Death: The Loss of Life-Constitutive Integration

• Authors: Nguyen Doyen
• Languages of publication: PL EN

Abstracts

EN

This discussion note aims to address the two points which Lizza raises regarding my critique of his paper “Defining Death: Beyond Biology,” namely that I mistakenly attribute a Lockean view to his ‘higher brain death’ position and that, with respect to the ‘brain death’ controversy, both the notions of the organism as a whole and somatic integration are unclear and vague. First, it is known from the writings of constitutionalist scholars that the constitution view of human persons, a theory which Lizza also holds, has its roots in John Locke’s thought. Second, contrary to Lizza’s claims, the notions of the organism as a whole and somatic integration are both more than adequately described in the biomedical and biophilosophical literature.

Keywords

EN

constitution theory; Lockean view; organism as a whole; life-constitutive integration; ‘higher brain death’

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 60
• Pages: 72-78

Dates

published

2019-06

Contributors

author

Nguyen Doyen

• Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas (Angelicum)

References

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• Language

Identifiers

DOI

10.13153/diam.1244

ISSN

ISSN 1733-5566