner rather than a country-centred approach"[36]. Regime survival rather than long term stability is the goal of most heads of state in the region. De Waal has pointed out the flaw in the theory of objective security communities: that peace is the starting point. De Waal argues: "before Africa can begin to develop inter-state pluralistic security communities, its states need to consolidate themselves as internal 'amalgamated' security communities themselves"[37]. Due to the

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[33] A. Hiroko, *Forced Displacementand the Prevention of Further Conflicts: lessons form the African Great Lakes Region and Kosovo*, [in:] *Containing conflict: cases in preventive diplomacy*, ed. S. Hideo, Tokyo 2003, p. 140.

[34] T. M. Shaw, *New Regionalism in Africa*, [in:] *New Regionalism in Africa*, eds. J. A. Grant and F. Söderbaum, Burlington 2003.

[35] R. Iyob, *The Foriegn Policies of the Horn: the clash between the old and the new*, [in:] *African foreign policies: power and process*, eds. G. M. Khadiagala and T. Lyons, Boulder 2001, p. 123.

[36] A. Hiroko, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[37] A. de Waal, *Demilitarizing the Mind: African agendas for peace and security,* Asmara 2002, p. 25.

historical absence of trust, de Waal views this objective conditionality based on conditions that are constructed (regionalism) through future settlements based on the aim of securing a "regional order for peace"[38]. Alternately, subjective conditions are pre-existing, by identifying, defining and pursuing security interests based on interests and core values, threats faced, vulnerabilities and capabilities. However, military regimes generally do not have long term aims, and it is necessary to "stimulate long-term security thinking in a manner that is realistic, practical and rooted in African realties. This means clear thinking about power"[39].

Because of the permanent state of emergency outlined earlier, people in the region have therefore been forced to choose between "total collapse through civil wars or political survival with an uncertain future. Both choices have been detrimental to human security and have at times augmented insecurity"[40]. The assumption with this conclusion is two fold; that individuals in East Africa have a role in the security policy decsion making process at a national level and that they wilfully choose civil war or poor governance structures, unaffected by the external forces of regionalisms. A starting point would be defining long term national security goals, beyond regime survival, which needs to be representative of all members of society. This is where track 2 and track 3 diplomacy are crucial in building security capabilities to expand the dialogue of security down to the individual level rather than focusing on regime survival.

National Security vs. Human Security

The state is a threat to individual security both directly (violence) and indirectly (orchestrated famine, corruption, inaction). There is a common saying among Sudanese, that everyone leads two lives, a public and a private, this is true of national versus regional security as well. Politicians and diplomats participate in summits and organisations of collective security speaking the language of cooperation, human rights and equality. However, as national leaders, they are inclined toward policies of self interest and national preservation which are carried out in direct opposition to commitments that were made in public. IGAD is a response to the Western strategic theorist analysis of Africa, that conflict in the region is irresolvable. The legitimacy granted to IGAD by those same analysts is a testament to its success in helping to create an environment that fosters development based on human security. For example, pressing human security issues such as refugees, there is "no African mechanism that permits individual refugees to bring claims against host state

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[38] *Ibidem.*
[39] *Ibidem,* p. 35.
[40] M. A. M. Salih, *The Horn of Africa: Security in the New World Order*, [in:] *Globalization, Human Security, and the African experience*, eds. C. Thomas and P. Wilken, Boulder 1999.

governments or combatants for violating their human rights. Until such structures are instituted, the international community would be well-advised to question the authenticity of African governments' and regional actors' attempts to tackle problems associated with the plight of displaced persons"[41]. For IGAD, the EAC and The NBI to be legitimized by civil society in terms of building human security long term insecurity issues, like refugees, must be addressed effectively.

In terms of the future of Human Security, Kenya, the nation traditionally looked on internally and externally as corrupt but stable, slid into devastating post-election violence last year despite being the headquarters of IGAD and the EAC and despite its role as mediator in regional conflicts. What does this say about the future of regional security? No East African state is immune from insecurity, conflict or in fact collapse and all states are vulnerable to the insecurities of their neighbours making regional security of the utmost importance. Martin Kimani, a Kenyan journalist with the East African, a leading regional newspaper, has expressed a sense of failure to prevent insecurity through application of theory and rational analysis in the region citing the internal conflict that individual East Africans harbour as a reflection of the internal struggles the region faces concerning identity, history, proximity, power, culture and how ordinary civilians are turned into "killing machines." The self assurance that 'Kenyans are not like Rwandans,' until Kenya reaches a tipping point after elections in 2008: "[S]imilar acts of violence were committed in Kenya and the explanations that had seemed to work so well in Rwanda now seemed inadequate when used in my own country… In the weeks that Kenya appeared to teeter on the edge of all-out war, most people felt a need to keep tabs on the rising body count, on the numbers of attacks recorded, of the towns and villages thousands were fleeing from…Abdalla Bujra, identified by a New York Times reporter as a "retired Kenyan professor who runs a democracy-building organisation," was quoted in that newspaper as saying, "We've had tribal fighting before, but never like this …it reminds me of Rwanda"… Ultimately coming to a reckoning of what has happened to us and what we are, and indeed whether we can live together peacefully, will require more than erecting commissions named Truth, Justice or Reconciliation"[42].

East Africa is a constructed region as a result of regionalisms based on external perceptions (Africa as a continuous bloodbath), systems (Neoliberal policies, colonialism) and policies (War on Terror, Humanitarian Interventions) and victimization (a permanent state of emergency), East African individuals, groups and states are also faced with internal regionalization of refugee flows, parallel economies, violence and culture. East Africa is currently being

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[41] J. M a x t e d, A. Z e g e y e, *Human Stability and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, "African Security Review 11", No. 1 (2002), pp. 95-109.
[42] M. K i m a n i, *The banality of evil revisited: Killing our fellow Kenyans*, "The East African Magazine*"*, (August 2008), p. 1-6.

constructed as a region from the outside: a place where violence, poverty, ethnic tensions, etc is part of the "culture" of Africa. The identity that East Africa has is then one that is defined from outside at the same time as it is being transformed from within through participatory process and assertions of traditional economies, lineage and identity.

Conclusion

The theories of Regional Security are very useful to Africa, in that "if appropriately nuanced or informed, can throw light on the diversities of political economy and culture on the continent which other established approaches fail to discern"[43]. As a theoretical framework for understanding internal and external causality, outcomes and future threats, regionalisms provide matrix for sorting through the complex social, political, historical, economic and environmental causes of conflict. By examining cooperative structures, Regional Security provides a more positive examination of relationships between and within nations other than conflict or poverty centered analysis. Regionalisms and regionalization may not lead to a more secure East Africa, but do frame a dialogue around the interconnectedness and interdependence of states, the relationships between state, non-state and individual actors and provides a opportunity for increased inclusivity of civil society in the regional security dialogue. Greater understanding of the construction of regionalisms and the process of regionalisation will contribute to future planning within East Africa's regional security organisations and assist with minimising the challenges to effectively maximizing security in the region.

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