Payment Card Systems as an Example of Two-sided Markets – a Challenge for Antitrust Authorities

• Authors: Katarzyna Tosza
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This article aims to present the concept of two-sided markets on the example of payment card systems, which have attracted the attention of regulatory and antitrust authorities in recent years. First, the paper offers a few insights into the basic economic theory behind two-sided markets. Second, it presents a brief description of payment card systems and their features. The following analysis focuses on arguments that speak in favour of a regulatory or antitrust intervention into payment card systems. Finally, some of the potential problems that antitrust authorities must face when assessing two-sided markets are presented on the basis of an assessment of the decisional practice of the UOKiK President and the European Commission.

Keywords

EN

two-sided markets; antitrust v. regulation; interchange fees; payment card systems

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 2(2)
• Pages: 125-140

Dates

published

2009-12-01

Contributors

author

Katarzyna Tosza

• Chair of European Law of the Faculty of Law, Jagiellonian University in Kraków

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